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 In 2013, the lobbying group Tamms Year Ten was successful in closing the Tamms 
Correctional Center, a prison in which men lived in near-total and near-constant isolation. The 
group’s founder, Laurie Jo Reynolds, is an artist who describes her lobbying work as “legislative 
art,” an homage to the governmental interventions of activist Brazilian playwright Augusto Boal. 
Working backward from legislative art to legislative aesthetics,  I postulate the potentially 
fruitful concepts of judicial aesthetics and executive aesthetics, borrowing the familiar American 
separation of powers as laid out by James Madison. I attempt to understand Reynolds’ work in a 
larger historical, aesthetic, and political framework by trying to describe the aestheticization of 
politics in America through the various mutations of racial concepts in the legal system, as well 
as in education, visual art, and literature. To do this I borrow ideas from the Continental political 
theory canon to shed light on how punishment is understood culturally in America in this 
moment of mass incarceration. In the end, I hope the essay yields a set of terms that allows artists 
and activists to have more meaningful conversations and debates, and through this dialogue to 









Your statutes are wonderful; therefore I obey them. 
The unfolding of your words gives light; it gives understanding to the simple. 
I open my mouth and pant, longing for your commands. 
Turn to me and have mercy on me, as you always do to those who love your name. 
Direct my footsteps according to your word; let no sin rule over me. 
Redeem me from human oppression, that I may obey your precepts. 
Make your face shine on your servant and teach me your decrees. 
Streams of tears flow from my eyes, for your law is not obeyed. 
   --Psalm 119:129-136 (New International Version) 
 
…For the beautiful is nothing 
but the onset of the terrifying, an onset we but barely endure; 
and it amazes us so, since with equanimity it disdains 
to destroy us. Every angel terrifies. 
--Rainer Maria Rilke, The Duino Elegies (1923/1993, p. 3) 
 
The visitor to the installation space becomes an expatriate, who has to submit himself to a 
foreign law, to a law that is given to him by the artist. Here the artist acts as a legislator, as a 
sovereign of the installation space--even, and maybe especially so, if the law that is given by the 
artist to a community of visitors is a democratic one.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction-- Tragedy and farce 
 
 
1.1  Rhetoric, art, and law 
 
 The state of Illinois had four penal facilities in 1899: two penitentiaries and two 
reformatories (Barton, 1899, pp. 87-88). While the overall state population has not quite tripled 
since that time, in March 2018 the Illinois Department of Corrections website listed 36 state 
prisons. But while many have opened, a few have shut down. In January 2013, the Tamms 
Correctional Center in southwest Illinois closed its doors. Opened in 1998 by Governor James 
Edgar, the facility was a “supermax” prison, in which people were kept in hermetic isolation in 
concrete bunker-like cells, deprived of human contact or much sensory input of any kind: 23 
hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. In Tamms, “(t)here is no dining hall; there is no 
chapel; there is no library; there are no classrooms; there is no yard” (Casella and Ridgeway 
2013). Tamms was in part a repository for “jailhouse lawyers,” or incarcerated amateur legal 
experts, as well as alleged high-ranking gang members and the severely mentally ill. Inmates 
frequently languished there for years—some for the full 15 years of its operation. This pattern 
has been repeated at supermax prisons throughout the country (Reiter 2016). 
Some of the more mild psychiatric symptoms affecting prisoners in long-term solitary 
confinement include “(p)roblems with concentration; sleep disturbances; hallucinations; paranoid 
thinking; anxiety; hostility and rage; impulsive behaviour; hypersensitivity to light and sound, 
not unlike the photophobia and phonophobia of a migraine; headaches; and rapid heartbeat” (as 
cited in Burki, 2017). Extreme stress, self-harm, and mental breakdown has been documented for 
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decades in many contexts of punitive isolation (Arrigo and Bullock, 2008; Arrigo and Bersot, 
2015). Resisting the conditions that engender these afflictions, men at Tamms held a hunger 
strike in the year 2000, and in that same year a statement condemning American supermax 
prisons was issued by the United Nations Committee Against Torture. This was elaborated upon 
by the Roderick MacArthur Justice Center (2000), a Chicago-based public-interest law firm that 
helped to bring attention to the conditions in the facility. But the primary advocacy group 
responsible for the prison’s eventual shutdown was an art project. 
 This group, Tamms Year Ten (TY10), began its work in 2008, ten years after the 500-bed 
“C-MAX” prison opened at Tamms. The Tamms supermax had been intended to hold violent or 
disruptive inmates for brief periods, but the majority of those held at Tamms had been there over 
a year, and in 2008, 88 men had been there since it opened (MacArthur Justice Center, 2008). At 
the same time, the prison was never much more than half full, and was a massive financial drain 
on the state of Illinois. TY10 turned a mutual support system formed by family and friends of 
those incarcerated at Tamms, working with artists and prison reform and abolition advocates, 
into a sustained and strategic lobbying campaign that resulted in a highly visible victory for the 
human rights of incarcerated people worldwide. At the same time, the effort was led by an artist 
who insisted upon characterizing the project as a piece of art. In what follows, I will describe the 
remarkable lobbying work that the group did, but I especially want to talk about the implications 
of this equally remarkable claim. So I will largely be discussing the larger context that makes 
this project meaningful. 
TY10 has many precedents, but is a unique case. As a collective art project, its obvious 
precedents are other forms of “social practice” or “socially-engaged art” that have taken and are 
taking place largely outside of designated art spaces such as galleries and museums. While much 
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social practice work actually does exist in these conventional contexts, at least in part, many 
projects focus on public spaces, as did projects by Fluxus, Situationist, and Systems artists in the 
1960s, not to mention innumerable pieces emerging from the iterations of international 
conceptualism, all of which elaborated upon earlier transgressive gestures by avant-gardes and 
the cultural products of revolutionary movements around the world.  
TY10 can also can be related to forms of popular protest theater—particularly the work 
of Augusto Boal, a Brazilian director and playwright, founder of the Theatre of the Oppressed, 
who coined the term “legislative theater” when he was elected to the city council of Rio de 
Janeiro in 1991. Boal viewed politics as an interactive extension of theater; in his “forum 
theater” approach, the actors, whom he identified as “cultural animators,” created short vignettes 
to dramatize various forms of injustice and public concern, and then the audience would become 
involved in proposing and acting out ways to redefine, address, or solve the issues raised by the 
“cultural animators.” In the municipal legislature of Rio, Boal made memorable speeches and 
brought forward many policy proposals, some of which were enacted into law. ”The legislator 
should not be the person who makes the law,” asserts Boal (1998, p.10), “but the person through 
whom the law is made (by the citizens, of course!).” One noteworthy performance at the 
Assembly of Deputies, the body to which Boal was elected, was an event entitled “Be an MP for 
Three Minutes,” in which anyone who showed up could speak and propose legislation; he 
comments that “the session lasted five hours, instead of the usual one and a half!” (p. 16). Boal’s 
idea of the active spectator, or “spect-actor” (p. 9) is prefigured in an essay on political theater by 
Marxist theorist Louis Althusser (1965/1999), who states that “the play is really the production 
of a new spectator, an actor who starts where the performance ends, who only starts so as to 
complete it, but in life” (p. 151). 
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While there have been numerous purely theatrical electoral campaigns, there are some 
other examples of true aesthetically-conscious lawmaking. These include the Estridentistas, 
revolutionary artists and poets who held province-level positions in 1920s Mexico (Rashkin 
2009), and, more recently, two-term Bogotá, Colombia mayor Antanus Mockus, who replaced 
the corrupt traffic police with first a phalanx of mimes (Cruz and Forman, 2016, p. 373) and then 
people in zebra costumes (Henderson, 2017), as well as Mexican congressman Marco Antonio 
Rascón, known both for his grassroots activism and outlandish performances in public sessions 
(Camnitzer 2007, p. 308n). In 1975 Raivo Puusemp became mayor of Rosendale, a struggling 
New York small town and, pursuing an aesthetic agenda, set about to see the town dissolved in a 
matter he considered aesthetically significant. American artist Peter Svarzbien got elected in 
2016 to a position on the city council of El Paso, Texas, in order to pursue his artistic idea of a 
reviving a cross-border trolley service to and from Mexico (Creative Time, 2016).  
 While making links between the ethical and practical universals of law and the 
contemplative and fanciful aesthetic creations may seem far-fetched, the relationship in the West 
between law, drama, rhetoric, and literature can, according to Jody Enders (1992), be traced back 
to classical sources. Roman writers Quintilian and Cicero encouraged learning rhetorical skills 
from actors, while in guiding actors Lucian encouraged the study of orators (p. 25). Enders 
mentions that the classical rhetorical canon of actio, or delivery, was the basis of the term actor, 
which could denote dramatic actors, authors, and lawyers, as well as any authority figure, 
including members of the clergy. She goes on to posit legal elocution as fundamental to medieval 
theater. 
 Since the juridical ritual in particular gave rise just as readily to the most devotional of 
mystery plays as to the most blistering of satires, it provides a partial explanation for 
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many kinds of generic interplay that have been insufficiently explained by the traditional 
polarities of  “comic” versus “tragic,” “popular” versus “learned,” “secular” versus 
“Christian.” (p. 10) 
In this era, identical rhetorical techniques could be used in the training of lawyers, theologians, 
poets, and theatrical performers, and depictions of legal procedure in the theater was mirrored by 
the deployment of spectacle in the courtroom. “Paramount to the success of actors and advocates 
alike,” Enders says, “delivery lay at the crux of both rhetoric and drama and often rendered 
distinctions between the two discourses elusive” (p. 23).  
Closer to the modern era, Henry Turner (2006) writes about how this confluence of 
rhetoric and theatre produces the concept of literature through the visual element of space, and 
how the idea of a “plot”, with its connotations of spatiality, story, and conspiracy, entered 
simultaneously into English Renaissance drama. The artifice of the state and the artifice of the 
stage are explicitly compared by Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan (1668/1994), with his 
discussion of the term “person,” as derived from a dramatic “persona:” 
And from the stage (person) hath been translated to any representer of speech and action, 
as well as in tribunals, in theaters. So that a person, is the same that an actor is, both on 
the stage and in common conversation, and to personate, is to act or represent himself, or 
another, and he that acteth another is said to bear his person, or act his name (.) (p. 106) 
Perhaps through these relationships of drama and law, understandings of authority as a role, and 
of lawful and unlawful spatial sabotage, would appear throughout the development of modern 
political science. In this metaphor we can read an appreciation of governing as a form (maybe 
the ultimate form) of free creativity, devoted to the production of a harmonious social order, 
depicted as an object of beauty.  
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Augusto Boal’s political performance is cited by Tamms Year Ten founder Laurie Jo 
Reynolds in coining the term “legislative art” to define her practice. Based on the traditionally 
fluid ideas of art and acting compiled by Enders, Reynolds’ invocation of the “legislative” idea 
may allow for some free association. My above use of the words “precedents” and “case” in 
discussing the history of avant-garde political art could be seen as suggesting a legal analogy, 
along with an artistic genealogy. It would then be fair to point out that, if I am invoking the law, 
“precedent” and “case” evoke the judicial rather than the legislative sphere. But this could be 
seen as appropriate, since, like a lawyer or a judge, I am justifying the importance and describing 
the meaning of an example by putting it in a historical context. In the tradition of stare decisis 
jurisprudence, I am citing earlier conclusions in order to support a claim. More a lawmaker than 
a judge, though, Reynolds, like Boal, was a representative who worked to create legislation 
intended to function in the simultaneous registers of policy and art. But before I go any further I 
should try to address the first and most obvious question: why is closing a prison “art?” 
 But the difficulty of answering that question, other than by nominalist tautology—it’s art 
because an artist called it art—is what makes the discordant connotations of the analogies 
suggested by “legislative art” so important. The analogy could be traced to early modern Europe, 
in which the relative popularization of both politics and publishing led to texts that traced the 
development of an “art of government,” largely in response to the renown of Niccolò 
Machiavelli’s Prince, a succinct 16th-century overview of practical wisdom on the subject of 
political maneuvering, and other Machiavellian works on politics and warfare. Michel Foucault 
(2004) summarized this new discourse under the heading of  “governmentality,” describing a 
uniquely modern approach of soliciting the consent of the governed, versus a more traditional 
notion of absolute sovereignty. An iconic text theorizing this self-constraint on the part of the 
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powerful is Montesquieu’s 1748 treatise The Spirit of Laws, which emerges from but only 
partially joins in the earlier chorus of Machiavelli critiques (Hendrickson, 2013), adding in a 
critique of despotism that focuses on cruel punishments. But authority, even if reframed in terms 
of jurisdiction or remit, is not eliminated in a liberal society. Rather, the capacity to coerce is 
distributed in a new way, with Montesquieu’s division and constraint of administrative powers at 
upper levels of republican government (constrained particularly in regard to the power to punish) 
echoed further down the chain of authority by a profusion of vassals claiming unique zones of 
domination. The role of the artist has come to embody this micro-sovereignty, through its unique 
form of self-anointed authority. 
The idea of lordly dominion is certainly an old one in mainstream Western legal and 
philosophical discourse, while that of universal individual autonomy is relatively new. Mediating 
between the two in contemporary liberal states is a structure of power largely justified through 
the “rule of law,” reinforced at times actively by force, and at other times passively through 
culture. But there are points in this network of explicit and implicit enforcement where the rule 
of law is inflected in odd ways. These points can be specific social roles that offer a peculiarly 
modern authority, in which socially sanctioned power is curtailed in a formal sense, while 
ambiguously open in a practical sense. In describing the relation of power and beauty, G.W. F. 
Hegel (1835/1975) refers to the authority structures among the heroes in the Iliad or Arthur’s 
Round Table as a form of distributed autonomy.  
 Like Agamemnon, Charlemagne was surrounded by free heroic characters, and therefore 
he was equally powerless to hold them together, because he had continually to draw his 
vassals into council, and he is forced to be a spectator while they follow their passions all 
the same (.) (p. 186). 
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If we were to try to complicate the simple options of central absolute sovereignty versus 
flattened social-democratic granularity, we could think of a powerful suzerain who delegates 
authority to a just such a tributary vassal, who is free to exercise authority over a small 
population.  
In the modern era this can be seen when the idea of “police powers” entered the U.S. 
Constitution in order to formalize an idea expressed in the Federalist Papers by James Madison 
(1787/1999), who says that the Federal government’s jurisdiction “extends to certain enumerated 
objects only, and leaves to the several States a residual and inviolable sovereignty over all other 
objects” (p. 213)—the idea that would become the Constitution’s Tenth Amendment. An 
analogous type of legal compromise, based on original sovereignty, was attempted by the 
formally educated indigenous Creek leader Alexander McGillivray. He negotiated treaties with 
the British and the Spanish governments before the American Revolution, but his 1790 Treaty of 
New York was only observed by American state and Federal authorities for a few years (Stock, 
2008). In general, the ambiguity of sovereignty in the colonial era between various Indian 
peoples and competing European nations led to ambiguity of ownership, an ambiguity which 
many Indians and Europeans adeptly exploited (Richter, 2015). In none of these cases could 
various jurisdictions be considered harmoniously aligned, and the same could be said for 
Tamms: a state-run prison, filled with people arrested by Chicago’s police and staffed by people 
from a depressed rural town, effectively free from Federal intervention except through torturous 
and risky litigation. 
Such intermediate authority subsists in our society through forms of structured political 
specialization. While professional duties and titles have changed over time, professionalism has 
exuded an aura of authority for centuries. But quasi-professional positions have emerged in the 
		
9	
last 200 years in which qualifications are far less emphasized, or strictly defined. Michael Lipsky 
(1980) coined the term “street-level bureaucracy” to describe individuals who, in his telling, 
have “discretion” in the way that policies are implemented at the lowest, most applied level. 
Paradigmatic examples of such roles include the teacher and the police officer, but I would, with 
poetic license, include the artist.1 In all of these, the role is to tend and somehow embody an 
ideal (beauty, knowledge, order) for which evaluative criteria are constantly in question.  
These three positions are all distinct, but each can be seen as a mediator between the 
other two. Teachers perform pedagogy and inflict punishment; cops reinterpret rules and trust 
their instincts; artists teach viewers through both enforcing and transgressing norms. While I see 
the artist as having the most mediating role of the three, what they all have in common (even the 
artist, albeit in a highly figurative sense) is a nominal authority to compel. This is far less than 
unchecked power, but more than a compromised relative freedom to choose between limited 
options. The mandate of teachers, artists, and cops entails an incoherent prerogative to dominate 
individuals whose submission is merely formal and thus incomplete. In this these roles are not 
absolutely different, in structural respects, from those at the highest level of legal authority in a 
liberal republic. By bringing art into the legislative process, Laurie Jo Reynolds put this curious 





1 The trio of teacher, artist, and police officer matches up fairly well with the modern personae of 
therapist, aesthete, and manager, proffered by philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre (1981, pp. 70-75). 
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1.2  An assortment of triads 
 
An analogy between art and law could go in any number of directions, but I am going to 
focus on the “checks and balances” at work in the three branches of American government, 
courtesy of James Madison. This familiar liberal paradigm of specialized and mutually 
restricting liberal institutions proposes a government in which tyrannical urges are divided and 
thereby conquered. At the Constitutional Convention on June 6, 1787, Madison stated: 
The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, and thereby divide the community into so great 
a number of interests and parties that, in the first place, the majority will not likely be at 
the same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of the 
minority, or in the second place, to unite in pursuit of it. (1787/1902, p. 104) 
In his Federalist Papers (1787/1999), Madison lays out the necessary elements of an “extended 
republic,” a democratic state that exists on the scale of a continent, and thus an empire, rather 
than a city-state like Plato’s Athens or Machiavelli’s Florence. “The extended republic,” 
Madison claimed in the same convention speech, “is the only defense against the inconveniences 
of democracy consistent with the democratic form of government” (1787/1902, p. 103). His 
operative notion is not to discourage factional conflict, an element of society he views as 
inescapable, but to distribute conflict as evenly as possible by locating power in a plethora of 
overlapping local institutions. 
While Madison (1787/1999) perceives that universal concerns cannot be represented by 
any one faction, and “it is uniquely on the basis of this common interest that society ought to be 
governed” (p. 247), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762/1978), upholding the ideal of formally 
indivisible sovereignty introduced by Renaissance jurist Jean Bodin, speaks out against thinkers 
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like Montesquieu and Madison, thinkers who “sometimes . . . mix all [the] parts together, 
sometimes they separate them. They turn the sovereign into a fantastic body formed of bits and 
pieces” (p. 60). Seeing the attempt to appropriate and divide up the functions of a monarch, he 
claims they overlook a basic truth: “for the same reason that sovereignty is inalienable, it is 
indivisible” (p. 59). But it is noteworthy that Rousseau describes a contradiction that would 
become not only acceptable but undeniable in modern art, wherein “art makes universal claims 
that could not previously be wagered, specifically through the development of fragmentary, 
incomplete forms” (Schneider, 2012, para. 4). In any event, through the mechanism of Madison’s 
separation of powers, the power of the majority is frustrated no less than the power of any 
individual potentate (Balbus 2009, pp. 17-18).  
Protection against what John Adams (and later Alexis de Tocqueville. John Stuart Mill, 
and Friedrich Nietzsche) called a “tyranny of the majority” is fundamental to Madison’s scheme. 
Yet the minority he sought to protect was landowning white men, of which a narrow elite 
subsection retains an overwhelming amount of political as well as economic power in the U.S. 
today. In the early U.S., the basic human rights of the enslaved minority were eclipsed for 70 
years after the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, as they were before, by the egregiously 
outsize political influence of the slaveowning planter minority (Richards 2000), even though 
Madison’s 1787 “Virginia Plan” (1902) sought to restrict the power of the state governments that 
now incarcerate the majority of Americans. In contemporary Illinois, largely through legislative 
lobbying, the counties populated by the rural white minority have the dubious privilege of 
tending and repressing the largely urban and nonwhite incarcerated minority—and, as in the 
antebellum South, these counties gain electoral and other public benefits via their captive 
populations (Huling 2000, Pettit 2012).  
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But for Madison, ultimately, the balance of powers is an abstract matter of reason, 
something of a Newtonian canceling of opposed forces: “Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition” (1787/1999, p. 247). Evoking modern utopian thinker and inventor of the geodesic 
dome R. Buckminster Fuller (1968/1969), such ideal structures of flexible tensile strength could 
be said to exist at both the level of the macrocosm and the microcosm—although in this case, 
unlike with Fuller, both the microcosm and macrocosm are social contrivances. In order to 
explicate the work of Tamms Year Ten, I believe that there is something to be gained from 
looking at how Madison’s ideas dictate political relationships at the smallest level, by comparing 
the dynamics of authority in state structures to those of mundane conflicts at the level of daily 
life, which in turn become the subjects of artworks.  
These dynamics operate both within law and within art. In Hermann Kantorowicz’s The 
Definition of Law (1939/1958), he divides the law itself into three kinds of rules: 
first, commands which originate from the positive will of an acknowledged authority, 
secondly, norms whose contents conscience acknowledges as right, and thirdly, dogmas 
which must be acknowledged as part of a self-contained balanced system. (p. 30) 
The “commands” are administrative or executive, by definition. The second, the idea of duty, 
represents the natural law expressed in an intuitive moral imperative, and would seem to align 
with the creative, collaborative lawmaker. Lastly, the “dogma that must be acknowledged” (in a 
modern secular context) is the province of the courts: particularly in the common-law tradition, 
in which a clear precedent is to be followed unquestioningly.  
Within the arts, the role of the artist as an intuitive collaborator, and thus a sort of 
lawmaker, is borne out by innumerable examples, and the systemic pedagogical dogma that 
forms the content of artwork can come from critics, conceptual artists, manifesto writers, and 
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aesthetic theorists. The executive role is, on the other hand, is elusive and unpredictable. It is 
everything that cannot be reduced to content—it connotes an idea of the artist as a lonely genius 
endowed with an ineffable quality of authoritative authenticity, embodying the total freedom that 
artistic expression seems to offer, but also applies to the invisible patronage that makes such 
freedom possible. In many modern aesthetic theories this is referred to as “autonomy”. 
 Kantorowicz’s legal triad could be replaced by the so-called “trinity” in Carl von 
Clausewitz’s classic stategic treatise On War (1832/1976), wherein the outcome of the “theatre” 
of war is decided by the rational direction of governments, the affective passions of warring 
populations, and the chance circumstances faced by armies. The arts would intuitively occupy 
the second role, as art that participates directly in war would be propaganda. But it should be 
noted that the art historians and critics who explain artwork are, like the commanders in war, 
reacting to specific situations--exhibitions, objects, and performances, in the case of art. The 
executive role belongs to the economic, ideological, and technological context in which military 
personnel or artists find themselves. This is the shifting background against which battle-
readiness and artistic autonomy are defined. 
I am going to look at the work of Laurie Jo Reynolds and Tamms Year Ten through these 
sets of threes. I will reflect on the roles of the teacher, the artist, and the cop alongside the three 
branches of liberal republican government, but I’m also adding in the cliché about a vigilante 
acting as “judge, jury, and executioner.” At the same time, I’m trying to examine how each 
branch, job, or role relates to what might be considered art, in the broadest possible sense. The 
judicial power will of course be the judge, and I will talk in this section about teaching, as well 
as the concept of law. As I’ve mentioned, art criticism fits into this area, as does canonical 
Conceptual Art, which could be said to be an art form in which the artist creatively usurps the 
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role of the critic, as well as the teacher. The executive matches up with both the executioner and 
the cop, who offer the pleasurably violent fantasy of non-compromise, in light of the 
impossibility of perfect compliance, not to mention the appearance of autonomy that the artist 
borrows from her patron. The legislative power overlaps with the jury, as both seek to reconcile 
official imperatives with the values of the community. Here I will discuss the compromises 
required of artists, and strategy as not only the means of the creative process, but the result. 
While I plan to discuss the legislative and artistic function second in this set of three, the section 
in which I will tell most of the Tamms Year Ten story, I hope to portray TY10 as presenting a 
bridge between the abstraction of the judge or teacher and the direct authority of the 
administrator or cop.  
The primary motif in discussing the judge, the critic, and the teacher will be 
“interpretation”, or the translation and transmission of texts. This is a good place to start 
discussing Tamms Year Ten, since it began with support groups that made use of litigation and 
literature. For the jury, the legislator, and the artist it will be “interpellation”, the vocation that 
aligns the needs and desires expressed by the community with conscience or internal authority. 
Laurie Jo Reynolds has recalled having such a come-to-Jesus moment with regard to her 
mission, and in this section I will describe the five-year lobbying battle. Interpellation can also 
be identified in the very act of declaring a lobbying campaign to be art. For the executioner, the 
administrator, and the cop it will be “interrogation,” the retrospective and forceful shaping of 
intention. The Tamms prison was ultimately closed by the governor, which illuminates the 
importance of the bureaucratic allies in the TY10 campaign, as well as of the value of its targeted 
acts of gratitude. 
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These three sets of three could also be matched with other triads. They align with the 
three classical forms of elocution in the foundational Western treatise on rhetoric, the Ad 
Herennium, once attributed to Cicero: Judiciale, which addresses legal controversies, 
Deliberativum, for discussion of policy, and Demonstrativum, which praises or condemns an 
individual. We also have the Aristotelian trinity of approaches to knowledge in the Nicomachean 
Ethics: episteme, phronesis, and techne, which roughly equate to science, prudence, and skill, 
and these in turn relate to legal interpretation, legislative negotiation, and effective enforcement. 
But there could be any number of analogies, so my choice of these triads requires still more 
explication.  
 I want to make the case (extending the case made by others) that the legal stability and 
force of liberalism relies to a great extent on pleasure. In psychoanalytic jargon, the liberal is 
libidinal. In making this argument, I juxtapose the three branches of liberal government with 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s three psychosocial registers: the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and 
the Real. In simple terms, these are aspects of our experience, and describe ways of coping with 
anxiety and pleasure. The Imaginary was the first of the three that Lacan developed, in 
describing the formation of the ego. In his telling, an infant, upon recognizing herself in a mirror, 
starts to develop a sense of having a singular, unified existence—a sense of wholeness that is 
ultimately as insubstantial as her reflection. The Symbolic deals with language, and also with law 
and morality, and is connected to a particular society and culture. Therefore, Lacan describes the 
Symbolic as being dependent upon the “Other,” the individual’s sense of any person or group 
outside of her head. His therapeutic techniques, as well as his general outlook on all aspects of 
human interaction, rely on his theory of the nature of language, and thus the Symbolic. Although 
language is the medium for rational thinking, he stresses its arbitrary and violent nature.  
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 However, his most subtle, irrational, and ineffable realm of experience is the Real, which 
cannot be imagined in images or expressed in language. Associated with horror and ecstasy, its 
very non-reproducibility resonates with the specificity of individual condemnation and 
punishment, and is often expressed through repetitive nightmares or flashbacks. The Real is 
linked with trauma, and with the unconscious drives that, psychoanalysts claim, precede and 
deform our apparently rational and meaningful experience of the world. So the Real represents 
the mute, incomplete, and unrepresentable nature of Immanuel Kant’s being “in-itself,” while the 
Symbolic offers artificial modular schemes for distinguishing and acting upon the phenomena of 
perception, and the Imaginary attempts to present an integrated world that bridges or grounds 
these irreconcilable registers, mitigating their contradictions in the recognition of truth, beauty, 
and goodness. Aspects of Tamms Year Ten, as with many works of art, connect and conflict with 
all three psychosocial domains at various points and times. 
Without explicitly referencing Lacan, the three domains are movingly illustrated in 
Roland Barthes’ Sade Fourier Loyola (1971/1976), a book that successively considers the 
Marquis de Sade, a libertine revolutionary and lifelong prisoner best known for his brutal erotic 
fiction; utopian socialist Charles Fourier, who made fanciful but influential plans for perfect 
communities; and theologian Ignatius Loyola, who founded the scholastic Jesuit order. The 
Symbolic order of law and language resembles what was in Freudian psychology termed the 
“superego.” Teaching and judgment relate to the Symbolic, as do Fourier’s unsuccessful but 
internally consistent attempts at an ideal society, founded on the balanced optimization of 
pleasure; pleasure is for Lacan the core demand of the moralizing superego. Loyola’s Spiritual 
Exercises, which, in attempting a fully-realized identification with the physical experiences of 
Jesus, apart from theological dogma, also produce an economy of pleasure in the form of a 
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minutely regimented visualization; this recalls Lacan’s description of the ego, our sense of self, 
as a pacifying fantasy of order founded on the image of oneself as a undifferentiated unit. This is 
the regime of the Imaginary. And the domain most associated with pleasure, that of the desiring 
“id,” is one dependent also on denying pleasure, on the detachment and deferral of gratification. 
The obsessive litany of afflictions that Sade visited on imaginary victims remain no less (or at 
least not much less) shocking in our day than in his, but, as Barthes and others have commented, 
they depict complete power while valuing debasement over any effort at titillation, resembling 
what Lacan would call the “Real:” disruption defying description, an incomprehensible 
conflation of sex with violence.  
 Each in their own way, Barthes’ three figures, as the three street-level sovereigns I 
identified earlier, embody the form of drama most intimately associated with the law: tragedy. 
Fourier as teacher directs pleasure through instilling control, while relishing the cruel imposition 
of evaluation; Loyola the artist is the ostentatiously self-negating paragon of integrity, and Sade 
is the cop as antihero, the debased instrument of asymmetrical social harmony. Continuing the 
theme of punishment embodied by these figures, Oedipus inflicts punishment on himself for 
transgressing perhaps the most universally prohibited activities in human society: incest and 
parricide. His daughter Antigone violates a royal decree to fulfill what she perceives as her 
absolute duty to divine law, which is to do honor to the dead body of her brother, Polyneices. 
Killed in battle, Polyneices is declared a criminal for having attempted to take the city of Thebes 
by force. As Roberto Calasso says, “Antigone betrays the law of her city to make a gesture of 
mercy toward a dead man who does not belong to that city” (as cited in Krell 2005, p. 361).  
At the risk of being grandiose (and unnecessarily morbid), Laurie Jo Reynolds is a figure 
that could stand in for Antigone. In speaking with a group (like a Greek chorus, or a jury) on 
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behalf of those inhabiting the living death of a carceral tomb in the Tamms supermax, her work 
takes on aesthetic as well as political meaning. Collective shame and desire exposed by power 
and experienced as pity set up the conflict in political tragedy, just as in classical drama. The 
success of Tamms Year Ten suggests the possibility of assigning aesthetic success and failure to 
many other political projects, and conversely, assigning political value to aesthetic projects. 
Such an assessment must then apply to the project Reynolds took on a year after the 
prison closed: Illinois Governor Pat Quinn’s unsuccessful 2014 re-election campaign, and his 
replacement by Bruce Rauner, a hardline fiscal conservative who initiated a nearly three-year 
budget standoff affecting not only prisons, but nearly all public services. Jonathan Wender 
(2008) cites Max Weber and William Muir in speaking of “the inherently tragic exercise of 
administrative and juridical power” (p. 5). But the impossibility of fulfilling the dictates of the 
law is at the heart of every tragic tale, including Hamlet and the Christian Gospels. It is the 
source of the recognition, reversal, and catharsis outlined as the virtues of good tragedy in 
Aristotle’s Poetics. But this inadequacy is also the source of endless humor. Every transgression 
mocks the dictate it violates, which accounts for the parade of absurdities in visual art after 
Impressionism—of which no more iconic example exists than Duchamp’s Fountain, a urinal 
hijacked for the purposes of artistic display. Politically, this farce is perpetuated in absurd 
attempts by authority figures to silence the laughter of their subordinates, whether in a classroom 
or a confrontation with police. 
In tragedy or in farce, innocently and without malice, the protagonist flaunts convention 
and is judged—but only convicted and punished in the case of tragedy. Taking aesthetic distance 
from his youthful stridency, while lamenting the failure of the 1848 revolution and the 
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ascendancy of Louis Bonaparte to his father’s autocratic throne in France, Karl Marx famously 
observed: 
Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to 
speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. 
(1852/1978, p. 594) 
The authoritarian regimes Marx’s doctrines underpinned seem to have followed this pattern, 
largely ending with a whimper of corruption rather than a bang of collapse. In concluding, I will 
reflect on the role of the media in the Tamms campaign, and the aesthetic value of the futility 
and failure that inevitably accompanies and surrounds the so-called “rule of law,” relying on the 




1.3  Racial aesthetics, colorblind blind spots 
 
In talking about the campaign to close the Tamms Supermax prison, I intend to look at 
these sets of three in the context of American incarceration, which, as has been widely 
acknowledged, is inseparable from the nation’s history of historical racist atrocity and 
widespread de facto apartheid. Thus, although there are no significant legal restrictions on who 
may choose to be an artist, teacher, or cop, the power these roles embody has a relationship with 
the authority bestowed by the regime of white supremacy. In America the heroism all three jobs 
promise—provocateur of the masses, enlightener of the benighted, or defender of the 
defenseless, respectively—still accrues primarily in the U.S. to white practitioners of these 
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majority-white pursuits, all of which have their own antagonistic histories with urban 
communities of color. In a sense, jails and prisons could be said to hold people who have been 
temporarily (or permanently) relocated to make room for interventions in low-income and often 
racially isolated neighborhoods by white artists, teachers, and, of course, cops.  
The ideals that motivate people to enter these jobs reflect cultural desires and anxieties, 
and thus certainly have an aesthetic element. The modern origins of race as a social institution lie 
not in aesthetics, but in laws around commerce that operated (and still operate) as an extension of 
state violence. While a Virginia judge in 1640 sentenced both of his fellow runaway servants, 
who were white, to an additional year of servitude, John Punch, who was Black, received a 
sentence of lifetime slavery. This began the mass importation of African slaves to Virginia, and 
begat the American system of legal apartheid, in which race has consistently denoted a line 
between who is a subject of wealth, and who is an object of wealth.2 This system only began to 
be challenged in the 20th century through cases such as the 1964 Supreme Court case Katzenberg 
v. McClurg, in which segregation in restaurants was struck down not to uphold the principles of 
equity in the 13th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution, but on the basis of restricting 
consumer freedom, under the Constitution’s commerce clause. Today, as African-Americans 
continue to receive longer sentences for identical convictions (United States Sentencing 
Commission, 2017), skin tone continues to influence African-American incarceration rates 
(Monk 2015). At the same time, conservative Supreme Court justices have begun to roll back 
protective regulations based on the commerce clause, beginning with United States v. Lopez 
(1995). In all of these decisions there is a clear element of creativity. Race is in some sense 																																																								2	African slaves started being imported by Spain to the New World starting in 1501, after a great 
many indigenous people escaped or died after being enslaved. 
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invented by the courts; race is then not dismantled, but treated as if it never existed. Both in the 
1640 decision and under the recent Rehnquist Supreme Court, this is an act of visual illusionism. 
While laws create the concrete circumstances that allow race to appear real, race as an 
idea is an artifact of racism as an affective impulse. This impulse, not a coherent political 
agenda, sustains the worldview referred to as white supremacy. White supremacy could now be 
described as a near-ubiquitous aesthetic outlook (Taylor, 2016), bound up, like all embodied 
aesthetics, with mythologies of power and erotic fantasies and fears. Racism and white 
supremacy are neither merely individual/psychological or social/political phenomena. “The 
psychical affectivity of racism,” as Derek Hook (2012) says in discussing Frantz Fanon and 
Homi Bhaba, “…eludes such attempts at explanation” (p. 21). “Colorism,” the aspect of racial 
hierarchy connected strictly to the shade of one’s skin, has endured for centuries in Jamaica 
(Brown-Glaude 2013), India (Nadeem 2014, Jha 2016), Latin America (Telles and Paschel 
2014), China (Luo 2012), and within as well as outside minority communities in white-
dominated societies (Mathews and Johnson 2015). As Fanon shows, the color line is a line of 
access barring consideration as a rational subject (1952/1986). Also in response to Fanon, Lewis 
Gordon (2007) notes that “the absence of a Self-Other dialectic in racist situations means the 
eradication of ethical relations” (pp. 11-12). Aesthetics negate ethics. 
Of course, the color line has defined access to full citizenship in the American law for 
centuries (Haney-López, 2006; Sharfstein, 2011), before the mid-twentieth-century “racial 
break” (Winant, 2001) that has moved legal rhetoric toward a “colorblind” orientation in which 
the historical consequences of racism are disavowed (Williams, 1991; Han, 2015). The ingenuity 
of the contemporary disavowal of white supremacy, as well as attempts to rebrand it, can be 
understood as forms of political art just as easily as can attempts to resist or undermine these 
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efforts. A theoretical assumption I hope to justify, if not prove, is that under modern liberalism 
all aspects of life are made aesthetic—and thus the laws of society describe points of aesthetic 
tension. Meanwhile, no matter how much they recede from active consciousness, racial codes of 
beauty are regularly enforced.  
White male artists are not the only people who have defined beauty in European societies 
and colonies, but they have wielded enormous power in this regard. Enormous amounts of 
scholarship have documented the whitewashing of history and culture by art; just one example is 
Elizabeth McGrath’s study (1992) of how the Ethiopian princess Andromeda, a figure of 
classical myth, came to be depicted and thus understood as a white woman. Resisting this legacy, 
African-American artist Tomashi Jackson has built a body of abstract work literally illustrating 
the absurdity of colorism, based on drawing connections between the aesthetic color theory of 
Josef Albers and the language around race in 20th-century Supreme Court decisions. Another 
Black artist, Amanda Williams, worked with friends and family to repaint condemned buildings 
on Chicago’s historically Black south side in colors coded by racially marketed products: 
“Harold’s Chicken Shack” red, “Newport 100s” teal, and “Crown Royal bag” purple. In both of 
these projects, the clear implication is that the aesthetics of color cannot be detached from the 
visual politics of caste. 
That beauty as well as intelligence in so many cultures is today equated with “Caucasian” 
features, pale skin most notably, is a way in which culture responds and contributes directly to a 
history of political domination. While seeking to dispel “false consciousness,” of which racism is 
perhaps a singularly plain example, political programs that ignore race or aesthetics may make 
important analytical insights. The story of African-Americans can be told convincingly in terms 
of state-enforced material dispossession; from slavery to Reconstruction to Jim Crow 
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segregation, violence permitted and enforced laws that have denied Blacks property and wealth, 
beginning with their own bodies, and law has thus thoroughly stifled the conditions for 
widespread economic growth in the Black community (Baradaran, 2017; Rothstein, 2017).  
But in trying to understand these laws, replacing the uncanny, irrational afterlife of a 
conqueror’s fantasy with mere ethical universalism can result in a whole new arena of 
fetishization. Alexander Weheliye (2014) describes the aesthetics of “pornotroping,” in which 
suffering black bodies are presented for the pleasure of viewers—from the memoirs of Frederick 
Douglass during the era of American abolitionism, to recent depictions of slavery such as those 
in the televised versions of Alex Haley’s story Roots. Speaking of Sankofa, a 1993 fictionalized 
slave narrative by Ethiopian director Halle Gerima, Weheliye says, “(the film) paradoxically 
reinscribes the very racialized assemblages it seeks to leave behind.” He continues, “It also takes 
for granted that black people have been fully integrated into the world of Man” (p. 108). To 
liberally endorse unproblematic emancipation through education requires answering for a lot of 
unintended consequences. 
I am a cisgender straight white man, and I taught art for years to public school students in 
majority nonwhite communities in Chicago. I was inevitably associated with the police—not 
necessarily in the eyes of every single student, but that was my role as a white public servant in 
the neighborhoods where I worked. I don’t mean to minimize the struggles that teachers, cops, 
and artists face, but, despite the impressive stress level of the job, I found the extent to which I 
was able to operate autonomously both exhilarating and bewildering. While I never had full 
control of any class I taught (to say the least), I could, if I chose, snitch on a student to a parole 
officer (which I never did) or to a parent or guardian (which I often did), who might very well be 
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terrified of the consequences on their child of upsetting a white man with institutionalized 
authority. I know that at times this resulted in violence toward these children. 
While this sense of autonomy was a valued aspect of my position, the structural role of 
white privilege couldn’t be separated from my job. This exhilarating, bewildering aspect of my 
teaching was a form of pleasure that binds together the experiences of the teacher, the artist, and 
the cop. And, as ineffable as that pleasure might be, it has everything to do with power. 
Reflecting rather than merely embodying this power can be a way to put it at the service of a 
larger group. I am going to use law, then, in both a loose and a specific sense, as a way to talk 
about reflecting power-- but in terms of art, once a domain of refined pleasures, but a realm that 




1.4  Methodological caveats 
 
 For Lacan, who applied psychoanalytic ideas to culture, language, and philosophy, the 
moral imperative that Freud referred to as the superego represents a law whose sole injunction is 
not (only) the repression of pleasure, but the opposite: enjoyment itself.  Enacting, explicating, 
and enforcing laws must then be in some part an act of gratification, and promoting pleasure is 
thus a gesture of obedience. In a similar paradox, G.K. Chesterton asserts: 
 The romance of the police force is thus the whole romance of man. It is based on the fact 
that morality is the most dark and daring of conspiracies. (1907/ n.d., p. 123) 
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Although Chesterton presumes that the reader should embrace the morality exemplified in the 
police, I would endorse a more neutral, literal interpretation of the statement. Art and politics 
propose different but compatible pleasure-seeking behaviors, and the rules through which they 
derive gratification are aesthetics and law, respectively. The link between them can be insight, or 
justice, or study- whatever is ideally imparted by the acts of pedagogy, judgment, and criticism. 
My effort will be to make comparisons that allow for flexibility in discussing what it means to 
pursue art, activism, and teaching. 
 But first I will make a note on my methodology, or the lack thereof. By pursuing an in-
depth analogy between modern art and aesthetics on one hand and modern law and government 
on the other, I am proceeding on the presumption that analogy is an illuminating method of 
analysis. Under the heading of “expressive causality.” Frederic Jameson (1981) describes the 
allegorical role of analogy in terms of Biblical typology, formalized in the Middle Ages, as a 
primary model for hermeneutics in the West. Typology involved reading the pre-Christian texts 
incorporated into the Biblical Old Testament, essentially those texts comprising the Jewish 
Tanakh, as containing prefigurations of the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. Jameson 
describes a typological interpretation as 
 less as a technique for closing the text off and for repressing aleatory or aberrant readings 
and senses, than as a mechanism for preparing such a text for further ideological 
investment (.)  
Citing Louis Althusser, Jameson then describes such interpretations as opening up space for a 
believer to “’insert’ himself or herself” (p. 30) into the narrative. The algorithm of the allegory 
provided in both the prefiguration and the lived example of Christ then offered medieval 
theologians a moral model for individual conduct, and an anagogical model for the history of 
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mankind. In the case of Christian typology, there is an implied hierarchy, wherein pre-Advent 
laws are (to some degree) surpassed by the “Good News” of the Gospel. Similarly, in my 
account, the Althusserian “interpellation” (1971/2001) that occurs when Laurie Jo Reynolds is 
called into action is a moment in which Reynolds “inserts” herself into the legal apparatus 
through committing to lobbying for the closure of Tamms.  
While I cannot explain away a great many distinctions between art and law, I do use the 
story of Laurie Jo Reynolds and Tamms Year Ten as linked exemplars to interpret political and 
cultural phenomena on both micro- and macro- levels, with the assistance of the tripartite liberal 
state as an explanatory frame. I acknowledge that critiques (such as Althusser’s) of the 
subjectivity and lack of rigor in medieval Christological retrojection are applicable to my project 
as well. However, Paul W. Kahn (2011), who argues for an analogy between art and law as acts 
of creation, makes a case for the rhetorical force of analogy itself as the most fundamentally 
relevant form of political (and legal) argument. Accordingly, I am approaching this text from the 
outside in, as more of a sermon than a syllogism—I want the three branches of government to 
intuitively align with the definitions of art, law, and teaching that I hope to present.  
 So, while I have mapped a modern Western sensibility of art (visual art in particular) on 
to a modern Western ideal of liberal governance, I don’t ultimately make the case for why this 
analogy should obtain. My presumption is not that art and government are related in this way in 
all times and places, but just that liberal humanism as a defining paradigm in the 21st century, as 
solidified in preceding centuries, has implications for both politics and aesthetics—precisely 
because of the connections between prohibition and enticement. I contend, using circumstantial 
evidence, that cultural content has merged with political form, and political content has merged 
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with cultural form, through the play of order and allure. A metaphysical article of faith I assume 
is that culture cannot be dismissed as an epiphenomenon of either economics or physical force.  
More specific concerns remain to be stated regarding culture. Following Frank Wilderson 
(2010), I would claim the European-derived culture I focus on is to a degree a function of the 
invention of race in the West via a categorical equivalence of whiteness and humanity. The 
position of a subject racialized as Black is nonsensical (or unspeakable, using Wilderson’s 
terminology) in the terms set forth by whiteness. And yet one of the philosophers I give the most 
space to, Immanuel Kant, was one of the earliest and most influential theorists of white 
supremacy. Similarly, figures like Hegel and Madison cannot and should not be excused from 
their explicit racist assumptions. Thus, my second problem is that of foregrounding race in a 
study that ventures speculations based on terms set forth by European and European-American 
promulgators of a white humanist liberal order, rather than finding ways to tie in the historical 
and theoretical insights of C.L.R. James, Derrick Bell, Saidiya Hartman, or Charles Mills, though 
other important authors of color are featured, such as Frantz Fanon and W.E.B. DuBois, and I 
cite thinkers like Sora Han, Alexander Weheliye, and Patricia Williams.  
Ultimately, my story is about the fallout of white-identified acts and actors in the late 
stages of settler colonial capitalism, fallout which affects people of color most directly, 
consistently, and violently. But authors who chronicle and theorize a range of forms of racial and 
colonial violence, from the position of the enslaved and their descendants, tend to favor 
discussions of property law and the ideological content of white-supremacist jurisprudence over 
the political mechanics of the law, which is more my interest here. Nor do these scholars often 
employ examples and arguments that connect aesthetics to the legal structures of American and 
European white supremacy. There are exceptional moments, however, such as Robin D.G. 
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Kelly’s brief comments regarding the impact of surrealism on Black radicals, in his foreword to 
Cedric Robinson’s landmark work Black Marxism (2000, p. xxi). So I am quite possibly wrong 
to dismiss other such links, and intend to continue pursuing this possibility. 
Related to this, I created a story that takes race-focused critique as a point of departure, 
but my primary protagonist is a white woman. While I do reflect occasionally on aspects of 
Laurie Jo Reynolds as an individual, and I dwell quite a bit on racialized historical 
manifestations of legislative art as a concept, I don’t speculate on what role race plays in 
Reynolds’ own motivations or political worldview. This is to some degree because my interest in 
psychoanalysis is not an interest in plumbing individual autobiographies for secret drives, but 
rather reflects my hope to understand desires more generally, as phenomena being shaped by law 
and art-- law and art in turn created by and referring back to a given culture. Additionally, race is 
something that Reynolds has talked about with me as a political fact, but not in general terms. 
Just to dwell on this point, all colonial and post-colonial culture is defined in large and small 
ways by manifestations of power that should be understood through the history of race, as a 
concept and a practice. But I think that the idea and the history of the avant-garde, which began 
in Europe, is quite relevant to parsing the work of Laurie Jo Reynolds, and needs to be brought 
into productive tension with the liberation projects she also takes inspiration from. 
To shift over to influences- books that have informed this piece, such as Jonathan 
Wender’s Policing and the Poetics of Everyday Life (2008) and Lisa Guenther’s Solitary 
Confinement (2013), narrate experiences of criminal justice that make extensive use of 
philosophical phenomenology (thinkers like Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Emmanuel Levinas). Recent writers about social practice art (Grant Kester, Pablo Helguera, 
Nato Thompson) show some sympathy for these perspectives, with perhaps more of an American 
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pragmatist bent. On the other hand, some political thinkers and critics that I will discuss are more 
Marxist, anarchist, or ambivalently leftist-populist (Luis Camnitzer, Jacques Rancière, Slavoj 
Žižek), even though I don’t have much to say here about economics.  
Essentially, I don’t see my foundational theory as being nearly as important to my 
presentation as my superficial analogies. I present race as a central causal factor, and at points 
cite prominent figures like Frantz Fanon and Steve Biko, but, as already mentioned, I don’t 
predominantly reference theorists of race. By invoking Lacan and Barthes I reveal my sympathy 
for psychoanalysis and semiotics, but I am not systematic in my invocation. I side with the 
phenomenological writers in valuing aesthetics, I side with the political writers in valuing 
politics, and I disagree with all of them on various points, perhaps predominantly on matters of 
style. I acknowledge that this leaves some conceptual issues unresolved. I also don’t see myself 
as someone who is recording a history of social practice art around incarceration policies, so I 
don’t intend to be exhaustive in describing projects that share that feature with Laurie Jo 
Reynolds or with Tamms Year Ten. Important projects like Maria Gaspar’s 96 Acres, based in 
the area around Cook County Jail in Chicago, or Jackie Sumell’s Herman’s House project, which 
chronicled her conversation with long-term Louisiana solitary inmate Herman Wallace, simply 
don’t have enough in common with the process and goals of Reynolds and TY10 to merit 
comparison. 
 This confession does beg the question about what I am hoping to achieve in my writing, 
but, along with entangling sanction and seduction, I think my goals relate to the dilemma of 
aesthetes and agitators. I want artists to listen to activists, and I want activists to listen to artists. 
As mutually isolated and suspicious (sometimes bohemian) bedfellows, artists and activists are 
often politically paralyzed, despite their considerable collective cultural, financial, and often 
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racial capital. In my focus on the case of Laurie Jo Reynolds and Tamms Year Ten, carried out 
through aesthetic ruminations on the separated powers of liberal institutions, what I hope to offer 
is an unsterilized way of thinking about esoteric and dull legal discourse. Beyond the high-
minded frumpiness of activism, I seek to provide a view of the strange shapes and shadows that 
make the problems of struggling individuals and groups complex and alluring, rather than merely 
an unfortunate occasion for somber pity (if it happens to someone else) or anger, sorrow, and 
trauma (if it affects you). To do this, it will be necessary to argue that many profoundly cruel 
actions have a sort of humor or poignancy, and that many cultural artifacts exist in relation to 
politics and law in a manner only partially dictated by their formal and conceptual qualities. 
While Reynolds is the artist in this story, not the teacher or the cop, I feel that her long history of 















Chapter 2: The Judge and judicial aesthetics 
 
2.1  Judging, discerning, and interpreting 
 
Lacan’s Symbolic order is the place of “the Law,” in the senses of moral, abstract, and 
social codes. We could thus call it the judicial domain, wherein interpretation and application of 
statutes occur through the moral sensibility of individuals. The Symbolic is the space of the “big 
Other,” the paternal realm inhabited by the critic, teacher, lawyer, and judge, all of whom are 
anointed with both the authority to denounce error, and the inevitable stain of incompetence and 
hypocrisy. These are all didactic figures of principled authority, and this didacticism may inhabit 
all political art. Through the “art” of rhetoric, two of the most important figures of Western 
political philosophy, Plato and Machiavelli, address the reader as Other from the point of view of 
a teacher: indirectly through an interlocutor in Plato, and directly as a presumed ruler in 
Machiavelli (Zuckert, 2017). But pedagogical didacticism should not be understood as 
encompassing some essence or entirety of political art; nor should all political art be written off 
as a distraction from “real” politics. The consonance of law and art is a fundamental if largely 
unstated premise of avant-garde transgression.  
But until the appearance of what Luis Camnitzer (2007) terms “conceptualist art,” a 
global postwar embrace of poetic visual and textual production that spread far beyond New York 
(Camnitzer capitalizes New York’s “official” Conceptual Art), a legislative campaign like 
Tamms Year Ten would likely have found little traction, even among enthusiasts of the avant-
garde. Critic Benjamin H.D. Buchloh (1999) associated the rise of Conceptual Art with the 
development of a bureaucratic anti-aesthetic, emblematic of advanced capitalism. 
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   In the absence of any specifically visual qualities and due to the manifest lack of any 
(artistic) manual competence as a criterion of distinction, all the traditional criteria of 
aesthetic judgement - of taste and of connoirsseurship- have been programmatically 
voided. The result of this is that the definition of the aesthetic becomes on the one hand a 
matter of linguistic convention and on the other the function of both a legal contract and 
an institutional discourse (a discourse of power rather than taste). (p. 519) 
So it should come as no surprise, as I will describe, that TY10 had its beginnings in a context of 
both litigation-based advocacy and communion through poetry—and while Reynolds never 
abandons a discourse of power, Buchloh hints at reasons that the group changed its direction. But 
to begin with, I hope to reflect on how the possibility of judgment sets the terms for both art and 
law, in order to develop my story about how an artist like Reynolds could intervene, between 
legislators, litigators, and prison officials, on behalf of largely unrepresented people. 
In keeping with a focus on the Symbolic, an obvious point of comparison between art and 
law is that of creative interpretation. A much-cited example of legal creativity is the case of an 
English lawyer, Arundel Coke, convicted of assault in 1721 (Howell, 1816/2006, pp. 53-94). 
While he confessed to conspiring to maim his victim, one Edward Crispe, Coke attempted 
unsuccessfully to plead his innocence to the judge, after the jury’s guilty plea was handed down, 
on the basis that the law under which he was convicted, the Coventry Act, forbade maiming 
rather than murder; Coke confidently proclaimed to the judge his intention not merely to 
disfigure but to kill Crispe. Similar invocations, often similarly futile, of the “letter of the law” 
have been central to the U.S. Federal government’s long struggle to creatively leverage the 
Constitution to justify interference with the extensive police powers granted to states by the very 
same document (Gerstle, 2015). Meanwhile, after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 
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other measures prohibiting workplace discrimination, creative interpretation of the “letter of the 
law” became the means by which businesses have evaded Federal restrictions (Edelman, 1992). 
In Unfair: The New Science of Criminal Injustice, Adam Benforado (2015) marshals 
considerable evidence on the unreliability of interpretive techniques used to “solve” crimes, 
based on the dysfunctional procedures and unfounded intuitive certainty exercised by judges, 
prosecutors, witnesses, jurors, and police. He asserts that “procedural rules do not actually 
constrain officers, prosecutors, and judges very much at all; they only appear to do so” (p. 244). 
An historic instance of legal creativity Benforado recounts is the virtuosic performance of 
Sergeant Charles Duke, expert defense witness for the LAPD officers whose brutal beating of 
Rodney King was caught on video. Benforado doesn’t mention that Duke’s strategy built on the 
wording in the 1989 case Graham v. Connor, a unanimous Supreme Court opinion in favor of a 
plaintiff alleging wrongful treatment by police. Written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, this 
opinion staked its claim at least partially on the idea of the perceptions of a “reasonable” officer 
on the scene. Thus Duke’s technique was to play the video back almost frame by frame, carefully 
justifying each blow and kick individually, in order to visually shape the jury’s empathic 
connection to the police. Sun Tzu’s ancient admonition in The Art of War (n.d.) that “all warfare 
is based on deception” (1.18) applies to many such tactics, in which the law is approached (and 
undermined) artistically.  
After introducing numerous damning statistics on the contingent factors affecting judicial 
rulings (such as the judge’s age and whether or not he has eaten lunch), not to mention all the 
contingent factors affecting the availability and validity of evidence, Benforado concludes by 
advocating for constraints on judges’ interpretive freedom. He prescribes legal solutions that 
remove subjective interpretation, but without an eye to the unintended consequences of 
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automating a procedure as complex as a criminal trial. If instead we accept that subjectivity may 
necessarily be part of the judicial process, might judicial creativity be productively conflated 
with “art?”  
Critic Rosalind Krauss (1983) makes explicit a connection between art criticism and legal 
testimony in describing how critics scrambled to find ancient and exotic precedents for an 
“expanded field” of sculpture, lamenting that “anything at all could be hauled into court to bear 
witness to this work’s connection to history and thereby to legitimize its status as sculpture” (p. 
33). On the other hand, Pierre Bourdieu is something of a skeptic as to the relevance of art to 
authority, declaring that “one cannot read a piece of Dadaist poetry at a Cabinet meeting” 
(1982/1991, p. 113). While this may be true for a Cabinet meeting, or for testimony in court, he 
ignores the inherently whimsical nature of the legislative filibuster; this will be discussed later. 
At any rate, Bourdieu inadvertently points out an important way in which art and philosophy 
operate in parallel with legal hermeneutics, in a slighting comparison of philosopher Martin 
Heidegger to Dadaist artist Marcel Duchamp.  
The relations which are established between the work of a great interpreter and the 
interpretations or over-interpretations it solicits… resemble perfectly… those which, 
since Duchamp, have developed between the artist and his group of interpreters; in both 
cases, the production anticipates the interpretation(.) (p. 154) 
Of course all art, not only Duchamp’s, functions through its circulation in and legitimation by a 
community of privileged interpreters, as do political actions. Bourdieu seems to acknowledge 
this when he says, “A political intention can be constituted only in one’s relation to a given state 
of the political game, and, more precisely, of the universe of the techniques of action it offers at 
any given moment” (p. 173).  
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In art, critics are traditionally the interpreters, acting as judges and teachers in relation to 
intrigued but untutored viewers. But early avant-garde artists started supplanting this critical role, 
taking “techniques of action” and questions of legitimacy as artistic material. Anarchistic Dada 
and Surrealist artists employed games and performances intended to lampoon the procedures and 
conventions of rule-making, while, along with their glorification of technology and war, the 
proto-fascist Italian Futurists may be best remembered for their propagandistic manifestos. For 
all his misgivings about art, Bourdieu affirms that “(l)egal discourse is a creative speech which 
brings into existence that which it utters” (p. 42). Granted, of course, that the law is recognized 
as legitimate by subjects, just as art awaits legitimation by critics, just as knowledge must be 
recognized as legitimate by students, as well as the teachers themselves—Lacan’s “subjects 
supposed to know.” And when mingled, these areas of education, art, and law can delegitimate 
each other, as with Bordieu’s critique of the way in which the pedagogical pandering he 
identifies in officially sanctioned Social Realist art reproduces the class-based distinctions he 
famously denigrates in education (p. 235).  
For all the promotion of populism among today’s social practice artists, an arena of 
contemporary visual practice where Laurie Jo Reynolds is generally located, it is noteworthy that 
the experience of such art is often not so much that of a focus group, as Marxist skeptics 
sometimes think (Cronan 2013), but of a classroom. The classroom for Foucault is a place for 
imparting discipline, and may be one of the most straightforward examples of a “pastoral” 
setting, in which a teacher is responsible (to the point of legal liability and loss of employment) 
for the success or failure of his vulnerable charges. Through the jury, the sacred role of the judge 
(and the law he represents) is, for better or worse, democratized and perhaps subverted. Speaking 
of the juror, treated more in my next chapter, the French political historian Alexis de Tocqueville 
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(1835/2010) refers to the courtroom as “a free school,… where the laws are taught to him in a 
practical way… by the efforts of the lawyers, the advice of the judge and the very passion of the 
parties,” concluding that the jury is “one of the most effective means that a society can use for 
the education of its people” (p. 448). Like a jury, the former prisoners and family members that 
worked alongside Laurie Jo Reynolds as Tamms Year Ten represented and advocated for their 
community in circumstances that at times required pedagogy and learning, but, in contradiction 
to de Tocqueville, for the most part they promoted shared effort over and above passive 
absorption of knowledge. And, as juries sometimes do, they sought to counter the power of the 
judge and the administrator by reversing the series of decisions that sent men to Tamms. 
In her linguistic analysis of how judges assert control in the courtroom, anthropologist 
Susan U. Philips (1998) contends that judges who focus on transparency and on oral procedure, 
rather than on interpreting the written record, risk their authority and reputation in a manner 
analogous to the archetypal impotence of the substitute teacher (p. 89). This pedagogical attitude 
very much applies to how such “procedure-oriented” judges speak to juries. Philips quotes one 
judge on addressing jurors: 
 …(J)urors, they walk into a courtroom in many instances never having been there before, 
not knowing what to expect. There’s a lot of mumbo jumbo legal-talk going on. I think 
it’s important and I try to make an effort, particularly when I’m impaneling a jury, to set 
them at ease… And I think they function better if they feel relaxed and comfortable in the 
situation they find themselves in, and I hope I accomplish that. (p.108) 
Such judges, in Philips’ account, are also more likely to try to engage verbally with defendants. 
The precarious status of a judge who seeks to actively involve a defendant in establishing the 
factual record of a case, rather than simply treating them as a mute witness to the proceedings, 
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results largely from the fact that defendants often refuse to cooperate in this quasi-pedagogical 
operation. The situation bears significant resemblance to the dynamic between a teacher and a 
recalcitrant student in many compulsory education settings. Philips emphasizes, however, that 
for a judge such a compromised situation is not mandatory, but is a question of personal style—
in a word, aesthetics. 
The evaluation of a student’s academic performance, or the evaluation of a cultural 
artifact, has much in common with a common-law approach to adjudicating a court case based 
on principles derived from a combination of precedents. While judgments often can be overruled 
on appeal, and some American judges are popularly elected, thus risking countless conflicts of 
interest in the process of campaigning (Brandenburg, 2014), the position a judge has in regard to 
the law is unique. On the practical side, she does not have to compromise like a legislator. Nor is 
she formally subservient to the law. Rather, as an interpreter, she is informally outside of it. She 
is an unlike a police officer, who is allowed the power of discretion. Judges, like teachers, are 
given the power of discernment.  
While the ideal of individual sovereignty is often opposed to the so-called “rule of law,” 
the notion of sovereignty was initially defined for Europe by Jean Bodin, a sixteenth-century 
legal scholar who asserted that legal discernment was the sole determinant of power (Franklin 
1963). Bodin’s view is that sovereignty is to remain absolute, indivisible, and perpetual, subject 
to no authority other than law itself. This definition, while it appears to be describing a king, is 
much closer to a magistrate. In a common-law courtroom, a space defined by the rules on which 
the judge bases her independent decision, a judge has the final word, while authority in an 
assembly is multiple and relative, and even a king or a general relies either on force or an 
acceptance of legitimacy. Within strict formal limits, a judge’s ruling is unquestionable. Of 
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course a judge’s decisions are often subject to a variety of considerations, and can be overruled 
by higher courts, but at least in a given courtroom a legal or ethical or practical ambiguity is 
temporarily resolved, in the same way that a relatively powerless teacher still is recognized as the 
formal authority in a classroom. Indeed, the simultaneously totalizing and flimsy formalism of 
the law typifies the simultaneous subjective certainty and public incoherence of aesthetic and 
moral judgments, as described by Immanuel Kant.  
The fact that Kant’s aesthetics are described most extensively in his Critique of Judgment 
is suggestive, as in German the term for judgment, Urteil, is regularly used in judicial contexts. 
To be precise, the German title of Kant’s volume uses the word “Urteilskraft,” referring to the 
power of judgment, but nonetheless, the logical context in which he discusses judgment 
encompasses both judicial and aesthetic rulings—with the former tending to fall under the 
category of “determinant” judgment, and the latter under “reflective” judgment.  
 A determinant judgment is one in which the universal is given and the particular is to be 
found. In making a reflective judgment we must find a universal for a given particular. 
(Makkreel 1990, p. 54) 
Nonetheless, both fall under the heading of judgment, which, according to Kant, “is the faculty 
of thinking the particular as contained within the universal” (as cited on p. 54).  Kant proposes 
that the freedom of aesthetic imagination “consists in the fact that it schematizes without a 
concept” (as cited on p. 55). But, much as with his well-known ethical “categorical imperative,” 
aesthetic pleasure arises paradoxically in “the imagination’s free conformity to law” (as cited on 
p. 46). Beauty manifests in “the possibility of experience as a system” (as cited on p. 59); with 
aesthetic judgment, “the pleasing form merely gives us hope that nature as a whole can be 
systematized” (p. 63). For him, there cannot be beauty without rules. Events, in their irreducible 
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particularity, always contain the possibility of revising universal schemes—as suggested by the 
difficulty Kant has in even specifying what qualifies as an aesthetic form (p. 59).  
Such ambiguity requires careful discernment, which presumably comes from rigorous 
training in interpretation. Some distance from Kant, at the other end of the German Romantic 
tradition, is Friedrich Nietzsche, a specialist in philology who asserted the “irreducibility of 
interpretation” as “a central feature of aesthetic understanding” (Cox, 1999, p. 3)--the aesthetic 
being, for Nietzsche, the most holistic form of understanding. Nietzsche also associates 
interpretation, which includes “forcing, adjusting, abbreviating, omitting, padding, inventing, 
(and) falsifying,” with the “will to power” (p. 171), his instinctual ideal for human flourishing.  
The very necessity of interpretation is occasioned by ambiguity, in law as much as in art 
(Thacher, 2001), and the deceptive use of ambiguity by police and prosecutors is a fundamental 
element of the American legal process (Shuy, 2017). The conceptualist artist Charles Gaines 
(2015) reflects on the creative power of the law to tell stories, without undue restriction by 
objective facts: 
The law deals with the issue of representation much better than art does. In law they’re 
not really dealing with what really happened. In law they are dealing with what kind of 
convincing narrative can we put out there to justify a particular interpretation of an event. 
There’s a recognition of the gap between what really happened and what we can say 
happened. There’s even this issue of whether empirical evidence can transcend our 
emotional and affective relationship with an event. How meaning is formed is a much 
more complicated process than what establishes evidence at an intellectual level. (Black, 
2015, para. 16) 
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Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) understood the act of narrating a novel to be one of organizing 
competing and contradictory points of view, thus making some interpretations more viable than 
others and framing meaning through the possibility of judgment. Judith Farr Tormey and Alan 
Tormey state that the possibility of competing interpretations create the possibility of ambiguity 
in visual art, just as in language (1983). Theorist Egon Bittner (1990) applies this sense of 
indeterminacy to any system of rules. While legal scholar Ronald Dworkin (1983) contends that 
literary judgment, like legal judgment, aims reflectively at authenticity, seeking one “best” 
possible interpretation, Bittner views courts as mere theaters of rationality, designed to erase the 
necessarily arbitrary aspect of the law.3 Legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart (1961) discusses the 
“open texture” of the law, in which interpretation relies on context—context being a feature that 
Bakhtin identifies as “emergent” in the interpretive experience of the reader, and thus not to be 
taken for granted any more than the testimony of the characters.  
Stanton Wortham (2001) talks about a CBS News story, broadcast days before the 1992 
U.S. presidential election, on allegations that George H.W. Bush lied about his knowledge of the 
Iran-Contra arms deal. The story uses vocabulary and various framing devices to make Dan 
Rather and the CBS law correspondent appear as if they are conducting a legal trial, but only 
presenting the case for the prosecution. Wortham contends that Bakhtin would analyze not the 
mere statements made by the speakers, but the enactment of the narrative, the “interactioning 
positionality” that makes Rather the prosecutor. Authoring requires juxtaposing voices; thus, 
novels are more than plot.  Narrators position themselves through characters in conflictual 
dialogue (“double voicing”). And like a trial, a narrative is dynamic, and can change directions at 																																																								
3 Conversely, the legal concept of “integrity” informs much copyright litigation in the world of 
theater, which can itself be understood as a realm of intense power struggles (McDonagh, 2014). 
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any time. Bakhtin likes indeterminacy; he makes it clear that narratives talk about objects, index 
voices, and establish a narrator position (“ventriloquation”).  The narrative context “refracts” 
words like light, illuminating objects only partially. 
The source of narration in a criminal trial, as in the CBS News story, is always framed by 
the prosecution. The enormous creative power of the prosecutor uniquely spans all three 
branches of government. Prosecutors act in a judicial role on behalf of the law enforcement 
mandate of the executive branch, and, while not writing laws, they select charges and, through 
the plea bargain process, they effectively negotiate the consequences of transgression on a case-
by-case basis. “In the early stages (of a case), the prosecutor acts most like the magistrate;” 
writes Jerome H. Skolnick (1966), “in the later stages he necessarily comes to represent law 
enforcement.” While the low standard of probable cause by which prosecutors justify charges 
contravenes the principles of much early American jurisprudence (Ortman 2016), it has gained 
currency, even with the explosion in plea bargains, and is not a difficult standard to meet in 
constructing a story. Plea bargains concocted by prosecutors have become the norm in American 
criminal convictions, constituting what Brady Heiner (2015) refers to as “procedural 
entrapment.” 
In Hegel’s Science of Logic (1812/ n.d.), he makes space for ambiguity when he 
introduces the idea of “infinite judgment,” (§ 1376). An example he gives is an act of theft; it 
does not dispute ownership, as a legal case might, but implicitly negates the very presumption of 
a right to personal property. It seems that, as Hegel himself suggests, that infinite judgment is in 
fact a description of a nonsensical proposition. Perhaps both crime and policing could be 
characterized as an infinite judgment, the negative supplement that creates space for law. But it 
seems that Hegel offers the possibility of a judgment outside of judgment, which would perhaps 
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be an apt description of the prosecutor—an extension of the police who shapes the majority of 
criminal sentencing through the plea bargain process, an event in lieu of trial which often 
provokes no serious interpretive challenge, as public defenders often serve at the pleasure of a 
prosecutor, and have a far greater workload. The absence of due process is, as has been stated, 
quite relevant to every prisoner in Tamms. While many Tamms prisoners were doubtless 
sentenced under a plea bargain, and one prisoner, Mark Clements, was exonerated when his 
confession was found to have been extracted by torture, every man in Tamms was sent there 
from another prison with no charge and no hearing. 
The prosecutorial production is not a solo performance; it is often a technically advanced 
collaboration, much like an animated feature (Gershon 2015). And like animation, it is a story 
involving multiple media. Working in Sweden, Corinna Kruse (2016) structures a study of the 
treatment of forensic evidence around the shared prosecutorial effort to construct convincing 
narratives. She points out that “connections between story elements—for example, pieces of 
evidence—are what comprise the context within which to understand the central action” (p. 23). 
Prosecutors begin by “making the evidence part of legal stories—that is, through pretrial legal 
storytelling” (p. 34). But they have legions of support staff, as anyone who has watched televised 
police procedurals is aware. “Crime scene technicians transform the messy and material 
presumptive crime scene into an ordered and understandable contribution to the pretrial 
investigation’s multiple legal stories” (p. 105). In her conclusion she summarizes: 
 The crime scene technicians use “the story” around a case to examine the crime scene, 
and the abstractions they produce would not be useful to the investigation without the 
subsequent work of the forensic scientists, the investigators, and the prosecutors. (p. 150) 
Through their prosecution, defendants become characters in official state stories. 
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 Similarly, the “ventriloquation” Bakhtin identifies in novelists’ use of dialogue seduces 
the reader to legalistically judge characters’ intentions, so that education, like aesthetics, 
becomes a formal interrogation of unique, individual truth. The teacher is also an interpreter, 
perhaps first and foremost. Not all teachers see themselves in this way, but the standardization of 
textbooks, curricula, and achievement tests in countries with compulsory schooling situate the 
responsibility of teachers vis-à-vis a collection of texts. And on the basis of these texts he must 
judge his pupils. While not all schools give grades, the ones that do not may prepare “portfolios” 
or extensive written assessments that include more detailed evidence and thus assess with even 
greater scrutiny (Jones, 1995). In a compulsory situation, behavior must be evaluated along with 
academic progress, and so, as with judgments in courts of law, students’ intentions, in 
manifesting learning deficits and/or willful disruption, determine what responses are deemed 
appropriate. As over-scrutinized as teachers are, the role of interpreter does carry its own power: 
the authority of judgment. 
 
 
2.2  Ambiguity and silence 
 
Lynn Mather (2011) discusses the difficulty of gathering data on American trends in legal 
malfeasance and malpractice. “Individual states control their own disciplinary processes and few 
publish aggregate data… Many insurance companies, especially those covering large law firms, 
will not share information with the ABA (American Bar Association) for its report,” she writes, 
adding: “Even with better data on discipline and claims, we still would lack a clear picture of 
attorney misconduct without knowing something about the complaint process” (p. 130). Much of 
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what Mather ends up discussing are strategies for avoiding both the risk and the appearance of 
misconduct. Not only do lawyers get to largely set and monitor their own standards of conduct 
through their own professional associations, the ABA and other bars, the United States is a 
country largely run by lawyers—an observation famously made by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 
1830s (1835/2010)—primarily in the judiciary, but in the legislative and executive branches as 
well. He even comments upon legal language spreading throughout the population, saying (with 
unintentional double entendre), “the whole people have contracted some of the ways and tastes 
of a magistrate” (p. 441). Certainly American teachers can hardly hope to aspire to this iconic 
status.  
“Nowhere has the law left a larger portion of arbitrariness than in democratic republics,” 
muses de Tocqueville, “because there does not seem to be any reason to fear arbitrariness” (p. 
329). But law’s potential for violence is directly related to the ambiguity of language, While 
intrusive and even paradoxical laws that punish sex offenders long after they complete their 
sentences are being challenged on the basis of “void for vagueness”  (Reynolds 2016), vagueness 
is engaged deliberately in the work of renowned conceptual artist Lawrence Weiner, who said in 
1969, “I like language very much because it’s ambiguous.” Weiner explains further,  
When you read the language, or when you translate the language from one language to 
another language to another language, which is part of the new work I’ve been doing, you 
add to the ambiguity of the piece . . . So the language, really, in my eyes, helps to get 
away from this thing of what something should look like and just deals with it as a 
general thing. (Alberro and Norvell 2001, p. 107) 
Weiner thus wants to erode epistemological boundaries; he uses ambiguity to conflate Kant’s 
categories of judging the particular from the universal (determinant judgment) with judging the 
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universal from the particular (reflective judgment). But this transcendent level of ambiguity is 
key to the authority of the law, not only because it ratifies often arbitrary exercises of power, but 
because law must point to itself as a source of order—what Jacques Lacan calls a “master-
signifier,” intended to stabilize meaning via tautology (Žižek 1991, p. 35).  
Conceptual Art is founded on tautology-- perhaps exemplified in its most banal form in 
the works of Joseph Kosuth, in which objects are juxtaposed with their depictions and 
descriptions. Apprehending this tautological ambiguity requires extra effort, one might say 
discomfort, on the part of viewers. Weiner says that, 
this is the first art . . . where the information about the art is as important for knowing 
about the art as the art itself—which may be a lack and may not be because information 
about anything is necessary. You can’t really go in front of a Barnett Newman painting, 
without knowing a little bit about art, and know what it’s all about. So you can’t be 
confronted by a piece of mine without knowing a little bit about the aesthetic. (Alberro 
and Norvell 2001, p. 105) 
Access to contextual information allows some ambiguity to be reduced, but the meaning of a 
piece of Conceptual Art, just like a common-law precedent, exists as a game of Telephone, a 
floating suspicion built from compromised phrases, thus operating like what Oliver Wendell 
Holmes called “a brooding omnipresence,” and what Lacan might identify as a “big Other” that 
guarantees the consistency of reality.4  
																																																								
4 It is then fascinating to see how Weiner’s own voice as an artist was legally silenced in 1992, 
when his dealer disavowed responsibility for paying to store a piece by saying: “Without 
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 Combining silence, rumor, and schadenfreude, Ted Purves (2005) writes about a project 
whose only documentation (until he wrote about it) was the testimony of the British artist who 
initiated it. The artist, Johnny Spencer, was invited in 1997 to take part in an public art festival in 
Thailand called Chiang Mai Social Installation: Week of Cooperative Suffering. Spencer 
contacted a local school for the blind, and got two blind girls to volunteer to walk around the city 
with him, acting as guides and discussing the different public pieces in the festival that he 
described for them.  “To blind people,” one of the young women said, “talking is art” (p. 42). 
When Spencer recreated this, he called the project Site-Seeing, and it was not documented in any 
of the literature surrounding the festival. Purves views Spencer’s tourist project through a rose-
tinted anthropological discourse of ritual exchange, saying: "Where the gift and the discharge of 
the debt that it brings on are brought forth simultaneously, there is no real cognizance of the 
intention and its attendant burden, only an experience of the community that has been formed" 
(p. 43). A similar dynamic occurred with Simone Leigh’s 2016 show Waiting Room at New 
York’s New Museum, at which many events, geared toward particular groups of Black women 
and girls, and not documented for the public, took place while the museum was closed. Critic 
Helen Molesworth (2018) identifies Leigh’s “forthright insistence… that black women are the 
work’s privileged audience” as “both deeply necessary and positively exhilarating” (p. 168). For 
better or worse, then, visible invisibility is perhaps the key to the aesthetic reception of practices 
that seem to defy aesthetic reception.5   																																																																																																																																																																																		
purchase there is no property right. What is stored is material without artistic value” (as cited in 
Camnitzer 2007, p. 260). 
5 Cf. Claire Bishop’s discussion in Artificial Hells (2012) of unofficial, private forms of 
participatory art in the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. 
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Philip Abrams (1977/1988) notes that “an integral element of (state) power is the quite 
straightforward ability to withhold information, deny observation and dictate the terms of 
knowledge” (p. 62). “Omission becomes a form of expression,” says legal scholar Patricia J. 
Williams (1991) in regard to the legal invisibility of Blacks and women (p. 121). Becky Pettit 
(2012) writes about how, via incarceration, law is erasing the ability to even statistically record 
racial disparity in America. 
There is no valid comparison group for many of America’s inmates exactly because 
incarceration now inheres in whole sociodemographic groups, making it increasingly 
difficult to identify the effect of incarceration.  (2012, Kindle Locations 1796-1797). 
I want to call attention to this surprisingly “loud” insistence upon anonymity and ineffability, and 
suggest that the intentional ambiguity of law, combined with the hidden misery being addressed 
in politically performative artworks, is reminiscent of the fearful silence demanded in a 
courtroom or a classroom, or in John Cage’s well-known silent composition, 4’33”. The 
imaginary orgies of the Marquis de Sade are an intriguing space of dominance and silence; 
Barthes (1971/1976) calls this silence “the silence of the libidinous machine” (p. 166). 
A strain of text-based art has emerged over the last decade, in which sections of blacked-
out text call attention to secrets, often through the odd blocky shapes formed by lines of obscured 
type. This motif has existed for years in the work of artists like Jenny Holzer, who has used 
numerous media and approaches in presenting extensively redacted classified documents from 
the U.S. government’s “War on Terror” after the 9/11 attacks, and Jill Magid, whose own 
documentary work on the Dutch secret service was redacted and then exhibited (Lee 2011), as 
well as in artist and journalist Laura Poitras’s 2016 Disposition Matrix and Navine G. Khan-
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Dossos’s 2016 series of paintings Remaining and Expanding, based on redacting pages from 
Dabiq, the online media outlet for ISIS. Jamal Cyrus’ images Mentuhotep (2008/2015) and 
Cultr-ops (2008), both graphite powder on paper, are based on files the FBI kept on Black 
radicals during the 1960s through its controversial COINTELPRO program. Filmmaker Steve 
McQueen’s video installation End Credits (2012/2016) gives visual and audio form to the FBI’s 
profusely redacted file on multitalented African-American performer and activist Paul Robeson. 
As subject matter, these partially-erased government documents have various points of visual 
and conceptual appeal. For one, the act of censorship is such a rare curiosity in the West that the 
act of exposing it carries an undeniable transgressive satisfaction. As suggested above, the 
transformation of words to non-signifying shapes has an enigmatic formal cachet. But perhaps 
the most important aspect of such work is pedagogical. Lessons in history are conveyed, as they 
are in the classroom, through selective and decisive erasure. 
 Silence and solitude entered the world of punishment with the modern concept of the 
penitentiary, which was developed in European monastic orders and ecclesiastical law (Peters 
1998, Johnston 2000, Cassidy-Welch 2011) before being theorized by American Founding 
Father Benjamin Rush, who in March 1787 wrote a pamphlet entitled “An Enquiry into the 
Effects of Public Punishments on Criminals, and on Society.” The problem with public 
punishment, according to Rush, was that it gave prisoners an unearned sense of their own power, 
while witnesses of their punishment were prone to feelings of “abortive sympathy,” or even 
veneration for criminals. “Sympathy” and “sensibility,” in his analysis, were responsible for 
forming citizens or, in Rush’s terms, converting them into pious, disciplined, stoic, and 
industrious “republican machines.” And yet, despite his repeated insistence on moral 
rehabilitation, he was at least dimly aware of the torment that came to be widely associated with 
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long-term solitary confinement. 
A wheelbarrow, whipping post, nay a gibbet, are all light punishments compared with 
letting a man’s conscience loose upon him in solitude.  .  .  . A bad man should be left for 
some time without anything to employ his hands in his confinement. Every thought 
should recoil wholly upon himself. (as cited in Lisa Guenther 2013, Kindle location 
611/6792) 
Rush’s ideas on reducing spectacle while increasing punishment, and thus moral education, 
influenced the first modern prisons, including the Auburn Correctional Facility in New York 
state, which opened in 1818, and Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia, opened in 1829. In 
these facilities, inmates were kept in isolation and forced to remain silent, in order to reflect on 
their misdeeds. In this view, the prison was to be a space of teaching—not primarily through 
specific texts and lessons—though there were silent prison classrooms as well, as in the Surrey 
House of Correction in England--but through the very architecture and regime of the institution.  
The ways that “reforming” individuals has in modern times been bound up with both law 
and pedagogy is famously chronicled in Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1975/1995), 
in which he relates an 1842 quote from the Journal des economistes:  
Alone in his cell, the convict is handed over to himself; in the silence of his passions and 
of the world that surrounds him, he descends into his conscience, he questions it and feels 
awakening within him the moral feeling that never entirely perishes in the heart of man. 
(as cited on p. 238) 
Even at the dawn of penitentiary discipline in the U.S., Philadelphia’s Walnut Street Prison 
“functioned more as a means to regulate the poor—especially poor women and African 
Americans—than to embody a more just and rational practice of justice” (Meranze 2016, p. 758). 
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Lawrence Friedman (1993) describes the remodeling of the facility in 1790, where all cells were 
for solitary confinement.  At this facility, the intention was to add “unremitted solitude to 
laborious employment” (as cited on p. 78).  Philadelphia’s Cherry Hill prison, built in 1829, 
made use of Jeremy Bentham’s “panopticon” layout, memorably described by Foucault, in which 
prisoners isolated in a circle of cells are watched from a central point. Also in Philadelphia, and 
also a panopticon, inmates at Eastern Penitentiary were blindfolded when in transit.  
All of these facilities enforced a code of total silence. Upon visiting silent American 
penitentiaries, both Alexis de Tocqueville and the English novelist Charles Dickens documented 
their atmosphere of morbid cruelty. Dickens wrote,  
I hold this slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably 
worse than any torture of the body: and because the ghastly signs and tokens are not so 
palpable to the eye and sense of touch as scars upon the flesh; because its wounds are not 
upon the surface, and it extorts few cries that human ears can hear; therefore I the more 
denounce it as a secret punishment which slumbering humanity is not roused up to stay.” 
(as cited in Reiter 2016, p. 179) 
Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania model was adopted by other states. In New York from 1821 to 
1823, solitary confinement without labor was briefly attempted, but prisoners couldn’t take it: 
one threw himself “from the fourth gallery, upon the pavement,” and another “beat and mangled 
his head against the walls of his cells, until he destroyed one of his eyes” (as cited on p. 79). 
“From then on,” Friedman continues, “hard labor was the absolute rule” (p. 79). 
Although practices of solitary confinement were recognized as cruel at the time and 
generally abolished in the 1850s, they have returned to wide use, despite a great number of 
studies attesting to their potential for profound and permanent psychic injury, especially over 
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long periods (Cloud, Drucker, Browne, and Parsons, 2014; Felthouse, 1997; Smith, 2006; Haney, 
1993; Haney, 1997; Haney, 2003; Rhodes, 2005; Andersen, et. al., 2000; Franke, 2014), and 
numerous largely unsuccessful legal challenges based on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of legal due 
process. The impact is most clearly devastating for mentally ill prisoners, who are much more 
likely to be placed in solitary confinement, make up a large portion of the incarcerated 
population (Lovell et al., 2000), and are overrepresented in supermax units (Haney, 2003; Cloyes 
et al., 2006; Lovell, 2008). In the past few decades, the critiques directed at solitary confinement 
have been to some degree deflected by redefining these practices using the ambiguous but 
racially charged term “segregation” (van Aken, 2016).  
While a “public secret” generally describes a situation in which everyone knows about a 
scandalous fact that is never mentioned, the existence of “black sites” in the American policing 
and prison system somehow inverts that—in which people who work in a city or interact with a 
state government remain unaware of an institution that nonetheless exists in plain sight, 
documented in the public record. Just as with the secretive Homan Square police station in 
Chicago that the Guardian investigated in 2014, the very existence of the Tamms prison was 
both secret to the citizens of Illinois, and infamous to its prisoners. While working on the 
campaign against segregation practices at the Federal prison in Marion, Illinois, Laurie Jo 
Reynolds attended a rally at which she asked the mother of a man incarcerated at Tamms how 
often she spoke to her son, and was told that he could not make phone calls—this was her 
introduction to the idea of the Tamms prison. Even men sent to Tamms would wait weeks to find 
out why they had been sent there. “The thing about going to Tamms was there were no clear 
criteria,” Reynolds has said. “It was very unclear why people were at Tamms” (Dunn, 2013, 
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para. 9). Long-time TY10 volunteer Carol Wilcox said that when the group started talking about 
Tamms to legislators, “they had no idea Illinois had that type of prison” (personal 
communication, July 17, 2014). The Illinois Department of Corrections, Wilcox said, even told 
lawmaker Eddie Washington, an early TY10 supporter, that he could not enter Tamms for a tour. 
The revelation of these restricted circuits of knowledge about violence can be seen in the sudden 
recent proliferation of videos exposing the police violence against communities of color that has 
gone on for centuries. 
As demonstrated by a mass protest at the Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá, Colombia in 
February 1948, when one hundred thousand marchers gathered in silence to mourn state 
brutality, public silence can serve as an expressive form of passive resistance. One of the last 
public Tamms Year Ten performances was silent, taking place at the 2013 Creative Time 
Summit, where Reynolds received the Leonore Annenberg Prize for Art and Social Change. This 
performance involved TY10 activists Darrell Cannon and Reginald “Akkeem” Berry, who each 
served several years in Tamms, and Brenda Smith, the mother of a currently incarcerated 
prisoner who was in Tamms for 14 years; each individual stood in silence on stage for the 
number of minutes that matched the relevant number of years of incarceration in Tamms. 
Interviewed on the art podcast Bad at Sports (2014), artist and activist Mary Patten reported on 
Reynolds’s act as a transgression of the Summit’s strict time restrictions, and on a criticism she 
heard secondhand that this gesture amounted to Reynolds effectively “objectifying the bodies” of 
prisoners. To an extent this might be true—despite the “dematerialization” of conceptualism, 
much social practice art is no more able than a teacher to work without at least an occasional 
visual performance. But neither this anonymous comment, nor Patten’s subsequent dismissal of 
it, fully reflect the subtlety of Laurie Jo Reynolds’ gesture—which, I think, has everything to do 
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2.3  Judicial exceptions and conceptual critics 
 
Just as Tamms Year Ten used art to enact a critique of law, judges have stepped into the 
role of art critics at points, rendering judgments in which they attempt to stabilize art’s murky 
social role. While art can function discursively in a manner similar to law, without 
acknowledgement by legal entities, law can define the possibilities of symbolic pleasure that art 
will exploit through various narratives around transgression. One example among many is the 
1892 U.S. copyright case of Fuller v. Bemis, cited by Jacques Rancière (2013), in which the 
court deemed the fluttering fabric dances of Loie Fuller unworthy of intellectual property 
protection because of its non-symbolic embodiment, saying that her dance “can hardly be called 
dramatic” (p. 102).  But Rancière also cites the contemporaneous critic Roger Marx, who, in the 
vein of John Ruskin, praised the expressive utility of the decorative arts, while also claiming that 
Fuller’s dance “proved to hold interest for aesthetics, sociology, and political economy at the 
same time,” asserting what Rancière calls “the formative potential of a new society“ (p. 145).  
Further, Philippe-Alain Michaud argues in his analysis of Aby Warburg (2007) that 
Fuller’s dances represent a revisionist view of Renaissance classicism emerging from Dionysian 
ecstasy and trance. This Dionysian element reappears in Opera Sextronique, a 1967 performance 
collaboration between artists Charlotte Moorman and Nam June Paik, in which Moorman played 
the cello in various states of undress, sometimes wearing an animal mask. The duo had debuted 
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their ambitious suite before uniformed police beforehand in order to avoid prosecution, but when 
Moorman defied a rarely-enforced law on topless public performance (just before it was 
superseded by a new law), she was arrested, and contested the charges in court on the grounds of 
its artistic content (Landres, 2017).6 A cultural analysis (though not a legal one) could place 
Fuller and Moorman neither beneath nor above, but before and beyond the court rulings. 
If Michaud’s logic were as applied to a judicial model, it might seem somewhat like the 
“originalist” judicial stance expressed by late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, in 
which “someone interprets legal provisions as their words were originally understood” (Ponnuru, 
2017, para. 1), yet without regard for the intent of lawmakers (para. 7). Rob Hunter (2014) 
summarizes originalism as “the doctrine that the views and preferences of long-dead politicians 
and judges should supersede those of the living” (para. 11), arguing that the nature of such 
constitutional fundamentalism is irrevocably conservative. Regardless, Fuller is not judging or 
citing, she is producing her own history, in the way a new law attains legitimacy through 
addressing a pre-existing necessity—approaching the virtual realm denoted since ancient Greece 
and Rome by the ideal of natural law. Žižek (2012) often refers to Hegel’s view of history, in 
which radical change appears, as does Fuller’s classical inspiration, by “retroactively positing its 
own presuppositions” (p. 251), a view that may not appeal to judicial purists, but at least sets an 
imaginary stage where art can confront law. So the cultural vanguard recognizes its purpose as 
one of making law and overturning precedents—even retroactively, in the case of Loie Fuller as 
parsed by Michaud. 																																																								
6 In 1967 Moorman also was castigated by the artist John Cage for her interpretation of one of 
his indeterminate performance scores; Lauren van Haaften-Schick (2018) compares this dispute 
to a lawsuit for breach of contract. 
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But not all judicial questions on art have such a clear solution. In discussing the law 
around image appropriation and copyright from Pop Art and Pictures to today, Martha Buskirk 
(2014) states an obvious paradox succinctly: 
Content producers (many of whom are otherwise known as artists) do indeed have a 
vested interest in copyright protections… Yet artists are also more likely to push the 
envelope with respect to assertions of fair use that extend beyond prescribed terms of 
service(.) (p. 166). 
Few artists likely felt sympathy for Island Records in their lawsuit on behalf of mega-rockstars 
U2 against underground audio bricoleurs Negativland, any more than the record companies that 
drove sampling out of hip-hop in the early 1990s, but Shepard Fairey’s uncredited appropriations 
of other protest art could be seen as more problematic (Rodriguez, 2009). Malawi-born artist 
Samson Kambalu was sued by a radical artist, the Italian Situationist Gianfranco Sanguinetti, for 
a 2015 piece that made use of unauthorized copies of Sanguinetti’s archived papers; Kambalu’s 
anarchist gesture was eventually vindicated in court. African-American artist Sondra Perry 
created a digitally-rendered video about her brother Sandy, whose likeness was appropriated 
without his consent for a basketball game by the video game company Electronic Arts, for a 
show at New York’s Bridget Donahue Gallery in February 2018. In another vein, Luis Camnitzer 
(2007) tells us that in 1988, in regard to a question of importing Cuban art under the American 
embargo, “the U.S. federal courts ruled that art is information and not merchandise” (p. 191), 
perhaps inadvertently striking a theoretical blow for Conceptual Art against Pop Art.  
Just as judges act as art critics and theorists, critics and theorists of art are themselves 
judges and teachers, in the sense that a proper outlook on all artwork (Kant’s “reflective 
judgment”) is expressed through specific examples (Kant’s “determinant judgment”). Like 
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judges issuing a ruling, they are generally encouraged by their audience to be as 
uncompromising as possible, while, like teachers, they are expected to communicate the truth of 
an experience. Conceptualist art opened up questions on the form of didacticism within 
modernist art, but religious and political popular art forms have utilized didactic approaches for 
centuries. In appealing to readers and listeners, these artists plead a case, just like a trial lawyer 
paid to act as if her moral judgment favored her client, or a teacher paid to enforce both truth and 
discipline. The only difference between the didacticism of a teacher and a conceptualist artist, 
according to Brian O’Doherty (1986), is that the artist teaches “by irony and epigram, by 
cunning and shock” (p. 70). For their part, the judgments of critics can be entertaining, 
pretentious, or irksome, but, despite their triviality, they bear comparison with the most severe 
judgments, in that the edification of some unenlightened addressee is necessarily invoked. 
 Awkward judicial efforts to discipline legal ambiguity evoke the position of a teacher 
who must insist on the consistency of established rules, rather than changing or eliminating them. 
In the 1989 case of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony 
Kennedy made the absurd claim that Miss Patterson, a Black woman claiming to have been 
harassed and fired by her employer because of her race, would not merely need to have signed a 
contract when she was hired that specifically barred her employer from racial harassment and 
dismissal, but would actually need to have been presented by her employer with a contract that 
actually explicitly did contain the right to race-based harassment and dismissal, and then to have 
rejected that contract (Campbell, 2004, p. 175). This is because of Kennedy’s desire to remain 
consistent with the wording of a ruling in an earlier case, that of Runyon v. McCrary (1976), in 
which two Black girls were expelled from an all-white private school. Judicial interpretations of 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1964, 1965, and 1992 have provided a range of efforts to curtail 
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the freedoms claimed by members of protected groups in specific circumstances, and the 
existence of these multiple legislative acts largely represent a desire on the part of the legislature 
to then reformulate the rules by which such cases are judged, and thereby reassert the attendant 
rights. For their part, the Supreme Court justices, as in the case of Affirmative Action and school 
desegregation, have seen fit to repeatedly roll back what few anti-segregation legislative 
protections exist. 
 It doesn’t seem that many solutions can be found in unrestrained judicial-pedagogical 
creativity. While in the West the secular idea of rehabilitation through imprisonment is 
associated with relatively recent reforms proposed by Cesare Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham, and 
American Founding Father Benjamin Rush, it resonates both with medieval European religious 
practices (Peters, 1998; Johnston, 2000; Cassidy-Welch, 2011), as well as a similar idea of 
reform that has held sway in China for centuries (Martin, 2014). Chinese methods of re-
education were cited as highly influential in CIA reports that helped to initiate a return to 
practices of solitary confinement (Guenther, 2013). In general, Communist regimes in the 
twentieth century were known for claiming to substitute education for punishment, such that the 
sentences bestowed upon those deemed bourgeois and intellectually counterrevolutionary were 
pronounced as instruction rather than cruelty—essentially, doctrinal rehabilitation. The juridical 
massacres overseen by Joseph Stalin offer a memorable example of such a dynamic. 
The so-called “show trials” under Stalin began as more “show” than “trial.” They were 
dramatic public shaming sessions, growing out of confessional interrogations by local 
Communist Party officals, and only later developed into the high-profile events of the mid-1930s 
(Fitzpatrick, 1999). Robert Conquest (2008) wryly comments, in regard to the Soviet Union 
under Stalin, “it is extraordinary how many of the leading terrorist bands were headed by 
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historians” (p. 291). It is also noteworthy that the thousands of deliberate executions undertaken 
by the Stalin regime, in stark opposition to those of the Nazis, made extensive use of the courts 
as a means of punishing anti-Party heresy. The court of record in political cases under Stalin was 
the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, which managed after 1934 to streamline its 
operations impressively; “It took mere minutes even for leading officials…Thus the Collegium 
got through tens of thousands of cases in the years of the Terror” (p. 283). Laws on terrorism, 
sabotage, and “crimes against State property” were vastly broadened and extended. The crime 
“suspicion of espionage” carried a sentence of eight years (p. 285). State prosecutor Andrey 
Vyshinsky declared that “there are no ordinary criminal offenses, that these offenses now 
became crimes of a political order” (as cited on p. 283). Upon making this poetic leap, 
Vyshinsky then aesthetically declared that “the art of identifying saboteurs” did not require a 
lengthy investigation, but merely required “political flair” (as cited on p. 284). A memorable 
actor in this bloody drama was the informer Polia Nikolaenko, who helped seal the fate of 8,000 
people; Stalin called her a “heroic denunciatrix” (as cited in Brodeur, 2010, p. 239). There would 
be no end to the executions until Stalin called a voluntary halt, which only happened when the 
very structure of the state, economically and institutionally, was on the verge of collapse (p. 
290). While the backdrop of the Tamms closure was a state budget battle that hardly approached 
the instability of Stalinist Russia, the ceaseless condemnations would not cease, despite (as with 
Stalin) torture in both police and correctional custody, until executive action was taken by the 
Illinois governor. 
As Stalin knew, a decision from a position of judicial authority usually acts to endorse the 
power of the state. Reynolds knew it too, and chose in her organizing efforts to largely bypass 
the judiciary. “For the sovereignty of the state is marked precisely by this power to decide, to 
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judge, to rule, to interpret freely and sovereignly what is exceptional, what is the exception,” 
says Jacques Derrida (2014). “Sovereignty is the absolute exception,” Derrida asserts, tweaking 
Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt’s axiom that “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (p. 129). 
The Roman emperor, who could issue laws, rulings, and commands, is perhaps the archetype of 
this principle. The emperor Justinian, known for his codification of the massive Roman legal 
corpus, provided an excellent example, as when in 535 CE he agreed to a petition by a widow 
named Gregoria to contravene a law set out in the revised code he had issued just a year earlier. 
But, along with also being the supreme ecclesiastical authority, Justinian was a pedagogue, as he 
was responsible for the Institutes, textbooks created for beginning law students (Humfress, 
2005). 
A compelling modern example of the exception as an expression of state power can be 
seen in Harris v. New York (1971), and several other Supreme Court rulings on exceptions to the 
Constitution’s exclusionary rule, the rule intended to bar illegally obtained evidence from being 
used in prosecutions.  
 With so many exceptions, any police officer informed of the law would realize there was 
virtually always some potential to make use of illegally seized material, or un-Miranda-
ized testimony, in some way… The existence of previous exceptions made any new 
exception a sure thing. (Campbell, 2004, p. 107) 
This authority is, however, formally limited in the case of the judge, who is granted wide 
discretion primarily “in order to distinguish between the relative blameworthiness of individuals” 
(Hessick, p. 148n). While these moral overtones are suppressed, this holds true as well for the 
reputable critic and the teacher subject to standards-based evaluation. Discussing the ambiguous 
ambit of international courts, Mohamed Shahabuddeen (2010) observes that “judicial creativity 
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cannot be used to fill any conceivable gap in the law,” and “(j)udicial creativity is not license for 
unregulated action.” And yet, in these courts, judicial creativity “is intrinsic and fundamental to 
the judicial process. It does not have to be justified under any more specific grant of jurisdiction” 
(p. 187). 
 But this creativity must not announce itself, appearing rather as mindful obedience—a 
performance typical of modern authority figures, and surprisingly characteristic of the anxiety of 
influence among artists. Applied to the law, such obedience resembles the instinctive choices 
made by artists. Reflecting upon the intuitive, analogical approach to common-law judicial 
decisions based on using precedent to derive rules, Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin (2009) 
conclude that, if only by preserving a tradition of studying applied cases, this traditional form of 
interpretation is superior (in their realist paradigm) to a rigorously rational philosophical 
approach. “Experience tells us that, in fact, we do follow rules without reflection,” they say. 
“Assuming this is true, we must follow the rules without the assistance of philosophy, which tells 
us that unreflective rule following is not rational” (p. 243).  
In the same volume, Stephen D. Smith (2009) describes the concept of rational 
jurisprudence taken up by philosophers of law as not only undesirable but delusional. Smith 
claims that, while lawyers and judges insist that  “legal arguments and decisions are not 
attempting to ascertain and give effect to some preexisting hidden or transcendental model” (p. 
254), this is exactly what they do in practice. One reason he suggests for this ongoing fidelity 
within the legal community to a phantom moral absolute is that this projection may “enhance its 
aura of authenticity and impartiality” (p. 255). For the judicial Constitutional originalist, this aura 
may apply to an unambiguous founding document. Such an aura should never be overlooked 
when attempting to understand the boundary-setting power of a teacher—as when George H. 
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Taylor (2009), from the same volume on realist jurisprudence, concludes his rumination on legal 
creativity with a recommendation to include imaginative applied exercises in law school 
curricula (p. 86).  
Jacques Rancière (2010) similarly disputes the aura of pedagogical rationalism presented 
in Theodor Adorno‘s Kulturkritik, which Rancière describes as “part of the Romantic re-
enchantment that has expanded ad infinitum the sensorium of art as the field of disused objects 
encrypting a culture” (p. 128). Adorno is known for demanding a form of political truth from art; 
he favors art that acknowledges itself as a self-aware fiction, through its “powerlessness and 
superfluity in the empirical world” (1970/1997, p. 144). For him this anti-mimetic modesty, this 
confessional quality, is an indication of autonomy. In contrast to Adorno, Guy Debord, renowned 
theorist of the “spectacle,” reflected in 1961: 
The critic is someone who makes a spectacle out of his very condition as a spectator — a 
specialized and therefore ideal spectator, expressing his ideas and feelings about a work 
in which he does not really participate. He re-presents, restages, his own nonintervention 
in the spectacle. (para. 8) 
But the line-drawing authority of the critic has been appropriated by artists themselves, creating 
the conditions for Tamms Year Ten to be considered as an artwork. Theorist Boris Groys, (2014) 
notes: 
Art activists do not want to merely criticize the art system or the general political and 
social conditions under which this system functions. Rather, they want to change these 
conditions by means of art—not so much inside the art system but outside it, in reality 
itself. (para. 1) 
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Critic Gregory Sholette (2016) suggests: “Conceptual artists may have opened the door to this 
ontological evasiveness in the 1960s when they stated that they were going to serve as their own 
art critics and theorists” (para. 5).  
Legal theater, staged expression before the authorities and/or before the people, including 
dramatic impersonation, has long been an element of the rhetorical training received by 
barristers, lawmakers, and bureaucrats—emphasized in the writings of Quintilian (Enders, 1992, 
p. 56), but present at least since the time of Plato, who called lawyers “the authors of a tragedy” 
(as cited on p. 56). One relatively recent example of the creative dialectic engaged in political 
struggles can be seen in the exposure of the FBI’s COINTELPRO program, in which numerous 
advocacy organizations were infiltrated and hundreds of activists were targeted for investigation, 
framing, or assassination in the 1960s. The program was first revealed by an oppositional 
performance: a carefully planned burglary of an FBI office in 1971 by a group calling itself The 
Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI—a burglary that involved costumed impersonations 
for both the scouting and the break-in. This burglary led eventually to the People’s Law Office in 
Chicago, through a long civil suit beginning in 1976, exposing thousands of documents on the 
FBI’s operations against the Black Panther Party in Chicago (Taylor, 2013). A later example of 
creative judicial resistance is the costumed figure Superbarrio Goméz in Mexico City, possibly 
one individual or a small group of performers who saved over 1500 people from eviction through 
the courts between 1987 and 1992, and who still continue(s) to make public appearances 
(Camnitzer, 2007, p. 257).  
Describing the kind of strategic mimetic reversal seen so often in politics, Nikole 
Hannah-Jones (2015) writes about how the deployment of white college applicant Abigail 
Fisher, in a conservative legal challenge to Affirmative Action in college admissions, echoed a 
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precedent tactic used by the NAACP during the civil rights era, when they challenged laws using 
plaintiffs “who would elicit both sympathy and outrage” (para. 4). This actually echoes a strategy 
that groups advocating civil rights have used ever since the staged conflict that resulted in the 
infamous “separate but equal” decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). In fact, the matter at issue 
in the equally famous reversal of Plessy, the school integration decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education (1955), was actually whether or not groups had the Constitutional right to pursue such 
a test case—a ruling that not only upheld the equity of access to education, but the dramatic 
nature of litigation (More Perfect, 2016).  
In the twentieth century, artists, like lawyers, began to use the judgment of critics as 
material for the setting of artistic precedent. The iconic artwork associated with the Dadaists, 
Marcel Duchamp’s immortal “readymade” sculpture Fountain, a urinal signed with Duchamp’s 
pseudonym “R. Mutt,” found its fame through being rejected for exhibition in 1917 by renowned 
painters Rockwell Kent and George Bellows, representing the Society of Independent Artists. 
Thierry de Duve (2014) says that “Duchamp alias Mutt had chosen the object so as to make sure 
it would be rejected.  He had set a trap” (p. 308). Duchamp challenged assertions of aesthetic 
freedom after the collapse of the Beaux-Arts system through the presentation of what might be 
thought of as a test case. The verdict passed on him redounded instead on to those who passed 
judgment. In doing so, he exposed a double standard, but he did not merely overturn a law. 
Naming a urinal art is an action, a legal reclassification, for which the object is just a 
placeholder.7 Huey Copeland (2013) makes an incisive analogy between readymades and legal 																																																								
7 On the topic of precedent, it is appropriate here to note that there is a dispute over the 
authorship of Fountain, which Julian Spalding and Glyn Thompson (2014), following the 
scholarship of Irene Gammel and Amelia Jones, attribute to the German artist, writer, and 
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subjection, saying that, long before Duchamp “turned a urinal into a work of art through a series 
of enunciative acts in 1917, Black bodies were subject to even more arbitrary and binding shifts 
in their categorical status, ready-mades avant la lettre”  (p. 18). The double-edged nature of 
precedent, illuminated by Copeland’s comparison, shaped the aesthetic and practical 
development of the Tamms campaign. 
 
 
2.4  Performance advocacy 
 
Hearings, meetings, and lobbying are actions that Reynolds regards as Tamms Year Ten 
performances, but she has worked on many projects that incorporate a more traditional idea of 
spectatorship. TY10 actions helped to create publicity around issues of solitary confinement, like 
a 2009 protest in which TY10 members brought ten corrections, written on tablets in the manner 
of the Ten Commandments, to the office of the Chicago Tribune in response to an opinion piece 
it had run on the new Illinois Governor Pat Quinn’s efforts to reform Tamms.  There was a 
parade for the tablets, a picketing circle, and addresses made by former inmates.  TY10 
representatives ended up meeting with the editorial board ahead of this protest, and members on 
the street below floated helium balloons with messages written on them, controlled like kites, up 
to the high floor on which the board was meeting.    
Creating creative cards to hand legislators, inspired by sources as far afield as 
performance artist Adrian Piper and affirmational mantras, would remain a recurring format used 																																																																																																																																																																																		
baroness Elsa, born Else Plotz in 1874.  In this account, the work is a protest against the U.S. 
entry into World War I, with Duchamp only claiming authorship in 1950, after Stieglitz’s death. 
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by the group. Reynolds gave speeches in university and cultural spaces nationwide on her work 
with TY10, which got the project support within the art community.  She continued to work with 
family members and other artists, activists, and community members, through rallies, vigils, 
mud-stenciling campaigns, press conferences, and several other formats, such as the 
collaborative project “Supermax Subscriptions,” in which people could donate frequent-flyer 
miles in order to buy magazine subscriptions for Tamms prisoners. 
While working with Tamms families in 2001, Reynolds visited Tamms with State 
Representative Lou Jones and was able to speak with inmates about their experiences in 
isolation.8 Although in a meeting with corrections officials in 2009 she was told that Tamms 
prisoners were allowed to get together and play Monopoly, Reynolds was, by that point, able to 
show that those prisoners were in a room together, but isolated in separate Plexiglass cages, 
termed “therapy booths.”  Inmates would be brought to this room for this kind of “social” 
interaction, or for counseling, but mostly for occasional television viewing.  Even this slight 
relief from the near-total sensory deprivation of the Tamms cells, Reynolds told me, was the 
result (the sole result) of a protracted lawsuit led by attorney Jean Snyder to get the prison to 
establish a mental health unit.  The therapy booth Monopoly game provided material for a re-
enactment of memorable TY10 moments that members, including released prisoners, put on as a 
public performance at Chicago’s Links Hall in 2009.   
																																																								
8 After founding Tamms Year Ten, she went to Tamms again in 2008 with Representative Eddie 
Washington and Malcolm Young of the John Howard Association, at the invitation of IDOC, but 




An image TY10 has made use of in rallies and photo opportunities since 2012 is the 
protest sign “I AM A MAN,” which the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME) famously used in a 1968 Memphis sanitation workers’ strike publicly 
supported by Martin Luther King, Jr. immediately before his assassination. In Illinois in the 21st 
century, AFSCME, also the union which represents Illinois prison guards, had been the strongest 
political force in the state opposing prison reforms advocated by TY10.  When mothers of 
Tamms prisoners marched on the AFSCME headquarters in Chicago on the anniversary of 
King’s death in 2012, many carried the sign “I AM A MOM,” while other signs read, “MY SON 
IS NOT A PAYCHECK,” and “TORTURE IS NOT A CAREER.”  Pseudonymized TY10 
volunteer Carol Wilcox mentioned that Reynolds consulted with and got the blessing of the 
original artist behind the “I AM A MAN” signs (personal communication, July 17, 2014). These 
slogans added to the slogan repertoire, as “TAMMS IS TORTURE” shirts and signs had been 
featured in performances and actions for years. Other artists have also used this sign as a 
reference point. Prominent African-American painter Glenn Ligon has created two works, 
Untitled (I Am a Man) (1988) and Condition Report (2000), based on the iconic sanitation 
workers’ sign, and political art provocateur Dread Scott did a simple performance negating the 
statement in I Am Not A Man (2009). Queer performance artists Sharon Hayes and Dazié Grego 
have separately used this sign and slogan to challenge and play with ideas of rights and gender. 
Since the closing of Tamms, Reynolds’ primary focus has shifted from solitary 
confinement to sex offender registries. In the U.S., these registries continue over time to expand, 
both in the numbers of people publicly punished, over 800,000 in 2017 (Feige, 2017), and in the 
severity of the sanctions they carry. In April 2017, Reynolds organized two events within the 
space of a week, events which memorably illuminated her practice and outlook. In the first event, 
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held at the University of Chicago’s School of Social Service Administration in conjunction with 
the annual social practice conference Open Engagement, she and advocate for sexual assault 
victims Lynne Johnson held an event in which people affected by underage sexual violence and 
some people who perpetuated similarly aggressive acts., were able to tell their stories to the 
crowd. After this, state legislators, lawyers, and activists spoke about the progress being made to 
restrain sex-offender registry expansion and overreach through the courts, the State House, and 
grassroots organizing. The following week, as part of an event titled “What is an Artistic Practice 
of Human Rights?” Reynolds directed a group performance at the Logan Center, also at the 
University of Chicago, which had many of the same individuals on stage giving testimony 
similar (often identical) to that they had given the week previous. However, the work also 
included spoken word poetry, stand-up comedy, and a child actor who performed famous 
monologues from movies such as The Jerk, Full Metal Jacket, and Taxi Driver. And, filling the 
role of the chorus in Greek tragedy, there was a small audience on stage, whose reactions were 
caught on camera and displayed on a large screen to the off-stage audience.  
Such fluid political theatre, as with Boal’s Theater of the Oppressed, and his “legislative 
theater,” may be among the most pedagogical of the arts. In visual art, the establishment of the 
Bauhaus art school was a landmark moment in modernism, that could also be considered a 
collective utopian endeavor, much like the Rudolf-Steiner-inspired chalkboard performances of 
Joseph Beuys. The introduction of electronic communications technology, as with the work of 
Experiments with Art and Technology in the early 1970s, brought visionary pedagogy directly 
into contact with fine art. Made popular by figures such as Buckminster Fuller, this utopian-
pedagogical conceptualism has continued to influence the art world, just as education became the 
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battleground for civil rights. Recently many social practice projects, like the Bruce High Quality 
Foundation, have carried on this legacy.  
A close colleague of Reynolds and an activist who opposes and repeatedly runs afoul of 
one of the world’s few remaining revolutionary regimes, Cuban artist Tania Bruguera positions 
herself explicitly as a teacher in some projects, implicitly in others. Not only in her 
straightforwardly pedagogical pieces like Arte de Conducta, a discussion and “training” group in 
Havana that lasted from 2002-2009, but in works like Tatlin’s Whisper #5, a 2008 performance 
in which mounted police used crowd-control techniques on Tate Modern visitors (reminiscent of 
Marta Minujin’s 1965 Happening Suceso Plastico, involving a crowd hemmed in by police 
motorcycles), or the 2012 piece Tanks, in which, also at the Tate, visitors were subjected to a lie-
detector test about their citizenship and immigrant status. As with Johnny Spencer’s Site-Seeing, 
mentioned above, Tatlin’s Whisper #5 was not officially documented by the Tate. Bruguera 
impersonated the police, even hinting at the infamous police code of silence, but was clearly 
operating from the position of a radical museum educator. These pieces offered a transformative 
experience of improvement; she has referred often to her work as “arte de conducta,” or 
“behavior art.”  
From “behavior art” it seems like only a small leap to relate this to an “art” that many 
teachers are familiar with as “classroom management.” Jacques Rancière is known for 
comparing schools to police (Bingham, Biesta, and Rancière, 2010), which, in the many 
American urban public schools staffed by “school resource officers,” would make a great deal of 
sense. But, particularly after the modern drop in tolerance for corporal punishment in schools, 
and in societies such as the U.S. without any traditional reverence for teachers, the teacher’s is a 
form of authority founded on a demand for obedience that, while it is nearly always backed up 
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with various threats, is recognized as thoroughly formal. To obey a teacher is in a way similar to 
obeying a scarecrow. This is not a result of classroom conflict, but in a sense the cause of these 
conflicts. Theodor Adorno (1965/1998) compares teachers to other officials, but takes note of the 
low esteem in which they are held.  
 Judges and administrative functionaries by contrast are delegated real power, whereas 
public awareness probably does not take seriously the power a teacher has, since that 
power is wielded over people who are not considered legal subjects having fully equal 
rights, that is, children. The teacher’s power is resented because it only parodies the real 
power that is so admired. (p. 181) 
As Adorno goes on to say, it’s not hard to see any adult with such power as a sadistic tyrant. 
Adorno himself as a critic finding fault with much mainstream artistic expression cuts an 
analogous figure, which is why the essay reads like a work of veiled or unintentional self-
deprecation. But it’s not only the imbalance of power that fosters contempt for the teacher and 
critic, but also the fact that they, like lawyers and judges, parrot the words and ideas of others. 
And all of these figures claim authority through words by sanctioning a definitive interpretation. 
While a number of impressive artworks claim such an authority, and are carried out under the 
pedagogical heading of what could be called “judicial aesthetics.” it’s important to recognize that 
such work has both an affinity with and a distance from a project like Tamms Year Ten, in which 






2.5 Litigation versus lobbying 
 
In January 2016, the Uptown People’s Law Center in Chicago (UPLC) was successful in 
a class-action lawsuit that sought to improve Illinois prisoners’ access to mental health services, 
and to reduce the use of solitary confinement (Quandt, 2016). The home page of the UPLC states 
that the office is dedicated to “(f)ighting for the rights of prisoners, tenants, & disabled people in 
Illinois” (Uptown People’s Law Office, n.d.). It has been one of the few organizations in the U.S. 
suing on behalf of incarcerated people to protest the conditions of their confinement, ever since 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act made it through Congress in 1996, a bill that Marie Gottschalk 
(2015) says has “made it extremely difficult to hold state officials and prison administrators 
accountable for the unsafe and degrading conductions of their facilities” (p. 44). The office’s 
executive director, Alan Mills (personal communication, 2016), described how their work to 
improve the conditions of confinement for Illinois prisoners began with a single class-action case 
they worked on from 1982 through the mid-1990s, that began with a man from the Uptown 
neighborhood where the office is based, and became a wider battle about giving people detained 
in segregation “meaningful access to the courts.” They lost the case, but made connections with 
many jailhouse lawyers. They fought the building of the Tamms supermax facility in the mid-
1990s, and then ended up working with men who were sent there- the first of whom was Marcus 
Chapman, a prisoner at the Stateville state prison that Mills’ office had successfully represented 
in a case involving confiscated possessions. Just days after Chapman’s settlement was finalized, 
he was sent to Tamms, and the office began investigating by making contacts within the prison. 
“We fairly quickly learned that it was full of litigators,” Mills said; “Five of our clients ended up 
being sent there within the first month or two.”  
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He then learned that men sent to Tamms had no hearings before being transferred, and 
the office filed a class action suit against the Illinois Department of Corrections in 2000 alleging 
that men were sent there as retaliation and in violation of due process. At about this time the 
office also began producing a newsletter for incarcerated men at Tamms and their families. The 
case they filed remained undecided at the time Tamms was closed in 2013. But through the 
newsletter, and various litigators’ efforts to communicate with prisoners’ friends and loved ones, 
the circulation outside the institution surpassed 1000. Many of these individuals started to form a 
mutual support network--through which, Mills attests, they were able to come to understand that 
their sons, brothers, and fathers were telling similar stories about the arbitrary nature of their 
punishment. By the time Mills became involved in 2001, these family members had formed an 
advocacy group which called itself the Tamms Committee. Working with lawyers Jean Snyder 
from the MacArthur Justice Center, which issued the 2000 report on Tamms and torture, and Jim 
Chapman, who in 1998 founded the Illinois Institute of Community Law and Affairs, to study 
criminal recidivism, the family members organized bus trips to visit their relatives, which for a 
time received help from the Uptown People’s Law Center.  
Laurie Jo Reynolds ‘s 2001 collaborative exhibit “Ask Me!,” a series of booths featuring 
groups and individuals with a variety of forms of expertise (such as sexual roleplay, 
conscientious objector status,, Iraqi sanctions, televised soul music, mixology, Islam, the Power 
Rangers, and sexual abuse and body image), included a booth for members of the Tamms 
Committee. Every booth had a sign, and theirs said, “Ask me about Tamms.” Visitors learned 
that men at Tamms spent 23 hours a day in solitary confinement and essentially lived in 
conditions of long-term sensory deprivation. The Tamms Committee representative spoke about 
their “hallucinations, psychosis, self-mutilation, and suicide attempts” (2014b), symptoms of a 
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condition the psychiatrist Stuart Grassian has studied for over 30 years, and dubbed “SHU 
Syndrome” (2006), after the Special Housing Units of supermax prisons.9  
Along with other artists, musicians, poets, and activists in Chicago, Reynolds co-founded 
the Tamms Poetry Committee in 2006. The Poetry Committee was organized to correspond with 
inmates around writing poems, and offering a space for socializing and emotional support. At 
this point, Reynolds’s work was as pedagogical as many conceptualist art pieces that have 
utilized the medium of written instructions. The Tamms Poetry Committee focused on helping 
incarcerated men and their families in a variety of ways, but it came together around the creation 
and exchange of poems. 
Poetry is, to step back, an artistic medium with a varied political history. Strongman 
military leaders from Frederick the Great of Prussia to Serbian war criminal Radovan Karadžić 
have written poetry, and have placed great importance on the righteous force of language. Of 
course poetry has at least as often served a revolutionary cause, as well as no discernible cause 
whatsoever, but can abet violence through the action of the “obscenely permissive superego” 
(Žižek, 2014, para. 3). The poet, the judge, the critic, and the teacher are all participants in 
Lacan’s Symbolic, in which language defines the limits that stoke transgressive desire. But the 
silence demanded by teachers and judges reminds us of the inarticulate demand made by the 
superego to control and direct the torrent of elusive meanings. The superego role of an art 
teacher’s classroom usually consists of extolling students to behave freely and seek pleasure. It 
negates the negativity of the usual classroom regime, instilling anxiety via “the lack of the 
prohibition that would sustain desire” (Žižek, 2003, p. 56). The art-teaching paradigm most 																																																								




associated with guided enjoyment is often termed “self-expression,” reflecting a belief in the 
ability of the individual to benefit from the intrinsic or therapeutic qualities of self-directed 
artwork. In doing so, the pupil is trained to actualize her authentic self within limits, 
appropriating the limited sovereignty of the artist. 
In a way, this tension between the artist and the teacher illuminates the distance that 
developed between the UPLC and the Tamms Committee, and eventually Tamms Year Ten, 
formed by Reynolds in 2008 with members of the Tamms Poetry Committee, eventually 
including Tamms family members (mostly women) and formerly incarcerated men. TY10 
advocated for men in Tamms, but now with a dedicated focus on lobbying for legislative policy 
changes. Mills was invited to speak with IDOC officials, and family members gave testimony at 
legislative hearings alongside volunteers, all organized by Reynolds. Mills recalls that  “Laurie 
Jo did a great job of organizing” and reflects that “that’s where the art part continued, both in 
terms of providing support to the men at Tamms, and just as a way of broadcasting to the world 
that this is what’s going on down there.” “I thought that was extraordinarily effective,” he said, 
“both in terms of humanizing the guys at Tamms, and also in terms of getting people involved 
who wouldn’t normally be prison activists.” Citing the esoteric procedure of the courts, Mills 
said, “it’s hard to get people to be involved in a lawsuit, so I really welcomed the idea that there 
was something easier to organize ordinary people around than a lawsuit.” He sees the goals of 
litigation and artistic advocacy as similarly oriented toward getting the attention of powerful 
officials and the general public, using stories of specific individuals.  
But Mills and Reynolds disagreed on pursuing a legislative strategy. Mills thought there 
was no chance of passing a bill to close Tamms, and Laurie Jo absolutely did. Eventually her 
lobbying work was pivotal to closing Tamms, but the closure was enacted through the executive 
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branch. Mills (2017) has written online about the difficulty of addressing IDOC policies 
legislatively, as lawmakers give wide discretion to departments in creating administrative 
regulations, a process that is overseen in Illinois by a bipartisan legislative committee known as 
the Joint Committee on Adminstrative Rules, or JCAR. While its website indicates that it offers a 
public forum for reviewing how general laws become specific policies regarding, for example, 
solitary confinement within IDOC facilities, Mills writes that “the entire process is pretty 
opaque… The system is designed so that only professional lobbyists can be expected to keep 
track of the process. Ordinary citizens don’t have a chance” (para. 5). As a case in point, Mills 
says that at the last minute JCAR rescheduled a meeting on IDOC rules that he was driving from 
Chicago in order to attend, and, at that meeting, “unanimously approved the rules proposed by 
the department” (para. 1).  
For her part, rather than working through the courts, Reynolds’ goal was to give a public 
voice to men who had been incarcerated at Tamms, and to communicate directly with 
progressive state representatives like Julie Hamos and Art Turner, who helped to oversee the 
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), in order to propose and lobby for reform legislation. 
Eight years of lawsuits had achieved little, Reynolds believed, even in some unfavorable rulings 
actually setting harmful precedents. “By pressing the issue,” Reynolds said, referring to the work 
of prison reform allies working through the courts, “we did make supermax prisons 
Constitutional.” “You can win,” she said, ”but if you don’t win politically, you don’t really win” 
(personal communication, April 20, 2014). Citing Keramet Reiter, Lisa Guenther (2013) notes in 
regard to solitary confinement that “many district and federal courts have ended up inscribing a 
‘just measure of deprivation’ within the law, even in cases where they have explicitly affirmed 
prisoners’ human rights” (loc. 2842, Kindle ed.). Reiter (2016) notes that scrutiny of prisoner 
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abuse at the Pelican Bay supermax state prison in California by the federal judiciary led to an 
oversight regime, but also has allowed a principle called “legal endogeneity” to emerge, in which 
prisoner rights declared by courts become in practice privileges that must be earned (p. 5). Ilana 
Gershon (2011) has commented that “laws in their originary moment in legislatures are widely 
understood to be the product of compromise, even shared disagreements ... as laws travel into 
courts, this divisive origin, with its transformative potential, often moves into the background” 
(p. 169).   
Reynolds invited Mills to sit in on meetings with corrections officials. However, Mills’ 
clinic, which was pursuing much of the litigation on behalf of Tamms prisoners, did not want to 
share information or work in any public capacity, for fear of endangering the prisoners politically 
(Scott McFarland, personal communication, February 23, 2014). Also, other members of the 
Tamms Committee, which also included family members of inmates, was not interested in doing 
PR and lobbying for fear of retaliatory action on the inside at Tamms. For his part, Mills 
recounted that correctional officials often wouldn’t communicate with Reynolds or the Tamms 
Poetry Committee (later Tamms Year Ten) because of the pending lawsuit, and that legislators, 
many of whom were not only uninformed on prisons but actually didn’t know about Tamms’ 
existence (likely true for most Illinois residents), tended to defer to correctional officials. Years 
later in 2012, surviving a Senate override and being written back into the budget in the House, 
Governor Pat Quinn’s line item veto ended up closing the prison. Also in that year, the Uptown 
People’s Law Center had a favorable ruling on their due process claim, which resulted in inmates 
getting transferred out (despite all of them losing the hearings they were granted), which Mills 
felt had something to do with the closure—although it may be fair to say instead that the political 
movement to close the prison influenced the court decision.  
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In 2016 the overuse of segregation was pursued in the state legislature by Illinois State 
Representative La Shawn Ford, who became interested in the issue through “Sentenced: 
Architecture & Human Rights,” a traveling show of art by prisoners in segregation, including a 
mock solitary cell, that the Uptown People’s Law Center set up at the Chicago art space operated 
by In These Times magazine in 2015. Inspired by a mock cell fabricated by the National 
Religious Campaign Against Torture, Mills has done presentations on solitary confinement in 
which viewers can enter a stripped-down version of the mock cell, which he stores in his 
basement when not in use. The ongoing project “Prisoners’ Inventions,” an installation and 2003 
booklet organized by the social practice art collective Temporary Services, also made use of a 
mock solitary cell. Though he makes no claim to be an artist, Mills also expresses a wider vision, 
saying “I don’t look at the judicial system as being the ultimate solution.” In a sense, Mills can 
be fruitfully compared to conceptual artists who make use of the law as a medium of their work, 
a tool for justice or for satire, but not a tool that can ultimately be transformed, or transformative. 
“Lawyers aren’t going to change anything,” Mills has stated (personal communication, February 
10, 2017). On an aesthetic note, however, it should be mentioned that the UPLC fundraising 
emails often adopt a far less modest tone—a tone that on occasion could be said to challenge the 
boundaries of good taste. 
Nuances of taste aside, Mills’ litigation echoes a history of artistic gestures. After 1963, 
when conceptual sculptor Robert Morris issued a notarized “deposition” (Rosenberg, 1970/1999) 
denying aesthetic value to one of his own sculptures, literal examples of artistic autonomy 
operating through judicial authority have become numerous. There’s the Canadian landowner 
and artist Peter von Tiesenhausen, who kept mining interests at bay by declaring his property an 
artwork and defending it under copyright law (Fung, 2010), and Khaled Hourani’s self-
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explanatory 2011 project based on loopholes in Lebanese law, A Manifesto Declaring 
Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon as an Art Community Until Proven Otherwise. The British 
artist Carey Young appropriates legal discourse in videos, installations, and performances that 
reference the language of legal documents such as wills, national constitutions, and commercial 
contracts. American artist Jill Magid (2016) has been working, with the blessing of the Mexican 
government and the family of renowned Mexican architect Luis Barragán, to convince the 
copyright holder of Barragán’s personal papers to make them public, going so far as to write up a 
contract and create a ring adorned with a diamond formed from Barragán’s ashes. Photographer 
Taryn Simon has made a number of works about the signing of international treaties. And the 
readymades that Cameron Rowland showed in 2016 at Artists Space in New York were 
commercial goods fabricated for manufacturers that contracted prison labor; Rowland also 
showed Disgorgement, a set of framed legal documents establishing a trust to pay reparations 
through the sale of shares of Aetna, an insurance company which once insured slaves as 
slaveowner property. On the other hand, in a case before the U.S. Supreme Court in 2017, Jack 
Phillips, a religiously conservative bakery owner, claimed the right to refuse to bake a gay 
couple’s wedding cake on the basis of Phillips’ self-description as a “cake artist”. And in a 
lawsuit backed by right-wing tech billionaire Peter Thiel in 2016, star professional wrestler Hulk 
Hogan used an artistic separation of his personal identity and his identity as a performer in order 
to justify litigation against a news website, Gawker. The site was shuttered as a result of the 
lawsuit. 
Conceptual art can intentionally overlap with litigation, as in the mock trials put on by the 
Dadaists (Witkovsky, 2004). More recently, the architect Eyal Weizman has led a collaborative 
group known as Forensic Architecture, a collaboration between architects, designers, 
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filmmakers, lawyers, scientists, and others, that seeks to enact what Weizman calls a “forensis", 
a practice of investigation that acts as something of a “counter-forensics”, pursuing goals of 
advancing human rights through a sophisticated reading of objects in relation to law. Weizman 
(2015) talks about buildings and other objects as both present in themselves, and representative 
of their histories and interactions. 
Buildings are dynamic entities. They’re continuously undergoing deformation, and 
deformation is information. The deterioration of a building over a long period of time is a 
diagram of the environment around it, a diagram of its use, of its material properties and 
their internal relations, the relationship of the various material bits that compose a 
building. And this is always a historical diagram. (35:12- 35:33) 
But his approach to truth appears to be more straightforward than his poetic appreciation of 
physical evidence might suggest. Weizman has worked with the United Nations, and Forensic 
Architecture has advocated for human rights in 13 countries. The group was, for example. 
involved in litigating against a border wall in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip, artfully achieving 
victory with a tactical argument focusing on environmental impact. Inadvertently describing the 
contemplative approach of all judicial art, David Huber (2017) writes that “Forensic Architecture 
has found a way to direct the techniques of the aesthete back on to the world” (p. 77). 
The 2017 European art festival Documenta 14 featured a project led by Forensic 
Architecture, in which they displayed results from their investigation of a murder committed by a 
neo-Nazi organization in the festival’s host city of Kassel, Germany. Maria Eichhorn did a 
somewhat analogous project at the same Documenta festival, creating an institute to track down 
and return property stolen by the (original) Nazis. While praising Forensic Architecture’s 
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contribution, Hill Perlson (2017) notes that this is a notable departure from the usual efforts 
made by conceptual artists to challenge ideas of truth; of course this could apply to Eichhorn’s 
piece as well. In fact, Perlson’s headline implies that the “evidence” gathered by Forensic 
Architecture is in fact “not an artwork”.  
Along these lines, Forensic Architecture group member Susan Schuppli talks in a 2013 
lecture about the formal aesthetic expectations that legitimize evidence presented to a court. 
Matter, in effect, only becomes a material witness when the complex histories entangled 
within objects are unfolded, translated, and formed into legible formats that can be 
offered up for public consideration and debate. The conventions surrounding which 
public forums are able to confer legitimacy upon the speech acts of objects, and which 
agreed-upon standards will permit material evidence to stand up to the scrutiny of 
epistemological frameworks that evaluate and pass judgment upon them, need of course 
to be continually queried and tested. (17:15- 17:46) 
Describing the trials of accused Yugoslav war criminals at the International Criminal Court, 
Schuppli notes that defense attorneys were able to challenge the veracity of edited and degraded 
video presented by prosecutors because “the court always prefers unadulterated materials to 
assert the relative merits of the media entered into evidence” (21:18- 21:25). The “conventions” 
of these “legible formats” include a simultaneous transparency and authenticity that in effect 
comprise a judicial aesthetic, an aesthetic that can increasingly be seen in art as well as in law. 
As artists working in the legal sphere, Forensic Architecture themselves offer an example of 
what sociologist (and occasional curator) Bruno Latour describes as an emerging “aesthetics of 
proof”, in which “everybody, everywhere in art is doing research,” such that a “multiplicity of 
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interpretation” now exists “in science as well as in art” (Halsall, 2012, p. 964).  
The word “symbol,” the fundamental interpretive unit in law as well as art, derives 
etymologically from “objects broken to record debt contracts” (Graeber, 2011, p. 298). 
Numerous artists, from Dada and Surrealism through to conceptualism, have used instructions, 
rules, and parameters, to curators and audiences or for themselves, as integral elements of 
artworks; turning the artwork into a sort of contract can be seen as a significant aspect of avant-
garde art. Evoking the judicial advocacy pursued by Forensic Architecture, many artists, 
including Reynolds, have created work in which customized works are made at the request of a 
politically subjected population, essentially fulfilling a contract—a commissioned work in which 
the commissioner’s identity enters the work’s content. In Reynolds’ case there is the Photo 
Requests From Solitary initiative, begun in 2009, in which artists took on the assignment of 
creating photographic images based on inmates’ specifications.  Some requests were whimsical, 
like J-Lo’s butt in a video with Ben Affleck, two kids at the piano with a rose, or a black-and-
white image of an old-fashioned clown writing a letter with a quill pen, while some are personal, 
like wanting an image of the inmate’s mother in front of a mansion with a Hummer and a pile of 
cash, or an image of the inmate himself with a blue sky in the background.  Some were more 
logistically challenging: one prisoner wanted to see all the members of the Tamms Year Ten 
group in one shot, and another wanted to see a prayer vigil on his behalf near the giant Bald 
Knob Cross in downstate Illinois. The photos have been exhibited in Santa Monica and 
Brooklyn, and have brought a lot of national and international attention to the project, including 
press in the U.K. and an Al Jazeera article, also helping the group to get some financial support.  
While TY10 made images from the Photo Requests From Solitary series into legislative action 
postcards, distributing them throughout the Illinois Statehouse, and also hung images in the 
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Statehouse hallway where the group did their lobbying, the origin of the work is in an 
informational transaction. 
The work evokes the task-based, equally whimsical photos and texts of Sophie Calle, 
documents that, in something of a legislative spirit, Yves-Alain Bois said “admit exhibits as 
evidence” and display a “judicial relation to reality” (as cited in Demos, 2013, p. 117); another 
analogy is the task-based work of American artist Emily Jacir, whose series Where We Come 
From (2001-3) records the artist using her legal freedom of movement to perform acts on behalf 
of Palestinians denied such movement. Jacir played soccer with a randomly-chosen boy, visited 
the grave of a man’s mother, watered a tree, and did many other modest deeds, documented in 
photos depicting the act rather than person requesting the act. The framing question that Jacir 
employed was, “If I could do something for you, anywhere in Palestine, what would it be?” (as 
cited in Demos, 2013, p. 103). Jacques Rancière (2010) dismissively refers to such work as 
examples of “the pedagogical model of the efficacy of art” (p. 136, emphasis original).  
Almost as if in response to Rancière’s repudiation of conceptualist artwork based on 
political communication, a contemporary American comedy show on the Comedy Central 
network, Nathan For You, removes all sober pretense in its use of legal contracts and loopholes, 
sometimes in relation to art, to create absurd and uncomfortable situations under the auspices of 
offering marketing consulting services to small businesses. In one program, host Nathan Fielder 
helps a bar to get around a non-smoking ordinance by staging the everyday activities of the bar 
as a theatrical performance, even hiring actors to minutely reproduce a recorded evening of 
typical spontaneous socialization. In another episode, which got widespread press attention, he 
proposed that a local coffee shop could appropriate the Starbucks brand under fair use law, 
declaring the store a satirical art project under the name “Dumb Starbucks;” rumors apparently 
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circulated that the whole affair was a prank by the anti-corporate “culture jammer” street artist 
Banksy. In another, he prepares a class-action lawsuit against Best Buy when the electronics 
retailer frustrates his attempt to help a local small competitor through a ludicrous exploitation of 
the corporation’s “price match guarantee.” And in a stunt with relevance to Reynolds’ work, 
Fielder created a escape act in which, if he could not pick a handcuff lock, a robot would pull 
down his pants in front of an audience of children, an event that he made sure, with a retired 
judge and a police officer in attendance, would get him convicted as a sex offender. While the 
show studiously avoids any appearance of explicit commentary, the humor is simultaneously at 
the expense of political institutions, businesses (from sympathetic small entrepreneurs to 
impersonal corporations), and contemporary avant-garde détournement, all thanks to open-ended 
cultural and legal definitions. 
But these definitions, in the context of law, seem constantly to be striving toward 
certitude. Describing the visionary philosophy of Charles Fourier, Roland Barthes (1971/1976) 
notes that Fourier attempts total specificity with his language; Barthes comments that “the 
context… has all the ingratitude of law: it reduces polysemy, it clips the wings of the signifier: 
doesn’t all poetry consist in liberating the word from its context? Doesn’t all philosophy consist 
in putting it back?” (p. 91).10 Echoing this opposition of poetry and law, Hegel describes a 
fundamental aesthetic resistance to legalism through a comparison of the classical eras of Rome 
and Greece. 
To be just a Roman, to visualize in his own personal energies the Roman state, the 
fatherland and its grandeur and power, this is the seriousness and dignity of Roman 																																																								
10 This does overlook a dissent in the 2002 Porreco v. Porreco case by Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court Justice Michael Eakin, which he wrote in seven rhyming stanzas (Kleefeld 2010). 
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virtue. Heroes, on the other hand, are individuals who undertake and accomplish the 
entirety of an action, actuated by the independence of their character and caprice… But 
this immediate unity of the substantial with the individuality of inclination, impulses, and 
will is inherent in Greek virtue, so that individuality is a law to itself, without being 
subjected to an independently subsisting law, judgment, and tribunal. (1835/1975, p. 185)  
This “aesthetic” element of politics in Hegel is not pointing at universal liberation, however, as 
Hegel elsewhere describes slavery, as practiced by the ancient Greeks, as “a necessary condition 
for aesthetic democracy” (Philosophy of History, p. 254). In the north European heroic epic 
Beowulf, it has been noted that the king Hrothgar contracts with the champion Beowulf, and that 
the public display of the monster Grendel’s severed arm as a trophy provides legitimate 
provocation for the vengeful incursion of Grendel’s mother (Kiernan, 1984; Day, 1999); in a 
sense this story, like many such confrontations, can be seen as depicting litigation by other 
means. As Oliver Wendell Holmes (1881/1963) asserts, “the various forms of liability known to 
modern law spring from the common ground of revenge” (p. 33). Ironically then, the outspoken, 
uncompromising stances of litigators like Mills and others associated with the Uptown People’s 
Law Center may look less institutionally constrained and more aesthetically free, while the more 
compromising artistic gestures of Laurie Jo Reynolds and Tamms Year Ten rely on a nuanced 
choreographed negotiation, the harmonizing of wills that is required for both leadership and 
artistic success. 
Robert Brandom (2002) represents the common-law judge, who works from precedents 
rather than statute, as an embodiment of how for Hegel a collective spirit comes into being 
through the apparently free decisions of individuals. Yet even the most morally (or aesthetically) 
refined judge, lawyer, teacher, or critic impersonates the solitary sovereignty bestowed by an 
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institution, while even the most didactic, collectivist, or hidebound artist, if and when they 
identify as an artist, represents an inscrutable collectivity—perhaps unless they cross into 
“judicial art,” and join the former group. The general lack of understanding that I generally run 
across as to what would make an advocacy campaign a work of art, even among diehard 
members of that campaign, wouldn’t necessarily apply to a piece from a series such as Photo 
Requests From Solitary, or Jacir’s Where We Come From. It’s not only the fact that there are 
photos, though a specified object helps to convince skeptics at least of the existence of an art 
piece; it’s that there’s communication.  
An individual photo may have its formal merits or pitfalls, but a great many viewers 
would likely accept the premise that the artwork being based on a task is part of its story. 
However, an opaque artistic gesture, like Minimalist sculptor Richard Serra’s obstructive public 
sculpture Tilted Arc, can make many viewers angry—and in Serra’s case, the artist lost a lawsuit 
and the sculpture was removed (Chave, 1990). Modern art in general confounds the laws of 
mimetic transaction that once took place through clear visual representation. But now art makes 
its laws in dialogue with a relatively small representational constituency, asserting autonomy in a 










Chapter 3: The jury and legislative aesthetics 
 
3.1  The microcosm of democracy 
 
Because of their incompleteness, images also leave room for interpretation. In discussing 
judicial aesthetics above, I both link and oppose the ambiguity in legal interpretation to the 
ambiguity faced by the silent object of adjudication, isolated in segregated detention. What 
begins with presumably impartial discretion winds up in a meaningless dead end. Writing in 
1929 of Picasso’s Three Dancers, George Bataille effects a roughly similar comparison when he 
muses,  
If the forms brought together on a canvas had no repercussion,… then painting at the very 
most would be good for distracting people from their rage, as do bars or American films. 
But why hesitate to write that when Picasso paints, the dislocation of form leads to that of 
thought, that is to say, that the immediate intellectual movement, that in other cases leads 
to the idea, aborts. (1985, p. 24) 
Bataille’s discussion of representation as not merely imperfect but self-destructive hints at 
aspects of art that I will discuss under the heading of “administrative aesthetics.” Yet Bataille 
here shares a common thread with Gayatri Spivak’s thoughts (1988) on overlapping but differing 
definitions of representation in the postcolonial context, in which interpretation operates in a 
more judicial mode. For Spivak, the aesthetic sense of “speaking about” is inevitably linked to 
the political sense of “speaking for” (pp. 275-276). Despite their incompatible outlooks, Spivak 
and Bataille both point from their opposing perspective to a problem that comes up any time a 
political and/or aesthetic vision is articulated, made immanent in paint or policy, which the 
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representation immediately fails. The actual disappoints the fantasy. In doing so, it seems to call 
for its own destruction. 
Lacan’s Imaginary domain speaks to representation, whether in the sense of a baby 
noticing herself in a mirror, or the artist’s prerogative to reflect the world back to itself in a 
striking and memorable way, or someone speaking on behalf of their community in a political 
setting. Representation is not so much about precise verisimilitude, but rather is seeks to elicit an 
intuition of meaning that induces a satisfying sense of recognition, a process that is repeated 
through the formation of identity, and a process that is key to both political and artistic 
representation. The Imaginary is theatrical when the jury acts as a chorus for an accused 
protagonist, and the Imaginary is legislative when both statues and statutes are crafted to 
wishfully rectify the distance between moral compulsions and the particular conflicts that create 
social anxieties. At the same time, the jury (as an ideal) exists to acquit, opposing the prosecutor, 
just as a legislature (as an ideal) exists to obstruct, negating the authority of the executive. One of 
Ireland’s greatest national heroes, Charles Stewart Parnell, is renowned for a masterful 
performance of Parliamentary procedure in which he bogged down the British House of 
Commons in endless irrelevant speeches. His tactics led in 1882 to an episode referred to as a 
“crisis of obstruction.” Despite countless such examples of subterfuge, the juror and the 
legislator are often seen (and often portray themselves) as untutored and intuitive representatives 
of a social group. Their status as popular representatives hinges on a lack of distinction, and 
certainly eschews formal connoisseurship. In a word, they are philistines. 
Tamms Year Ten approached the Tamms supermax prison not as another conceptualist 
art project might, as a discursive subject to be reimagined, but as an abomination to be negated. 
In this the group acted in thrall to fantasy no less than any other ideological project. The clarity 
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of their mission was at the core of their shared identity. But the project depended on the 
philistine claims that art could exist almost entirely outside of contemplation, and that political 
performance could succeed almost exclusively on political terms, with its framing as a 
performance coming across almost as a nominal afterthought. 
While art has been pressed into service for every political, religious, and economic 
regime in history, including Adorno’s modern “culture industry,” the economically exceptional 
nature of art is what even makes modern philistinism possible. Or rather, it could be said, 
philistinism is what makes modern art possible. Philistinism willfully ignores the status of art, a 
status that Dave Beech (2016) describes as a “mode of production” (p. 217) whose appeal 
depends on its apparent transcendence of any mundane social framework.  
An economics of art is never developed within classical economics because art’s prices 
and artistic labor do not help explain and promote the laws of supply and demand on 
which economic science turned. (p. 77) 
Of course it is possible to take the liberty, as this essay does, of looking at exceptional political 
gestures as intrinsically aesthetic, and the apparently static abstractions of artistic gestures as 
having numerous historical functions. Just as Banu Bargu (2016) identifies a formal novelty in 
the political deployment by Turkish prison activists of self-destructive acts such as hunger strikes 
and suicide bombs, in which ascetic practices have taken on new social value, the Tamms Year 
Ten project can similarly be seen as claiming formal novelty through its use of traditional 
organizing strategies and institutionalized legal entities to oppose the sadistic creativity of a 
hyper-punitive institution. I want to argue that this philistinism is not only externally constitutive 
of the category of art, as it was widely understood beginning in the twentieth century, but also 
the key factor that made philistinic modernist provocation possible. 
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With the blurring of class distinctions in post-industrial societies and the appearance of 
mass philistinism, the designation of something like a lobbying campaign as artwork may rest to 
a degree in an attitude of being willing to compare this artwork to other formally similar objects. 
In this spirit, the work of TY10 (when considered as artwork) looks somewhat like the work of a 
jury—a small group pursuing public justice, but often through private conversations in confined 
spaces. In writing about TY10, Christina Aushana (2014) discusses this very aspect of the 
group’s work, describing “borrowed conference rooms where they meet with prison officials to 
plea (sic) on behalf of their loved ones, temporary gallery spaces that serve as a home base for 
their campaign materials, and in the in-between spaces of hallways and corners of restaurants” 
(p. 289). In this they retained an artistic fidelity to purpose that didn’t achieve its completion in a 
finite series of ideas and objects in distinct spaces, attached to a lesson or a principle. Instead of 
being available to a viewership, the project was unfrozen and difficult to view and comprehend, 
as every effort was bound up with the ongoing campaign to close a specific prison. A sketch of 
the historic role of juries, and similar community interventions in the legal apparatus, can shed 
light on the way that activist groups aesthetically act upon legislative policymaking. 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1835/2010) was skeptical of the jury’s judicial effectiveness, but 
praised its political role, saying, “the institution of the jury really puts the leadership of society 
into the hands of the people” (p. 445). He comments on the jury as fundamental to American 
democracy, with a role equivalent to the legislature in expressing popular values. 
The jury forms the part of the nation charged with ensuring the execution of the laws, as 
the legislative houses are the part of the nation charged with making the laws; and for 
society to be governed in a fixed and uniform manner, it is necessary that the list of jurors 
be expanded or restricted with the list of voters. (p. 447).  
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And yet juries, through the intervention of prosecutors (Pfaff, 2017), have helped to establish an 
anti-democratic regime of incarceration. Discussing Supreme Court Justice John Marshall’s 
opinion in an 1833 ruling, Gary Gerstle (2015) states that the “theory of power on which the 
authority of the states rested… sanctioned illiberal policies in the name of the people” (pp. 67-
68). Much like de Tocqueville’s assessment of juries, Gerstle suggests that “state governments 
were thought of as embodiments of the people” (p. 67)—and of course American state 
governments imprison not only the majority of American inmates, but a far higher proportion of 
their citizens than do nation-states worldwide. In all these invocations of “the people,” trust and 
power are placed in the hands of the non-expert, who may or may not be concerned with the 
preservation of justice or democracy. 
Presumed to be (or idealized as) lacking in formal preparation for their roles, the roles of 
the juror and the legislator are in some ways like that of the so-called “outsider artist.” As with 
the freedom given to judges to create law through interpretation, the intuitive lawmaking 
freedom of the American jury is inherited from the English common law, under which 
community members, enrolled as spectators, were expected to be able to intuitively assess the 
character and thus the trustworthiness of defendants and witnesses. While the legislature has its 
own long history, its fundamental dilemmas of representation and compromise are demonstrated 
in microcosm with the direct role of the jury in (purportedly) providing a reflection of local will 
in determining eligibility for punishment—a practice carried out in the early days of juries 
through painful and sometimes fatal ordeals, such as the well-known immersion in water of those 
accused of witchcraft. If simple adherence to absolute standards were the sole measure of 
legitimacy, as in Kant’s determinant judgment, there would be no need for the juror who can 
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supposedly locate the rule reflectively, thus operating like the untrained artist or the authentically 
“popular” democratic representative, versus the allegedly rational judge, teacher, or critic. 
Jury trials may be thought of as a draconian instrument of mob rule, as in the 
aforementioned witchcraft trials. But along with the ordeal, a physical torment intended to prove 
or disprove accusations of supernatural maleficence, the medieval English jury, introduced by 
Henry II in the 12th century, was an intercession between accusation and punishment intended to 
introduce the possibility of mercy under the harsh laws of the land. Jury trials resulted in less 
frequent and severe sanctions than in cases of unmediated punishment by magistrates or other 
authorities (Hale, 2016). Representative juries existed to acquit, thereby providing “a way to 
protect subjects from officialdom” (p. 29). Today, the legacy of largely unpunished police 
murders of unarmed Black men, women, and children has been accomplished largely through the 
grand jury process, with the non-indictment of Darren Wilson, the officer who shot and killed 
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014, as a landmark example.  
This could be attributed to the historic tendency of juries in trials to find predominantly in 
favor of defendants. But grand juries, which issue indictments rather than verdicts, almost always 
vote to indict, with Federal grand juries voting to indict 99.99% of the time; a major exception at 
the state and local level is cases involving police use of deadly force (Goldfarb 2014). As 
Bernard Harcourt (2016) points out, the Wilson decision was carefully staged by the prosecutor, 
Robert McCullough, in order to not only get the desired decision but to sow doubt in the general 
public as to Wilson’s culpability, and even to create the impression that there had been a trial 
(pp. 22-26). Also, even with actual jury trials, this hasn’t necessarily been the case across the 
board over the last thirty years, as Federal bench verdicts have become much more lenient, and 
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Federal jury verdicts much less so, concurrent with the imposition of Federal and state 
sentencing guidelines from 1989 to 2002 in conjunction with the War on Drugs (Leipold, 2005).   
A reason for this shift, such as it is, may be that the role of the jury has gone from 
protection from officialdom, to protection from people of color. The Duke University finding 
(Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson, 2012) that all-white jury pools in Florida convict Black 
defendants at a substantially higher rate than white defendants is unsurprising. But nonetheless, 
given that English juries originated in an era when laws were severe, and there was no lack of 
violent, unruly behavior that could result, unless unchecked, in a politically unsustainable rate of 
execution, it could be argued that such a situation pertained also in the U.S., where jury trials 
perhaps reduced lynchings, but at the cost of contributing to a scale of racialized incarceration 
that is internationally and historically unique, as well as becoming an enormous source of strain 
on many communities.  
In the 1986 Batson v. Kentucky decision, the U.S. Supreme Court tried to make juries 
racially representative, thereby restoring this function of mercy. But the decision was greeted 
with skepticism by Thurgood Marshall, the Court’s first Black justice. 
 Even if all parties approach the court’s mandate with the best of conscious intentions, that 
mandate requires them to confront and overcome their own racism on all levels—a 
challenge I doubt all of them can meet. (as cited in Hale, 2016, p. 264). 
Indeed, as it turns out, it didn’t take long for prosecutors to begin training each other on how to 
circumvent the Batson ruling (Edelman, 2015, para. 8). In allowing racism to pervert the 
inclination of representative juries to acquit, we can see direct ways in which race has affected 
democracy through the artistic mechanisms of legal ambiguity.  
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As shown in the trial of Rodney King’s police assailants, and with recent videotaped 
killings by police, the same images that spark a rebellion in the streets can be used in court to 
manufacture an unfair acquittal. But the act of acquittal can itself be a rebellion. Refusal to 
acknowledge evidence and abide by existing law, an act termed “nullification,” has been a 
hallmark of prominent recent jury verdicts, with the 1995 acquittal of O.J. Simpson as perhaps 
the most infamous example (Hale, 2016, p. 311). As pointed up by that memorable verdict, acts 
of jury nullification are both praised and deplored. While the jury’s “right to say no” may be 
considered “far removed from the partnership in judging in which the republican jury 
participated” (p. 307), some have claimed that the surge of jury nullifications, as popular acts of 
resistance against legal authority, have provided “more direct control over the making of laws 
than the current system allows,” and “a second institution through which the people can and 
should exercise law-making and law-rejecting powers,” expressing “a right to enact… communal 
or personal norms in direct contravention of formally enacted laws” (all cited on p. 310). That 
such a trend has arisen alongside a greater freedom for prosecutorial peremptory challenges in 
jury selection, as well as the sharp decline in jury trials (and trials generally), offers all the more 
reason to assert the trend’s significance. In the privacy of a chamber, a small group of non-
experts can negate unjust laws.  
 In a similar act of negation, the popular network of extralegal abolitionist resistance 
known as the Underground Railroad succeeded against legal repression that increased throughout 
the antebellum period, when a block comprising seven percent of the South’s population formed 
a “plantocracy” that effectively ran the country. As W. E. B. DuBois (1935) puts it:   
 It had in American history chosen eleven out of sixteen Presidents, seventeen out of 
twenty-eight Judges of the Supreme Court, fourteen out of nineteen Attorneys- General, 
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twenty-one out of thirty-three Speakers of the House, eighty out of one hundred thirty-
four Foreign Ministers. (p. 47)  
Through an ongoing commitment to a “states’ rights” doctrine, southern U.S. Senators and 
Congressmen protected the generally unpopular institution of slavery for the first 70 years of the 
republic, just as state governments had both before and after the Revolution: through the 
exploitation of legal language and procedure. Republicans William Henry Seward and Abraham 
Lincoln were among the many antislavery campaigners who described the antebellum Federal 
government as a “slave power,” in which authority was both hoarded and limited in scope by a 
small number of highly-placed slaveowning agricultural oligarchs, and maintained by Southern 
officials at the Federal level, abetted by Northern “doughface” Democrats (Richards, 2000). 
Beginning with the “three-fifths” clause in the Constitution, which allowed slaves to be counted 
in determining legislative representation, and continuing with laws to allow the pursuit of 
fugitive slaves, to silence and imprison abolitionists, and to force new states to adopt pro-slavery 
policies, obfuscation and obstruction were key to the outsize legislative victories of wealthy 
Southern planter interests. 
It could be said that the Underground Railroad provided many Americans with the 
merciful intercession that neither the courts nor the legislature would provide, and it did so 
through artful acts of evasion. In opposition to the Congressional distortion of popular opposition 
to plantation owners, but also to pervasive racism among whites of all regions and nationalities, 
free and enslaved Americans and Canadians of African descent worked, both with and without 
the help of sympathetic whites, to make the most of international legal and political dissonance 
and ambiguity. Some emancipated slaves and free Blacks mounted legal challenges to their 
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enslavement, but they also crossed the border in the thousands, primarily through performances 
of minutely orchestrated redirection and subterfuge.  
One example among many is the ruse undertaken by the escaping slaves Adam and Sarah 
Crosswhite, who took the trouble of disposing of all of their family furniture in a bog, so that 
their pursuers would think they had left with all of their belongings and thus misjudge the speed 
of their journey (Marty, 2016, p. 202). Ellen and William Craft traveled to freedom with Ellen 
disguised as a white man and William posing as her servant. Ellen hid her face and disguised her 
voice by binding her jaw, and put her arm in a sling to avoid revealing her inability to write 
(Holmes, 2010). And in acts that subvert images of Africans’ kidnapping, imprisonment, and 
commodification that are now reiterated in solitary confinement, Harriet Jacobs spent seven 
years hiding in a tiny attic crawl space, while Henry Brown successfully had himself shipped in a 
box from Richmond to Philadelphia. Such heroic acts were supported by an array of Black and 
white Americans, reflecting a general consensus that, despite endemic racism, largely opposed 
the South’s consolidation of regional power. Among other measures, this was expressed in the 
North through “personal liberty laws” that forbade cooperation with slave catchers and allowed 
jury trials for fugitive slaves.  
 A group that I have worked with through a university program at an Illinois state prison is 
trying to serve a similar function. Creating a safe and confidential space for a small group of 
incarcerated men to discuss childhood trauma and neighborhood violence has not only provided 
group members with a strong support system and a model for community intervention, it has 
helped members to connect and contribute, through an outside member who sat on the Illinois 
Governor’s Criminal Justice Reform Commission, to the process of re-evaluating sentencing and 
parole in one of the nation’s most crowded and racially distorted correctional systems. Working 
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within IDOC, the group has created and intends to create opportunities for incarcerated and 
paroled people, as well as people in their home neighborhoods, to address the role of policing 
and state punishment in their collective existence. One of our key commitments is to egalitarian 
participation and consensus decision-making—the erasure of distinctions. Our relative protection 
from direct IDOC oversight is key to the atmosphere of trust the group has been able to preserve. 
Along with the (ideally) merciful jury in its chamber and the Underground Railroad 
network of secret compartments, isolation has been a tool of liberation, providing potent models 
for understanding the work of Tamms Year Ten as a private as well as a public effort. Lobbyists 
among and opposed to other lobbyists, TY10 sometimes deployed the language of art as a means 
of communication; yet the group produced few images. Slogans proliferated, like “Stop Torture 
in Illinois” laid out in an outline of Illinois on a large ground covering used at public events, but 
not the faces and conditions of the men for whom they advocated—except for the faces of the 
formerly incarcerated who appeared at events in person as advocates. Nonetheless, whether 
absent or present, imagery remains central to the concerns of legislative art. The crusader may 
pursue an inner vision, but outwardly this crusader often evokes the unrefined philistine. 
 
 
3.2  Iconoclasm, sacrifice, and consensus 
 
 Maps have long been used to represent political claims. The 1648 treaty reached by 
European states at Westphalia, which first established national boundaries on a continental basis, 
is a signature example. Other early modern examples include the maps that indigenous 
communities in the Yucatán created in order to negotiate land allocations with the Spanish 
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during the early days of colonial occupation (Solari, 2013). The use of images makes a statement 
of sovereignty concrete and immediately comprehensible, and also gives such a statement an 
appearance of factual, empirical authority. But this authoritative embodiment, which lends an 
appearance of certainty to a contingent claim, arouses strong feelings. Beyond disagreements 
over maps, though, disputes over images have long been a means to resolve or instigate violent 
conflicts.  
While the work of Tamms Year Ten was not primarily visual, debating laws has always 
involved the contestation and even desecration of images. In its tireless work to shut down 
Tamms, to take it off of the correctional map, TY10 was an iconoclastic and even philistine 
project—skeptical of beauty but enamored of action, going beyond the bureaucratic conceptualist 
anti-aesthete as described by Buchloh. In 415 B.C., the escape from Athens and defection to 
Sparta by the famous statesman, orator, and general Alcibiades was precipitated by the 
disfigurement of numerous public religious statues of Hermes, an act blamed on him and his 
associates. Occasioning denunciations by his political enemies and stoking popular outrage, the 
vandalism occurred just before the planned Athenian assault on Sicily. The ancient historian 
Thucydides (1910/2004), who served as an Athenian general, paraphrases Alcibiades’ speech to 
the Spartan ephors, in which, attempting to gain the Spartans’ trust, Alcibiades describes the 
circumstances of his departure from Athens: 
 Our party was that of the whole people, our creed being to do our part in preserving the 
form of government under which the city enjoyed the utmost greatness and freedom, and 
which we had found existing. As for democracy, the men of sense among us knew what it 
was, and I perhaps as well as any, as I have the more cause to complain of it; but there is 
nothing new to be said of a patent absurdity — meanwhile we did not think it safe to alter 
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it under the pressure of your hostility. (p. 316) 
In this frank assessment of democracy, as well as in the long string of maneuvers and shifting 
allegiances through which Alcibiades eventually regained his status as an Athenian citizen, we 
can see one definition of “legislative art”—a negotiation of status in which images and theatrics 
are props for an assertion of power, and in which unexpected shifts of fortune are to be expected. 
In Plato’s primary Alcibiades dialogue, Socrates extols virtue by comparing the practices of 
warmaking and of teaching to the arts of gymnastics and music, while Alcibiades asserts that war 
need only have the appearance of justice. In his essay on “transference,” Lacan would describe 
the iconoclastic outlaw Alcibiades, destroyer of religious fetishes, as coming, through this 
eroticized dialogue, to fetishize Socrates himself (Fink, 2015). 
Two millennia later, with the calling of the Long Parliament in November 1640 against 
the background of a revolutionary rollback of monarchical and church authority, English 
Puritans mobilized to petition the legislature to pursue the very action of which Alcibiades was 
accused—the deliberate destruction of religious images. One way they did this was actually 
through the creation of and distribution of images, simple woodcuts, but the primary medium 
was writing, with the creation of polemical tracts and satirical verses (Spraggon, 2003, p. 32). 
The splendor of the Church was one source of sinful visual opulence, but this could not be 
dissociated from the finery of the court (Agamben, 2011). Along these lines, the Puritan 
opposition to the theatre could be linked to their opposition to the Crown, exemplified by the 
elaborately staged European courtly masque performances of the 16th and 17th centuries, created 
to flatter and glorify the monarch. No matter how empty of meaning, the formal impact of 
official theatrics can hardly be overstated (Zupančič, 2006, p. 174). While Puritans were 
relentless in their deprecation of the arts, it could be said that this political anti-art writing was a 
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novel form of creativity—perhaps realized most spectacularly in Titus Oates’ 1678 invention of 
an anti-Protestant “popish plot” to overthrow the king, a fabrication spread through printed 
media but given credence by Parliament and many other officials. Creative prose and poetry 
additionally found its way into Puritan and Catholic print narratives of redemptive punishment in 
imprisonments and executions, derived from popular “murder tracts” (Lake, 2002).  
In these iconoclastic gestures may be seen the genesis of conceptual art, as a form of 
petitioning for the erasure of cultural tendencies believed to be somehow false. The rage of 
condemnation and the substitution of image with language are both inseparable from modern art, 
but have a long history, as in the American legacy of freed slaves creatively destroying the art 
treasures of their masters. One highlight of this history, recounted by Jennifer Van Horn (2017), 
involves an African-American woman’s public destruction in 1865 of a sculpted bust of the pro-
slavery Senator John C. Calhoun (p. 134). This event resonates with a 2016 incident in which 
Corey Menafee, an African-American dishwasher at Yale University, deliberately smashed a 
stained-glass window depicting an image of Black slaves, in a building named for the very same 
Senator Calhoun. Activist Bree Newsome brought down the Confederate flag from the South 
Carolina state capitol in that same year, setting the precedent for Takiyah Thompson, who in 
2017 led the group that brought down a Confederate war monument in Durham, North Carolina. 
As it so happens, 2016 was also the year of the first legal decision naming cultural destruction as 
a war crime; the contrite defendant was an Islamist militant leader sentenced by the International 
Criminal Court for the destruction of ancient mausoleums at a United Nations World Heritage 
Site in Timbuktu. 
 Not all legislative-aesthetic gestures are iconoclastic in this way, although they may 
involve another violent visual erasure: the sacrificial punishment of scapegoats. Scapegoats of 
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concern to Reynolds have long included the staff-assaulting prisoner, or the sex offender. French 
republican political philosopher Jean de Dieu d’Olivier published an “Essay on the Art of 
Legislation” (1815/2009). He described the design of a law much as modernist designers and 
architects would discuss functional structures. “Haven’t we established that the great art of 
legislation comes down to reducing its rules to their most simple form?,” d’Olivier asks. “We 
could say that in our art, less is more” (p. 31). He addresses the budding lawmaker In a calm 
reasonable tone of pedagogical advice, reminiscent of Socrates advising Alcibiades. But as 
Socratic dialogues often portend the poisonous hemlock Socrates would eventually be forced to 
drink, we can sense with d’Olivier the shadow of the guillotine, a device described at the time of 
its invention by the Jesuit-trained Dr. Guillotin as a “philanthropic machine” (Derrida, 2014, p. 
270)—and a machine that created its own (allegedly painless) visual spectacle (Graybill, 2006). 
Or we could look forward to the time when French colonial authorities in Algeria, projecting a 
façade of humanity, observed five rules for the proper conduct of torture, including that it never 
be done in front of children, or by “sadists” (as cited in Peters 1996, p. 178).  
Indeed, with the advent of the post-revolutionary Reign of Terror, France entered into an 
era of increasingly violent popular spectacle (Graybill, 2006). But reassuringly, d’Olivier tells 
us: “Have not the French, who are descendants of Gallic people, shown that, under peaceful 
princes and friends of the fine arts, they could set the tone of Europe in the kindest civility?”  (p. 
102). But he says also that “the art of legislation becomes very difficult, since it consists in the 
organization of a censorship that obstructs neither too much nor too little a fair liberty” (p. 
136)—bringing to mind the cosmetic labor invoked by British parliamentarian Edmund Burke, a 
fierce critic of revolutionary France, who observed, “there is a sacred veil to be drawn over the 
beginnings of all government” (cited in Ward & Waller, 1914, p. 23). We can see the aesthetic 
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function of the allegedly humane practice of segregated detention even before the French 
Revolution. In his aforementioned pamphlet condemning public spectacles of punishment, the 
American Benjamin Rush proposed isolation as a space of imposed self-reflection (1783/2005). 
This overdetermined privacy, invisibility as a form of protective spiritual retreat, was much like 
the “solitary reverie” invoked in the same year as Rush’s pamphlet by French revolutionary Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1783/2009). 
 By contrast, the judicial theater of the Reign of Terror, overseen by a Revolutionary 
Tribunal that included a twelve-man jury, provides an exemplar for Joseph Stalin’s show trials, 
the public condemnations of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the hearings of the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC), the main stage for the American “Red Scare” of the 
1950s. Many creative individuals went before the Committee, and used it as a stage, as in 1953, 
when Lionel Stander announced his refusal to perform without a paycheck, and when Jerry 
Rubin wore a Revolutionary soldier costume to testify in 1966 (Camnitzer, 2007, p. 276n). Tony 
Perucci (2012) examines the HUAC interrogation of legendary performer Paul Robeson as a 
form of both repressive and emancipatory performance. But an exceptional example is Harvey 
Matusow, a writer and performer by trade who, as a former Communist, worked as an aide to 
Senator Joseph McCarthy and gave a significant amount of testimony dedicated to informing on 
fellow radicals, before recanting all of his accusations in a book entitled False Witness, and 
serving a prison sentence for perjury. During his time as a paid informant he was working on 
raising money to publish a book of poems, doing a stand-up act at a Washington nightclub that 
included an impression of Senator McCarthy, and promoting another book denouncing the anti-
Communist magazine Counterattack, for which he had at one point served as editor (Lichtman & 
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Cohen, 2004, p. 96). Later in life he went on to produce an experimental music festival and to 
broadcast regularly on cable public access as a TV clown.  
These contradictions perhaps make it easier to accept the appropriation of works by 
Abstract Expressionist painters Jackson Pollock, Willem de Kooning, and Mark Rothko as a tool 
of anti-Communist propaganda by the CIA,11 at the same time artists were subpoenaed to appear 
before the HUAC. And the artifice undertaken by McCarthy himself should not be overlooked. 
While he had intervened on behalf of former Nazi officers after the war (Heartfield, 2012, p. 
388), McCarthy borrowed the name of his House Un-American Activities Committee from the 
Special Committee on Un-American Activities, established in 1934 to investigate Nazi groups 
operating in the U.S. Referencing this original anti-Nazi Special Committee, but avoiding 
reference to McCarthy, conservative American politician Newt Gingrich more recently used the 
occasion of the bombing of a Miami nightclub by a professed Islamist to argue for a concerted 
campaign to root out “Islamic supremacists” (Bobic, 2016). These are just some of many 
moments of scapegoating legislative sacrifice in the U.S. that calls to mind René Girard’s 
paradoxical idea of the divine victim (1999/2001).  
In the case of the Tamms Correctional Center, this sacrificial aesthetic moment came in 
1996 when Chicago news anchor Bill Kurtis released a 1988 video shot in prison of serial killer 
Richard Speck. In the video Speck, sporting breasts induced by taking smuggled hormones, 
wears only women’s panties, snorts cocaine, and performs fellatio on another prisoner. The video 
was shown to Illinois state legislators in a packed session, and is considered to be a significant 
factor in the approval of Governor Jim Edgar’s prison proposal (Eisenman, 2009, p. 40; 																																																								
11 “Parapolitics: Cultural Freedom and the Cold War” was a 2017 exhibition in Berlin that 
specifically addressed the use of art in pro-Western CIA propaganda.  
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Reynolds, personal communication April 20, 2014). The abject repugnance experienced by 
lawmakers viewing this tape translated more or less directly into the denial of sensation 
experienced by men in Tamms.  
The brutal response to the provocation of Speck’s shape-shifting body also calls to mind 
an earlier Chicago scapegoat: Linda Taylor, infamously demonized by Ronald Reagan as the 
“welfare queen,” a name bestowed by the Chicago Tribune in the 1970s. While wildly 
unrepresentative of welfare recipients generally, she was reminiscent of both a performance artist 
and an escaping slave (cf. the case of Ellen Craft, mentioned above). She was a chameleonic 
figure who relentlessly gamed a system that offered minimal sustenance to marginalized 
populations. And, at least in Chicago, Taylor also ended up doing her part to boost newspaper 
sales.  
She allegedly had at least 31 addresses, 25 phone numbers, 3 cars (including one 
Cadillac) and several husbands (most dead and one 25 years her junior). Her physical 
form was as elusive as her legal identity. Investigators alleged she had 30 different 
wigs and had claimed benefits as a white, an African American, and a Filipina.  
(Kohler-Hausmann, 2007, p. 334).  
Before being invoked in national politics, Taylor’s media image was used to enact restrictive 
surveillance on people receiving Illinois state welfare payments, beginning as early as 1974—a 
trend that continued in President Bill Clinton’s welfare reform, up through recent draconian 
Federal rules regarding food stamps.  
The vehement reactions to Speck’s provocative video and Taylor’s renegade 
performances are reminiscent of the public outrage at many avant-garde artworks-- in particular, 
the “culture wars” over the National Endowment for the Arts, highlighted in 1989 when 
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Congressional conservative Jesse Helms denounced works by artists such as Robert 
Mapplethorpe, Andres Serrano, and Karen Finley on the floor of the U.S. Senate. A year earlier 
in Chicago, African-American artist Dread Scott Tyler had aroused the ire of President George 
H. W. Bush for displaying a piece entitled What is the Proper Way to Display a U.S. Flag?, an 
installation which invited viewers to walk on an American flag in order to view a photo of flag-
draped coffins and write in a comment book. Condemned on the Senate floor, this piece helped 
to inspire anti-flag-desecration legislation that ended up being struck down by the Supreme 
Court. Tyler’s piece also inspired a response piece by an art teacher, which encouraged viewers 
to walk on a tape outline of Tyler’s presumably dead body in order to pay veneration to a flag on 
the wall (Thompson, 2016). 
The outsize, pedagogically punitive reactions to the abject aesthetic impact of Speck and 
Taylor can be seen as both a reflection and extension of the NEA artists’ attempts at representing 
sadism and deviant sexuality. Scapegoating has become institutionalized in many states through 
the adoption over the last two decades of criminal justice registries, which have been and remain 
a main focus of Reynolds’ organizing efforts. The most well-known are sex offender registries, 
but in Illinois there are also registries for murder, arson, methamphetamine crimes, and violent 
crimes against youth. The popularity of such registries with legislators is simply a reflection of 
their popularity with the public; everyone wants to be on record supporting such measures, just 
as nobody wants to be on record opposing them. The proliferation of pedophilia imagery in 
legislative campaign advertising, familiar in Illinois but making national headlines in a 2016 
North Carolina Senate race (Phillips, 2016), may help Reynolds to be understood as someone 
who may sometimes use images, but who opposes certain images with a will. The appeal of 
scapegoats underscore what makes the juror, the legislator, and the artist different from the 
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judge, administrator, or police officer (though not the teacher)—the presence of an audience. 
Often, the spectatorship is a two-way street. 
 In 1965, Yale political science professor James David Barber published a study of 
newcomers to the Connecticut state legislature. His narrative invoked a set of images, these 
being the four types he identified as representing fundamental characteristics of “freshman” 
legislators. One of these types is the Spectator, who does very little work to create, introduce, or 
work on legislation, but nonetheless claims to be interested in pursuing a legislative career. 
“Unlike other quiet legislators,” writes Barber, “they place a high value on the legislature as 
entertainment.” He cites a respondent who confesses, “there’s pageantry, there’s entertainment. 
And you can watch the people—I mean, I like to watch the people. And I’m sitting where I have 
a pretty good view” (p. 24). One legislator rapturously describes a beautiful table display at a 
legislative dinner party she attended: 
And on one side was a great big basket of flowers- real flowers. A great big floral 
display. On the other side was an ice-basket. One of those molded ice-baskets? And that 
had real flowers in it, too. And they had a spotlight on it. Different colors? And it was 
just a beautiful sight. And then the food was arranged—the turkey and the ham were cut 
real pretty and laid on trays with pansies and parsley and all kinds of decorations on it.  
(as cited on p. 49)  
Despite the Spectator’s lack of creative productivity, this type tends to help build consensus 
through ready acquiescence (pp. 65-66). Speaking of Spectators, Barber says:  
The legislator does not have to decide whether his constituents are wholly right or his 
party is wholly right. He does not have to resolve all their philosophical differences. He 
does not have to calculate how their preferences on all legislative issues, taken 
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collectively, can be arranged in a transitive schedule maximizing rewards for both 
sides… The multiplicity of demands reaching the Spectator from different groups may 
simply multiply his opportunities for submission. He can “go along” with several of them 
at the same time.  (p. 61)  
While this sounds very unlike the unwavering focus that characterized the legislative work of 
TY10, the role of the Spectator as a mirror of the popular will does seem like a viable definition 
of an ideal lawmaker, juror, or artist: chosen for mainstream predictability rather than 
idiosyncratic individuality, never fixated on principle to the exclusion of compromise. There is 
an element of philistinism, an indifference to perfection, with the congenial Spectator as much as 
with the militant Puritan iconoclast. The role of submission in legislation is a theme I will return 
to.  
Alongside the pleasure of submission, the pleasure of transgression, not only against the 
law but also through it and within it, often toying with written and unwritten laws of white 
supremacy, has fueled the enjoyment of modern art since its inception. As Charles Shepherdson 
summarizes Lacan, “we do not enjoy in spite of the law, but precisely because of it” (1995, n.p.). 
According to Karin Wieland, Filippo Tomasso Marinetti and the proto-Fascist Italian Futurists, 
active in the first decades of the twentieth century, “incorporated the methods of a political 
electoral campaign into art: newspapers, manifestos, public appearances, and scandals.” (as cited 
in Groys, 2012, p. 207)  Mock trials and other political spectacles were incorporated into public 
performances by the anarchic and anarchistic Dadaists, active in Zurich and Berlin after the First 
World War (Witkovsky, 2004). Before this, both reactionaries and revolutionaries made use of 
lawmaking imagery from Exodus in the turbulent decades following the French Revolution 
(Ribner, 1986), and the Paris Commune helped to establish the utopian but also legalistic 
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tradition of artists’ manifestos (Federation of Artists, 1871/2016). Transgression is perhaps the 
most obvious link between art and law.  
While her link to philistinism remains important, Laurie Jo Reynolds’ location of art in 
law and action does not remove it from the realm of aesthetics, but ties it to the history of 
modern art. Aesthetics “is by no means free from laws,” says Friedrich Schiller (1794/2004), 
even if “the mind in its aesthetic condition … acts freely and is in the highest degree free from 
all constraints.”  While Todd Cronan dismisses the idea that “the production and articulation of 
new formats is the occasion of new social realities,” (2013, n.p.), his paraphrase of David 
Joselit’s central claim in the book After Art, Joselit (2013) is just updating the Romantic view 
that a thing’s “aesthetic character” can “relate to the totality of our various powers, without being 
a specific object for any one of them” (Schiller, p. 99). Hito Steyerl (2016) has observed that cell 
phone cameras use data-mining algorithims to construct a fictionally enhanced version of an 
otherwise low-resolution photograph, but this is obviously what portrait painters have done for 
centuries—creating an imaginary image that, like anyone campaigning or lobbying in the 
legislative process (such as Laurie Jo Reynolds and Tamms Year Ten), solicits the fantasmic 
engagement and consent of the subject. 
 
 
3.3  Hearing the call 
 
 A moment of tragic awakening comes in Charlotte Bronté’s Jane Eyre, when Jane 
encounters a hidden prisoner in her home. In the book’s climactic crisis, Jane discovers that her 
fiancé Edward Rochester has a “dark” secret—Bertha Mason, a Creole “Negress” he met and 
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married in the West Indies, who was declared mad and has been locked up in the attic for a 
decade. A victim of torture, Bertha is portrayed as a wild beast, devoid of humanity— less a 
person than an allegory of maimed imperialist conscience brought to agonized life. Jane flees, 
only to wind up in the arms of St. John, a missionary who seeks to marry her and take her off to 
India. Eventually, with the independence granted to her by an inheritance, Jane returns to 
Rochester, now blind and incapacitated by Bertha’s desperate final attempt at liberation, to act as 
his nursemaid, much like Antigone with her blind father Oedipus in exile. While it is far from 
clear that Bronté sympathizes with Bertha, the stench of guilt, drifting in from the hinterland of 
Empire, seeps through the whole novel.  
 While there are reasons to critique the thoroughly dehumanized figure of Bertha, Jane 
may perhaps be understood to hear in Rochester’s appeals for her mercy the frustrated fury of the 
sadistic colonizer. In the other side of the colonizer-colonized dialectic, the Black Martiniquan 
psychoanalyst, critic, and revolutionary Frantz Fanon writes at length in his Black Skin, White 
Masks (1952/1986) of a traumatic experience of interpellation he experienced upon being called 
out in the street by a young white boy, who points Fanon out to his mother and says, “Look, a 
Negro!” (p. 84). In his last book The Wretched of the Earth (1961/1963) it could be said that the 
racialized self-estrangement Fanon describes in such excruciating detail in the earlier work finds 
its resolution and purpose when he rather reluctantly ends up working in Algeria, and then 
becoming a doctor supporting the militant Algerian resistance to the French. Throughout The 
Wretched of the Earth, Fanon refers to “we Algerians”, indicating the sense of solidarity in 
international anti-colonial struggle that he movingly articulates throughout that volume. 
The sacrificial scapegoat that Bertha represents, and the individual case studies that 
Fanon relates at the end of The Wretched of the Earth, are relevant for the sense of vocation that 
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would dawn upon Laurie Jo Reynolds when reading letters from men incarcerated at Tamms. As 
expressed in Jane Eyre, the sublime, à la Kant and Burke, is an experience of virtual death, the 
euphoria of disappearing like a speck in the vastness of nature. Like a zealot making demands in 
the name of a higher law, contravening Thomas Hobbes’ assertion of law as strictly earthly and 
absolute, Reynolds apprehended her political and artistic mission in a flash of insight brought 
about by an apprehension of suffering. Jan Verwoert (2008) cites an anecdote Giorgio Agamben 
tells about the eminent Russian poet Anna Akhnatova: 
Standing outside a Leningrad prison in 1930 where her son was a political prisoner, a 
woman whose son was also imprisoned, addressed Akhmatova with the question: “Can 
you speak of this?”  She realised that she had to respond yes— indeed she could—and in 
this moment found herself both indebted and empowered. (p. 101) 
A comparable moment of decision would occur for Reynolds in 2008, when a realization would 
make her reframe her work as an artist, and refuse to continue working as she had previously. 
This revelation emerged from a newfound depth of empathy, directed toward action rather than, 
as with Wender’s (2008) contemplative appreciation of police encounters, moments of ineffable 
aesthetic poignancy.   
  Regardless of how one chooses to respond, the experience of long-term solitary 
confinement is movingly expressed in stories of unrelenting interiority. Interviewed about his 
day-to-day life, a former long-term segregation inmate at Pelican Bay in California describes it 
as a thoroughly uncanny environment. 
 …And it’s quiet. Very quiet. And when you walk inside the unit, it’s so quiet, you can’t 
imagine that there’s anybody there. And when you walk in the unit, you don’t see bars. 
All you can see is doors, like that. And you can’t even imagine there’s people back there. 
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… And what’s even more creepy, when you go into the little SHU yard they have for 
us… Someone described it to me once… “Imagine yourself walking into a ten-feet empty 
pool, in the bottom… and you stand up, and that’s all you see in the all around, the 
walls.” (as cited in Reiter, 2016, p. 176) 
Falsely charged Black Panther Albert Woodfox, who spent forty years in solitary in Louisiana, 
once told a psychologist: “It takes so much out of you just to try to make these walls, you know, 
go back to the normal place they belong,” “Someday,” he went on, “I’m not going to be able to 
deal with it. I’m not going to be able to pull those walls apart” (Aviv 2017, para. 65). Kalief 
Browder, arrested at age 16 on charges of theft he steadfastly denied, refusing to accept a plea 
deal, ended up spending two of his three years at New York’s Rikers Island jail in solitary 
confinement. The charges were dismissed (likely because of national press coverage), but 
Browder committed suicide at age 22.  
The capacity of long-term solitary confinement to cause permanent mental damage can 
be seen as a deepening and magnification of this immediately unnerving quality. Lisa Guenther 
(2013) reflects at length on the capacity that such an experience has to dissolve boundaries 
between self and world, and any grounding in space and time. Such spaces fail to rehabilitate 
prisoners or deter recidivism (Gordon, 2014; Frost and Monteiro, 2016), results that render it 
meaningless in the terms of social engineering, and so addressing these spaces at the level of 
aesthetics seems necessary, if insufficient.  
Prolonged segregation is a brutally simple policy--minimalist, if you will-- that operates 
at the aesthetic level of a gesture, a wordless message that traps and immobilizes its subject like 
an image in a photograph. The utilitarian clarity of purpose that appeared in early prison designs 
based on Bentham’s panopticon seemed to be a presentiment of modernist architecture, and this 
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functional austerity has continued, up through the cutting-edge, largely automated supermax 
facilities of today. The solitary cell is an embodiment of this austerity as a test of psychological 
endurance that clearly surpasses mere functionalism. The stern, bleak rectilinearity of Minimalist 
art and Brutalist architecture resonate aesthetically with the prison—Robert Morris’ “steel cage-
like constructions of 1967” (Chave, 1990, p. 55) provide a straightforward example. The 
Minimalism-influenced installation artist James Turrell has capitalized on the “fugue state” 
typical of isolated sensory deprivation (Rodney, 2016, para. 4), evoked in the immersive 
experiences offered in his 1990s “Soft Cell” series, as well as his “Perceptual Cell” series in the 
2010s. These works, for all of their sublime power, simply represent the bliss of submission. An 
aesthetic gesture of resistance, like that of the (lowercase) brutalism it opposes, must perhaps 
manifest in the medium of law to be realized.  
Borrowed from observations of Chinese political detention, as well as inherited from 
early American penitentiaries, solitary confinement as a technique of interrogation and re-
education was studied and implemented experimentally in the early 1960s by the CIA as a tactic 
to be used against politically radical prisoners. One of these experimental programs was based in 
Illinois at the Federal facility in Marion, which hosted the first modern isolation unit in 1972, 
before effectively becoming the nation’s first supermax with the 23-year lockdown that began in 
1983 (Guenther, 2013). In 1997 Reynolds began working with the Committee to End the Marion 
Lockdown, opposing the solitary confinement of Puerto Rican political prisoners at this prison12, 																																																								
12 The solitary confinement of political prisoners at Marion continues today, as with the case of 
Earth Liberation Front member Daniel McGowan, who in 2008 was placed in the segregated 
Communications Management Units (CMU) there without due process, apparently in response to 
his online writing (Slade, 2014). 
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which has come to be associated with the inauguration of widespread segregated detention 
practices to punish and intimidate prisoners in the U.S. (Jeffreys, 2014). Although solitary 
confinement in the U.S. dates back to 1790 with Philadelphia’s Eastern State Penitentiary, this 
modern iteration of long-term isolation became institutionalized in Illinois in 1998 with the 
Tamms supermax, initially intended to house only inmates with severe disciplinary violations for 
no longer than one year. Neither restriction was observed.   
Men who transferred into Tamms were locked in a solitary windowless cell for at least 23 
hours per day, and denied nearly all human contact, an experience shown to cause severe mental 
anguish.  The use of terror by correctional officers should not be overlooked either, as TY10 
members told me. Johnnie Walton, who spent five years in Tamms and over forty behind bars, 
told me that guards in Tamms would physically torment inmates without provocation. Brenda 
Smith, whose son spent 14 years in Tamms, told me of a nearly fatal beating one prisoner 
received just before the closure of the facility. Walton spoke in particular about the SWAT team 
training that correctional officers started receiving in the late 1990s, in which swarming armored 
guards would not merely restrain but brutalize and intimidate unruly inmates. Walton reports: 
Eighty percent or ninety percent of these guards don’t want no trouble. They just want to 
do their eight hours and get out of here. But you got ten percent that’s gonna try to hurt 
you, they’re gonna try to drive you, they’re gonna try to break you. (personal 
communication, July 16, 2014) 
But the usual fate of men in Tamms was a slow, wasting mental and physical collapse that 
Walton characterized as “death by deterioration.” 
The political origin of Tamms was in the response to an era in which gang authority 
structures were used to control prison populations, which promoted peace at the expense of state 
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authority, leading to a harsh crackdown. One factor was certainly the 1996 Richard Speck tape, 
which spurred public punitive outrage.13 But changes brought about by the media-fueled 
backlash against gang authority in prison hardly resulted in success. Both within and outside 
prison walls, the dismantling of gang hierarchy led to more of a dispersal than a reduction of 
violence. At the whim of wardens, Illinois prisoners were transferred to Tamms without due 
process, although this transfer was widely claimed to only apply to persistent violators of prison 
safety rules. The brother of pseudonymized TY10 volunteer Carol Wilcox (personal 
communication, July 17, 2014) was taken out of his cell at the state’s Menard prison in the 
middle of the night with no warning or recourse and transferred to Tamms, despite his clean 
disciplinary record. Brenda Smith (personal communication, July 15, 2014) believes that filing 
grievances was what put her son in Tamms, and kept him there.  
The three main groups of Tamms prisoners ended up being highly litigious inmates like 
Smith’s son, powerful gang members (most without serious prison disciplinary reports), and the 
severely mentally ill. Johnnie Walton brought up in his interview the use of Tamms to house the 
mentally ill, and also said that the existence of Tamms served officials in other Illinois prisons as 
a potent threat for prisoners who assaulted staff; Reynolds said that only six prisoners ever sent 
to Tamms had committed serious acts of violence while incarcerated. One of these was Joseph 
Dole (2016), who recounts a brutal and prolonged beating he received from staff at the state 
prison at Menard after punching a warden, resulting in his subsequently being transferred to 																																																								
13 A contemporaneous crackdown was the increased harshness of juvenile sentencing after the 
high-profile 1989 “Central Park Five” case, in which five teenage boys of color, convicted based 
on coerced confessions and plea bargains amid a media frenzy of lurid paranoid provocation, 
were exonerated after spending over a decade behind bars.   
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Tamms, and being denied due process or adequate legal recourse.  More to the point, Wilcox 
related a quote from her brother that served as her call to action: “They’re sending me there to 
die.” 
In 2006, the Tamms Poetry Committee began to hold public events in order to share 
prisoners’ letters, events that began building interest in the issues raised by the project. In early 
2007, the group participated in the aforementioned exhibit “Captive Audience” at the University 
of Illinois at Chicago’s Gallery 400 space, a prison-themed show curated by artist Marc Fischer, 
affiliated with the collective Temporary Services. They displayed poems and responses from 
inmates, there was artwork by men at Tamms, and Reynolds installed her video “Space Ghost,” 
which juxtaposed audio of prisoners’ phone calls describing the effects of solitary confinement 
over footage of astronauts in space. They had a public event to write letters, and lawyers for and 
family members of Tamms inmates attended and shared information. This helped to build the 
group’s mailing list, and raised the level of public interest around issues at Tamms. At the end of 
that year the video was screened at the Hyde Park Art Center, and there was another 
informational event, which drew in a crowd less exclusively comprised of art enthusiasts. A 
former Tamms inmate was there, as well as a lawyer, and many more people who had signed up 
to receive updates from the Poetry Committee. They read from postcards and composed 
responses. Here Reynolds would hear her call. 
In analyzing the rhetorical structure of Ignatius Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises, Roland 
Barthes (1971/1976) describes “mantic art,” a “language of interpellation” in which a “question 
addressed by man to the Divinity” receives "a “response sent by the Divinity to man” (p. 46). 
“The function,” he says, “… is to determine a choice, a decision” (p. 47).  It was in this manner 
Reynolds had her breakthrough—appropriately expressed in parable form: 
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Okay, the story is now a parable.  There’s an artist, and there’s a man in the bottom of the 
well.  The artist has the urge to tell people about him and to make art about him, and she 
does.  At what point does the artist, who knows all about this man, try to get him out?... 
We sent letters and poetry to every prisoner in Tamms, to try to provide them with some 
social contact… But at a certain point, this ‘man in the well’ question came up from the 
prisoners themselves.  One prisoner wrote, “Hey, this poetry is great, but can you please 
tell the governor what they’re doing to us down here?”  This prisoner was saying, “Take 
some political responsibility.” (Reynolds, 2011)  
Johnnie Walton, who was a committed member of Tamms Year Ten until his death in 2015, 
wrote the postcard to which Reynolds attributes her decision to change the direction of her 
activism. For her, as for Latin American artists in the early 1970s, according to Luis Camnitzer 
(2007), “making art, at least in its formalist version, stopped being the real issue.  The aim 
became to organize a receptive community, which is a political issue” (p. 20). So it was at the 
origin of the “legislative art” project Tamms Year Ten: the creation of artworks turned into an 











3.4  The fight to close Tamms 
 
In 2008, the tenth anniversary of the opening of Tamms, Reynolds helped to found 
Tamms Year Ten as a group dedicated to undertaking direct legislative action in opposition to 
violations of human rights at the facility. Reynolds sympathizes with advocates of prison 
abolition, but opposed a group name that called for closing the facility, as she recognized the 
political realities of this effort. Speaking of corrections and other public officials TY10 deals 
with, she said, “I maintain a radical critique of the current system, and they know it, but I see 
their structural obstacles, and I also see their good-faith efforts to turn the system around” 
(2014a). Instead, she chose a name, Tamms Year Ten, that would hold legislators accountable 
for the prison’s first decade. “The men were originally supposed to be there for one year,” says 
Reynolds, “but at that point one third of them had been there for the entire decade.” She would 
continue to advocate for the closure of Tamms through developing warm, respectful 
relationships with as many representatives and administrators as could be helpful or feasible.  
 TY10 built relationships with sympathetic legislators through volunteering.  The group’s 
first action was to volunteer for State Representative Eddie Washington, one of the group’s most 
committed early allies, who demonstrated the importance of meeting frequently with corrections 
officials. Their first legislative action was to appear at a hearing of the State House Prison 
Reform Committee. Committee member Julie Hamos, who became Illinois’ chief health care 
administrator, offered TY10 numerous effective strategies for pursuing their legislative goals, as 
well as actively promoting the closure of Tamms. Shortly after that hearing, in April 2008, they 
introduced legislation to reform conditions at Tamms, and did so again less than a year later, in 
January 2009.  
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Reynolds made a point of lobbying members of the Black and Latino representative 
caucuses, and this continued throughout the campaign. TY10 started showing up at the capital in 
Springfield for lobbying days, at which members gave cards to state representatives in order to 
be invited to meetings in order to share concerns, and to advocate for the legislation the group 
had drafted. And, as Washington had encouraged, they met with administrators in the Illinois 
Department of Corrections. 
(W)e read, researched, filed Freedom of Information Act requests, extracted data from 
the public record and gathered statements from prisoners and their family members… 
Through forums, lobby days, press conferences, rallies, prayer vigils and parsley-eating 
contests, we gained the support of 70 organizations and 27 legislators for a reform bill 
sponsored by Hamos. She also initiated roundtable discussions between Tamms Year 
Ten, the IDOC and legislators. The highlight of these meetings was seeing the real 
experts—the men recently released from Tamms—confront their former captors. 
(Reynolds and Eisenman, 2013, para. 8) 
Reynolds’ partner Scott MacFarlane stated that at that moment, there was no widespread prison 
reform movement whatsoever (personal communication, May 9, 2014). The John Howard 
Association (JHA), a judicial watchdog organization, was focused solely on due process at that 
time, according to Reynolds. Still, Reynolds had a good relationship with director Malcolm 
Young, whom Reynolds invited to tour Tamms with her and Representative Washington in 2008. 
However, JHA was not addressing solitary confinement until the appointment of John Maki as 
the executive director in 2010.  
Early on, TY10 got in touch with human rights monitors in order to pressure for legal 
changes, and started working closely with reporters. The group got former Tamms inmates 
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involved in speaking directly to legislative committees, supporting “second chance” legislation 
and fighting tough-on-crime bills backed by the AFSCME, the union representing all the state’s 
prison guards. As mentioned earlier, in 2012 TY10 would hold the rally at AFSCME’s Chicago 
headquarters at which mothers of Tamms prisoners held up signs with phrases such as, “I AM A 
MOM.”  
Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich was indicted on corruption charges and impeached in 
January 2009, and the newly promoted Governor Pat Quinn appointed Michael Randle to head 
IDOC, a reformer concerned about mentally ill inmates who had closed a supermax prison in 
Ohio. Early on, Randle drafted a ten-point plan for reform at Tamms (2009), informed by 
legislation TY10 had proposed over the past two years. This plan advocated for a transparent 
review process for men transferred into the facility, mental and physical health evaluations, 
behavior-based privileges, access to education, religious services, and printed materials, opening 
up the facility to the media, transitional facilities for men transferring out, and reviews of the 
cases of long-term inmates at Tamms. In four months on the job, Randle oversaw the release of 
1500 inmates. One point in the plan that was realized was the creation of a step-down unit for 
people being released from segregation (another term for solitary confinement). Another point 
that was implemented involved a review of the conditions and effects of segregated detention on 
prisoners subjected to it, with one finding being that segregation did nothing to prevent 
recidivism once inmates were returned to the general population or released. TY10 sponsored a 
“Party on the Right Side of History,” in order to thank all who had supported the ten-point plan. 
And Reynolds began a positive working relationship with Governor Quinn, who would end up 
supporting the closing of Tamms starting in 2010 through using his veto power. Randle’s plan 
was derailed in 2010, however, by a sensationalized scandal over an early release program for 
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offenders with short sentences, which led to him losing his position. This was when TY10 held 
the “Ten Commandments”-themed rally, protesting an editorial attacking Randle, outside of the 
offices of the Chicago Tribune. 
After Randle’s departure, Reynolds continued meeting with IDOC officials and 
Democratic leaders in order to press for reforms, and came up with the plan of lobbying to de-
fund Tamms through working with State Representative Luis Arroyo. Arroyo pushed Reynolds 
to pursue this closure strategy by having TY10 attend and testify at IDOC hearings before the 
House Budget House Appropriations Committee. The committee was then chaired by 
Representative Karen Yarborough, a friend of TY10. At an appropriations meeting in April 
2009, Arroyo showed up and shared letters he had received from human rights organizations 
decrying the conditions at Tamms. Other legislators joined in, with one asking corrections 
officials to describe a typical inmate’s day in Tamms—a day which, it was revealed, would be 
profoundly uneventful. With Arroyo’s help, TY10 effectively hijacked the proceedings, 
answering questions and sharing information about conditions at the prison, and made a big 
impact on conversations around state prison reform.  
Arroyo decided that he would pursue the chairship of the Appropriations Committee, and 
successfully achieved it, remaining a reliable and powerful ally for TY10. Frustrated by another 
2010 meeting about Tamms that included IDOC acting director Gladyse Taylor, along with 
Reynolds and other TY10 members, Arroyo decided to advocate for a Latino director; this was 
also successful, when Salvador Godinez, who had long been warden of the prison at Stateville, 
became director in 2011. Through her relationship with Arroyo, Reynolds was able to meet with 
Godinez early on in his tenure, and would continue to do so, often bringing along formerly 
incarcerated men, and doing so without needing to invite in legislators to legitimize the 
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discussion. Through Godinez, Reynolds would be able to have direct visits with men who had 
been incarcerated at Tamms when they were transferred out to the maximum-security prisons at 
Pontiac and Menard as part of their “step down” transition.  
Despite relentless opposition from the prison guards’ union, Director Godinez would 
prove to be a stalwart ally in the effort to close Tamms. Yet by implicating herself within the 
highest echelons of the prison system, Laurie Jo Reynolds was attempting peace negotiations 
with what many would consider a violent state apparatus. The embrace of impurity and 
ambiguity is a key element of the project’s subtlety, as well as of its success. And its success also 




3.5  Art supports activism 
 
The women’s health project Women on Waves, founded in 1999 by Dutch physician 
Rebecca Gompers, has spent years operating an abortion clinic at sea, docking at ports in areas in 
which legal abortions are difficult or impossible to obtain. The Women on Waves vessel will 
take any women who appear at the dock twenty miles out to sea, into international waters, in 
order to legally provide medical services the women are denied on the mainland, including the 
abortion pill. This is an effort that has a clear ethical imperative, and can be held up as a small 
but important activist gesture: not only for providing abortions, but for being symbolic 
ambassadors for women’s health as a human rights issue. Beyond this, however, the group is 
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recognized as a significant social practice art project, boasting a number of high-profile 
exhibitions, and an appearance in Nato Thompson’s important social practice catalog, Living as 
Form (2011).  
Carrie Lambert-Beatty (2008) begins an essay on Women on Waves with aesthetic 
praise, describing this clinic housed in a floating shipping container as having “the stripped-
down gleam of contemporary high design” (p. 309), and goes on, in a slightly labored fashion, to 
lay out the group’s impressive artistic credentials (p, 313). But from the perspective of Gompers 
and other participants, the primary benefit Women on Waves has derived from appearing in 
high-profile exhibitions like the Venice Biennale is the elevation of the project’s international 
profile, and consequently an increased awareness of abortion laws worldwide. Although 
Lambert-Beatty seeks a more poetic motivation for the engaging of contemporary art discourse, 
the funding to purchase and equip the portable clinic came from the Mondrian Foundation, a 
granting agency founded by the estate of landmark modernist painter Piet Mondrian (p. 316). 
And, in at least once instance, the boat’s official status as art, rather than a medical clinic, 
stopped the group from being forcibly returned to the Netherlands (p. 322). These economic and 
legal incentives seem intimately linked to the mission of Women on Waves “to do media 
politics… by means of—medical service” (p. 320). 
Similarly, identifying the project as art was a way that Reynolds hoped Tamms Year Ten 
might receive funding and recognition, as well as flexibility. The diligent and resourceful 
Reynolds has the latter item covered. Speaking of Reynolds, Melinda Gullen (2014) asserts: “As 
an artist, she is independent of the institutional hang-ups experienced by many advocacy groups 
and can remain responsive with her tactics” (p. 291). But support and resources are another 
matter. For years before she was appointed to a faculty position at the University of Illinois at 
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Chicago in 2014, Reynolds had hoped that getting a teaching job through an art department 
would enable her to use a college or university as a funding mechanism, as TY10 functioned for 
years without significant backing.  
Throughout the history of the group, Reynolds worked with little to no funding, applying 
for grants but mostly running up debt, since the group’s political activity prevented it from 
becoming a not-for-profit organization. But in the days of the Tamms Committee, Reynolds 
received valuable volunteer assistance from local activists: Nadya Pittendrigh on administration 
and database development, and Josh Jones, who worked in the office of the Attorney General. 
Family members of Tamms prisoners have assisted in updating the listserv, arranging visits, and 
setting up meetings with legislators, as well as participating in rallies and lobbying efforts. For 
years the group also maintained a staff of four to six interns during the school year, who 
provided Reynolds with her opportunity to teach legislative art through long meetings and hands-
on projects. There were other small grants, but to a great extent TY10 was supported by 
Reynolds’s part-time teaching, her partner Scott MacFarlane’s Ph.D program income, and, of 
course, credit card debt. Being unable to claim nonprofit status led to tax problems, and so in 
2014 Reynolds hired a business consultant as the first paid staff position in the group’s history. 
In June of that year she overcame stiff competition to win her university teaching position, an 
achievement due in no small part to the significant amount of recognition Reynolds has been 
able to garner for the project. 
The awards she has received, like the 2012 John Peter Altgeld Freedom of Speech Award 
from Chicago’s Newberry Library, and a 2013 Leonore Annenberg Prize for Art and Social 
Change from Creative Time in New York, an award which has gone to highly visible artists like 
the Yes Men, helped to raise the profile of the organization, as well as Reynolds herself.  In 2012 
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Reynolds received the prestigious Soros Justice Fellowship for research and public work on the 
reform of punitive laws against released sex offenders, a project that began as a class she taught 
at Loyola University and DePaul University in Chicago.  Her opposition to practices of publicly 
shaming, excluding, harshly punishing, and stigmatizing sex offenders for life continued to 
informed the 2011 project “Sex Offender Coming Home,” in which released prisoners finishing 
sentences for sex crimes are imagined receiving a warm welcome and constructive re-entry 
support, to affirmation cards for legislators to aid them in analyzing new bills to punish sex 
offenders, and informative sex offender calling cards for neighborhood distribution.  
In 2013, Tamms closed. Also in that year, Reynolds was also the recipient of a highly 
competitive Creative Capital grant and a fellowship from the Blade of Grass Foundation to 
develop her satirical and informational viral video series on prison justice, “The Honey Bun 
Comedy Hour,” taking her back to her early-1990s roots in writing, directing, and producing 
televised comedy in Atlanta.  The show aimed to “depict the horrors, boredom, and small 
mercies of prison life,” using the metaphor of the packaged Honey Bun, a treat that is used for 
currency in many prisons.  She described it as “a film art comedy that’s usually not very funny,” 
drawing in part on stories gathered through her work with TY10.  For example: “Faygue, who 
has schizophrenia, tries to hang himself in Tamms, and gets a bill for $5.30 for the sheet he 
damaged.” Other than re-enactments, this “variety show” features segments such as “Best 
Bureaucrat Award,” “Prisoner Soliloquies,” and, “Bad Bill of the Month.”  She shows the videos 
to “individual decision-makers,” such as “a legislator at church, a warden in his office,” or 
“anywhere they’re needed to impact policy” (2014). The next comedy performance project, “The 
Starbucks Sleep Apnea Sex Offender Comedy Hour,” premiered in April 2017 at the Open 
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Engagement social practice conference, along with the “We Shouldn’t Have Policies We Are 
Afraid to Talk About” panel. 
At the beginning of 2014 Reynolds (and her cat Leon) spent time in the Netherlands at 
the van Abbemuseum in Eindhoven for a residency connected to the exhibit, “The Museum of 
Arte Util” (“Useful Art”), organized by Tania Bruguera. At this residency she intended to 
research Dutch prison closures, visit a treatment facility for sex offenders, and continue to work 
on Illinois prison issues. She was asked to create a timeline of efforts to reform conditions at 
Tamms, a project that she bristled at, saying that when she sees a timeline, she “just can’t make a 
narrative out of it” (2014b). So Reynolds subverted this request by refusing to summarize and 
encapsulate the group’s history. Instead she took on the Sysyphean task, as something of an 
ongoing installation/performance, to chronologically post and label every document the group 
had ever created, stringing them on wires—evoking something like Robert Morris’ 1962 Card 
File, the 1972 project index 01 by Art & Language, or any number of Conceptual and Fluxus 
archives. She had only brought along a fifth of the group’s massive boxed archive, which made 
the effort only slightly more manageable.  
Just for a sense of the scope of the van Abbemuseum archiving project, Reynolds 
estimates that the group has sent and received 75,000 emails over its history, and at one point 
issued no less than 30 legislator fact sheets over one legislative session of the Illinois House; 
also, she has 2,000 TY10 documents on her computer. Some years were titled, and so were some 
of the documents. Some sample document titles: “Reynolds Teaches Herself Advanced Excel 
From An Online Course So She Can Keep Track of Tamms Year Ten Campaign,” “Ambitious 
Meeting Agenda,” “Note From One Prisoner In Georgia To Another, Offering A Deal For The 
Debt He Hasn’t Paid So They Can Start Playing Checkers Again,” and, “Paper On Which We 
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Determined Which Of The Three Branches Of Government To Pursue To Address Crisis At 
Tamms Supermax Prison.”  The timeline project continued in fall 2014 when Tamms Year Ten 
exhibited work in California at the Santa Monica Museum of Art in conjunction with the group 
Solitary Watch, in a group show entitled “Citizen Culture: Artists and Architects Shape Policy.”  
In Towards a Lexicon of Usership, Steven Wright speaks of such work as being 
reminiscent of “On Exactitude in Science,” a Jorge Luis Borges story (inspired by Lewis Carroll) 
in which a map is made at a one-to-one scale to the landscape it represents (interestingly, “one-
to-one” was also the guard-to-prisoner ratio at Tamms). “I just started to think that the medium is 
work,” Reynolds said, “the medium is time, and labor… I guess what I experienced is just boxes 
and boxes of labor” (2014). This should not be overlooked as empty metaphor, as the 
comparison helps both to justify the work aesthetically based on craftsmanship, and to justify the 
central public role Reynolds has taken in the collective campaign of closing Tamms. Critics of 
social practice often disparage both the anti-aesthetic visuality and the egocentrism present in 
much socially-engaged art, and while these are fruitful critical approaches, there are good 
reasons to appreciate both Reynolds’ aesthetic humility and driving personality as aspects of an 
individual style. “Such evidentiary material still has political currency,” said Julia Bryan-Wilson 
(2014, p. 147), speaking of the Tate Britain’s exhibit of Margaret Harrison, Kay Hunt, and Mary 
Kelly’s multimedia investigative artwork Women and Work: A Document on the Division of 
Labor in Industry 1973-1975. Bryan-Wilson’s statement on this classic data-gathering 
conceptual piece will, I believe, hold true for Reynolds as well. 
During her residency Reynolds also got involved with a group called We Are Here, 
attempting to assist Somali and other African refugees whose requests for asylum had not been 
recognized by the Dutch government. They made extensive use of public squats for housing 
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these refugees, but with the approval of Amsterdam’s mayor, the group began housing many of 
these asylum seekers in decommissioned prisons. Along with getting a human rights 
photographer she knows to do a story on the group for Vice UK, Reynolds worked on creating 
flag-themed signage and calling cards in collaboration with this group, some of which made use 
of the poetry of Italian-Argentine poet Antonio Porchia, in order to make an impression on 
lawmakers and on the public at large. She used the free printing service offered by the van 
Abbemuseum to print the cards, and the printing continued after she returned.  
While she was doing all of these things, and giving regular presentations, she continued 
to advocate for basic needs and privileges on behalf of former Tamms prisoners back in Illinois, 
now transferred to long-term segregation units primarily in prisons at Pontiac and Menard. 
“Long-term segregation, which is basically solitary confinement, is quicksand,” Reynolds says, 
“and you take everything away from someone, and they quickly lose any sense of self from 
which to generate ‘good behavior,’ or anything else” (2014b). Pontiac is in fact entirely 
comprised of segregation units, divided into “protective custody” and the harsher “administrative 
detention,” the latter of which houses all the Tamms men who were transferred to Pontiac. In lieu 
of Reynolds finishing the TY10 timeline, the van Abbemuseum agreed to contribute funding to 
the work of TY10 in fall 2014, in exchange for the right to represent and display that work. 
“Right now there is strong potential for transforming Illinois prison spaces and 
experiences,” Reynolds stated (2014b), “through collaborations between artists, urban planners, 
social workers, architects, and farmers.”  Some projects she sees a lot of hope in include: a 
collaboration (based on a model program in Philadelphia) between artists and men serving life 
sentences to produce murals installed by inmates on work-release for the communities where the 
prisoners come from; a prisoner choir at the Stateville prison, which would hold walking 
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performances in its infamous roundhouse panopticon (the last panopticon in use in the U.S., 
closed in 2016); archiving photo albums of former corrections officials in order to document a 
time when, she says, “their system was way better” (2014b); and, a collaboration with the artists’ 
collective Fallen Fruit to create a fruit orchard inside the maximum-security state prison at 
Pontiac, in the town of Pontiac, and on Chicago’s west side, where many inmates come from.   
As mentioned, in fall 2014 Reynolds successfully landed a tenure-track faculty job in the 
Department of Art at the University of Illinois, which, as she had hoped, gave her more leverage 
and resources for advocacy. Beginning in 2015, she began turning her advocacy back to the issue 
of sex offender registries—and, along with them, the registries that also are kept for murderers, 
arsonists, and those perpetrating non-sexual violence on minors. Just as the term “decarceration” 
has finally begun to enter more mainstream political conversations, Reynolds hopes to promote a 
term coined by her partner, Scott MacFarlane: “deregistration.” Organizing sex offenders is 
extremely difficult, she explained, because of the risk involved in revealing their identities. They 
are unlike the men who were locked up in Tamms, many of whom were recognized in their 
communities for what Reynolds called their “high status.” She hoped to utilize expertise in First 
Nations restorative justice models to develop proposals for confronting the current registry 
paradigm.  
Reynolds has indeed flexed her academic muscle to organize major events around sex 
offender registries. She brought together a range of activists and attorneys from throughout the 
state and around the country for a conference at Northwestern University that she organized in 
fall 2016, entitled “The Registry 20 Years Later: Addressing Unintended Consequences.” In 
April 2017, as mentioned above, Reynolds orchestrated parallel back-to-back public testimonial 
events at the University of Chicago, to share and discuss and act upon the experiences of 
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formerly incarcerated people living under the oppressive legal sanctions of the sex offender 
registry. Both were titled “We Shouldn’t Have Policies We Are Afraid to Talk About” and 
featured some overlapping participants, but the first was presented as a panel at the School of 
Social Service Administration, under the auspices of a social practice art festival, and the second 
as a theatrical performance at the University’s Logan Center for the Arts. 
 Since she started her teaching work at the University of Illinois at Chicago, Reynolds has 
been finding her footing. In her work with students she has made some meaningful connections, 
but has found herself not knowing how to talk productively with some young people supporting 
anti-racist grassroots efforts to oppose police brutality and state racism, often affiliated with the 
Movement for Black Lives. She has concerns that, as in the differences she has had with 
uncompromising litigators and their supporters, the focus on ideological purity at the expense of 
practical organizing, lobbying, and coalition-building will not serve the goals of the effort. 
Interestingly, similar concerns have been voiced by Alicia Garza, the Oakland-based co-founder 
of the Movement for Black Lives.  
When I sit with elders, one thing they say is that they really underestimated the power of 
the state, and we didn’t actually understand the state as well as we thought we did. I think 
that is something that is still true for us, and it is something that will make or break this 
movement… It doesn’t mean that you sit in your kitchen and dream up a new policy and 
try to go at it on your own. It means that you have to do the hard work that many of these 
organizations are trying to do, which is organizing and bringing people together at scale, 
more than your five friends, to craft solutions to the problems that we face, and then to 
build strategies for how to get to those solutions. (Adetiba & Davies, 2016, para. 12, 28) 
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“We need to not write off politicians,” Reynolds said in much the same spirit, regarding 
contemporary protest movements; “We’re working from a position of no power” (2016).  
In the case of arts administrators reifying social practice, perhaps the idea of not writing 
off politicians could be extended to artists. Reynolds’ misgivings with a limited idea of politics 
also extends to the administration of her department, which has been working toward reorienting 
the studio art curriculum and programming to focus more and more on social practice, and the 
foundation-based nonprofit funding model that has allowed social practice to quickly become 
institutionalized. “Every problem has a different solution,” Reynolds told me; “If you’re doing 
(social practice) just for the sake of doing it, you’re erasing politics.”  
These confrontations are forcing Reynolds to develop her own understanding of the 
overlap between art and politics in everyday interactions that don’t directly involve sites of 
stigmatized suffering, and so her practice continues to change. Nonetheless, considering her 
career thus far, I feel that Reynolds’ projects have aesthetically done something at least 
somewhat bigger and better, considered separately or collectively, than Women on Waves, or 
any number of other social practice projects. Her edge, I think, comes from pursuing political 
progress from a number of angles, as well as generating somewhat undefinable performances, 
events, and ephemeral objects. This brings us to a more general discussion of how a political 








3.6  Chaos, ambiguity, refusal 
 
In his “Critique of Violence” (1955/1978), Walter Benjamin sees violence at the heart of 
legislative petitions. 
(W)hat parliament achieves in vital affairs can only be those legal decrees that in their 
origin and outcome are attended by violence. (p. 289) 
He subsequently asks, “Is any nonviolent resolution of conflict possible?” This raises the 
question of whether a law or an artwork could of itself be violent or nonviolent; the obvious 
problem in calling pieces of art or legislation violent is that no matter how many people are 
physically or emotionally injured by actions resulting from the enforcement of law and the 
administration of justice, or the indirect effects of aesthetic activity, laws and artworks 
themselves exist primarily as abstract concepts. Even the text of a ratified bill is not in itself a 
law, without the authorities that legitimate it and the subjects that recognize it. Empirically it 
would seem that abstract concepts do not injure people in the same way as bullets, clubs, 
chokeholds, or tasers deployed by conscious beings whose actions are indirectly motivated by 
those concepts. The diffusion of responsibility between the invention and deployment of 
potentially dangerous tools allows space for the specialized roles of legislators and artists.  
As did Rousseau in his First Discourse (1750/1779), Friedrich Schiller (1794/2004) 
phrased the seeming incommensurability of justice and aesthetics as a historical paradox: 
“Wherever we turn our gaze in the ancient world we find taste and freedom mutually avoiding 
each other” (p. 59). He compared the artisan, the artist, and the politician in terms of violence:   
When the mechanical artist sets his hand to the formless block… he does not hesitate to 
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do it violence… When the fine artist sets his hand to this same block, as little does he 
hesitate to do it violence, only he forbears to shew it… The situation is quite different 
with the pedagogical and political artist, who has Man at the same time as his material 
and as his theme… he must pay careful heed to its idiosyncracy and its personality. (pp. 
32-33) 
“If the inner man is at one with himself, “ he concludes hopefully but cryptically, “…the State 
will simply be… the clearer expression of his inner legislation” (p. 33). But it’s hard to see any 
clear expression in much recent legislation. The USA PATRIOT Act, a landmark expansion of 
Federal policing powers passed in October 2001 in response to the 9/11 attacks the previous 
month, is a just one standout model of creative legislative obscurity, formed entirely as a 
unreadable litany of amendments to earlier laws. 
From Plato and continuing through and beyond Schiller, “art” as a discourse has been 
connected by philosophers to education- but rarely if ever as a means of authorizing 
straightforward interpretations of artworks. Alain Badiou (2005) sees art and philosophy as 
necessarily linked by education through provocation, a link that modern education has for the 
most part severed. He claims that, “’education’ (save in its oppressive or perverted expressions) 
has never meant anything but this: to arrange the forms of knowledge in such a way that some 
truth may come to pierce a hole in them” (p. 9). Meanwhile, language, as Talleyrand says, hides 
our thoughts (as cited in Jameson 1981, p. 61); just as education transmits politically neutralized 
conventions, and law works to conceal power. But art can, in keeping with Badiou’s vision, 
construct an argument that is intended to fail, to trip over itself, and thereby become visible, 
while legislation, by that logic, can at least marginally upset an existing legal order. Any artist, 
not only Reynolds, is thus more like a legislator than a mathematician, a geographer, or a 
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watchmaker, pursuing representation for the sake of recognition, and seeking justification 
through consensus rather than utility. 
But this consensus must be aligned with the direction of power and influence. Attempting 
to moderate Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, who compellingly reasserted the political significance of 
force, Jürgen Habermas claims that our slow civilized transition from force to rules presents “an 
ambivalence in the concept of law” for modern governments. Habermas says: 
On the one hand, …the concept of law as an expression of will included as an element the 
claim, successfully asserted through recourse to violence, to the exercise of domination. 
On the other hand, however, the concept of law as an expression of reason preserved 
other, older elements of its origin in public opinion(.) (1962/1989, p. 81) 
Rather than a dialectic, though, Habermas is misidentifying an evasive yet necessary 
nonspecificity at the heart of law. Vagueness as to purpose and principle is key to the 
compromises that broker legislative deals. This vagueness, political as well as semantic, reliably 
creates the conditions of both a law’s misapplication (external contingency) and its sabotage 
(internal loopholes). Karl Marx pessimistically summarizes:  
Indeed, the movement of this world within its framework of laws is bound to be a 
continual suspension of law. (1844/2009, n.p.) 
Benjamin notes the “demonically ambiguous” nature of law (p. 295), claiming that in the case of 
lawmaking violence, such as war, the legislative moment happens in the “peace ceremony” when 
new borders are decided upon, a border that is only “fair” in the sense that everyone must 
observe it.  He quotes Anatole France’s quip that “(p)oor and rich are equally forbidden to spend 
the night beneath the bridges” (p. 296). If fairness is achieved, it is by an accretion of reforms 
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rather than the elimination of unjust laws, thus forever multiplying ambiguities. Freedom to 
interpret, as I’ve discussed, is key to the art that hides in law. 
Without apparent irony, given his belief in enlightened dialogue, Habermas notes that in 
most democracies the presumption of free choice has come to replace the language of 
prohibition. Herbert Marcuse would characterize this tendency as “repressive tolerance.” This 
can be seen clearly in the coercive leverage exercised by prosecutors through the apparently free 
and fair plea bargain process (Kaste, 2014; Pfaff, 2017), the process that produces most 
American prison sentences. The prosecutor essentially controls the functioning of justice, 
including the choices of which laws are enforced, in what way, in which situation, and with 
which subjects. The other partners in this “bargain” lack any equivalent power, and choice 
without power is an illusion. The enforcement of laws after the official elimination of explicitly 
racial codes emphasizes the ideological value of this apparent choice in prosecuting racially 
marginal legal subjects. As Jill Leovy (2015) puts it, “Black people experienced law… as a 
systematic extension of the campaign of terrorist violence that had brought an end to 
Reconstruction and stripped them of their rights under the Constitution” (p. 156). Blacks in the 
Jim Crow South, according to anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker, saw law as “a vague and 
sinister force, transcending any body of definite rules” (cited in Leovy, p. 82). And Ghassan 
Hage sees in the modern age “a recurring and even systematic history of social interactions 
where Westerners require from those they racialise an exact obedience of the letter of the law 
such that they do not require it in interactions among themselves” (2014, para. 12). 
In my own activist work in central Illinois, I had the opportunity to work in fall 2016 on a 
campaign to oppose a jail expansion referendum put on the ballot by the Champaign County 
Board. A well-contrived maneuver, the referendum was justified by an administrative plan in 
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which spending to expand a local jail in the wake of three recent deaths of African-American 
detainees from medical neglect was justified not only by adding a medical wing to the plan 
(without accompanying services), but also including in this plan, down the priority list, the cost 
of a behavioral health/detox center (also being planned under the leadership of the county 
sheriff)-- a center that the county administrator admitted couldn’t find a service provider. In 
addition, the plan served as an omnibus bill, tying funding for a public nursing home to the far 
more expensive jail project. As many have noted, repressive tolerance now often takes the form 
of so-called “carceral humanism.” But the coup de grace was that County Board members were 
able to disavow responsibility for the spending plan, since the referendum was only to create a 
blank check (a slush fund), rather than to fund the priorities detailed in the plan.  
And yet, Board members insisted on the advisability of the plan, and the urgency of its 
funding. This nebulous tangle of intentions was even highlighted in a conservative local media 
outlet (Kacich, 2016), The frequent claims of unavoidable necessity by County Board members 
recalled an interview with accomplished painter Marlene Dumas (Bloom, 2009), who spoke on 
the value of ambiguity as reflective distance.  
Sometimes people ask me, "Why does it all have to be so ambiguous?" But it’s not that I 
deliberately want to confuse anyone—that is how I experience things. There are artists 
who want to possess their images…These are ways of talking about images that I find 
quite scary—they sound so authoritative… On the contrary, you have to take distance 
from the work. (p. 27) 
This distance is not without political charge, however, as Dumas is a white South African whose 
apparently traumatized subjects include, in a 2013 series, images from the funeral of assassinated 
Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba. In this case it is possible to feel unease 
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around the presentation of historical documentation as evocative ambiguity—much as with 
painter Dana Schutz’s controversial abstraction of Emmett Till’s coffin in the 2017 Whitney 
Biennial.   
For some politicians, similar to artists like Dumas and Schutz, obscurity of purpose can 
be presented as a necessary part of the democratic process. The aesthetic of a presentation 
engineered for disavowal is frustrating both for voters and art viewers, such that bluntness, as in 
the 2016 election campaign of Donald Trump, is perceived simultaneously as transgressive 
authenticity and xenophobic philistinism. The jail expansion proposal lost decisively at the ballot 
box in 2016, while Trump did not, buoyed by an ingenious fusion of willful obscurity and 
baseless hyperbolic ultimatums. Following the election, the Board has been able to benefit 
similarly, by moving to sell the nursing home to private interests, while locating alternate 
revenues for jail expenditures. Such maneuvers display a perverse elegance. 
The intricate choreography involved in first being elected to office and then negotiating 
the web of interests and stated and unstated agendas in any legislative body, in order to increase 
one’s prominence and successfully promote legislative goals, is what makes it the most 
performative branch of government, as well as the most often perceived as slow-moving, 
ineffectual, and duplicitous. Legislators are rarely experts in anything other than the law; as if 
channeling philosopher Michel Foucault (1979/2008), litigator Alan Mills (2016) paraphrased a 
legislator who said, “Our expertise is in balancing competing interests.” In his 1994 memoir The 
Art of Legislative Politics, Tom Loftus, the Democratic speaker of the Wisconsin State Assembly 
from 1983-1991, relates his reflections and experiences deep in the weeds of election and 
lawmaking campaigns. “Chaos has gotten a bad rap,” Loftus ruminates, reflecting on his 
obstructionist gambit to save the position of Ed Jackamonis, his predecessor and patron.  
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Out of chaos comes order. Thus, I would learn, if you seek a new order, foment chaos. 
The trick is to get the desired outcome. When a leader is experienced he or she can leave, 
in order to let things fall apart, and then put them together in a more preferable way. (pp. 
55-56) 
 From a story of defeating one bill through a motion pulling an unrelated bill in order to trigger a 
caucus meeting, to a lobbyist altering memos on checks to dodge an investigation, to attempting 
to override a veto through humiliating a representative who was a potential swing vote, Loftus’s 
anecdotes illustrate how publicly-touted ideals are pursued incrementally through bizarre and 
banal artifice. An intriguing artifact Loftus mentions is a thick document he received for review 
and subsequently instructed his staffer to throw out of the window; it was recovered later and 
displayed in the office with a distinct tire track on the envelope (pp. 140-141). 
Known for his attempts at the reconciliation of matter and spirit, Hegel describes two 
opposed ways that modern literary and dramatic characters can define themselves in relation to 
their larger social environment.  
(A)s happens in genuine states, the whole details of their mental attitude, their subjective 
opinions and feelings, have to be ruled by this legislative order and brought into harmony 
with it. This attachment to the objective rationality of the state which has no dependence 
on subjective caprice may either be pure subjection, because rights, laws and institutions, 
by being mighty and valid, have the power of compulsion, or it can arise from the free 
recognition and appreciation of the rationality of what exists, so that the subject finds 
himself over again in the objective world. 
The “legislative order” he mentions defines the context for modern dramatic conflicts, in which 
an individual’s inevitable submission to the collective accompanies either enlightenment or 
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despair. Luis Camnitzer (2007) describes Duchamp’s breakthrough as one of substituting context 
for content, in a manner different than that of later Conceptual Art. “His intention,” Camnitzer 
says, “was not to lay down aesthetic rules over reality;” this would echo the judgment of a court.  
Rather, “ he was interested in re-signifying meaning without altering the object” (p. 159). In this 
action, Duchamp’s readymades demonstrated a transcendent, or legislative, function of art. A 
law is always a prohibition, and thus provides the opportunity for a productive negation. 
 Attempting to negate this negation, Tania Bruguera declared: “I have always said that we 
have to put Duchamp’s urinal back in the restroom” (2011, para. 6),14 sounding much like the 
disciplining philosopher, exemplified in Charles Fourier, whose task, as Barthes (1971/1976) 
puts it, is to put the unruly poetic word back into conventional usage (p. 91). But toilets are not 
found only in restrooms. As featured in the mock solitary cell used in the aforementioned 
Temporary Services project “Prisoners’ Inventions,” the toilet is also one of the only elements of 
most solitary-confinement cells; denied human contact, prisoners in segregated detention 
frequently bypass the toilet and resort to an elemental and desperate form of self-expression: the 
spilling of blood and the smearing of feces.    
The toilet is a provocative if somewhat base metaphor for discussing legislative art, as 
when Žižek (2004) contrasted European philosophical attitudes (or national ideologies) by their 
expressions in toilet design.  The spirit of revolution summed up in Rousseau’s cry to “shatter 
the old world to bits and then/ Remould it nearer to the heart’s desire” (as cited in Gauss, 1914, 
p. 16), is reflected in French toilets that immediately hide excrement, versus Kant and Schiller’s 																																																								
14 Bruguera installed a replica of Duchamp’s Fountain, which she titled Urine Luck, at the 
Queens Museum of Art in 2011. “A day later,” writes Sam Thorke (2014), “…Duchamp’s ‘R. 
Mutt’ signature had vanished, cleaned away by maintenance staff” (para. 1). 
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speculative tradition, which evokes the waste in German toilets left in plain view for thorough 
speculative or hermeneutic examination, calling to mind Hegel’s declaration, “Out of the 
foaming ferment of finitude, Spirit rises up fragrantly.” (1807/1995, p. 233).  But when the 
object of perverse fascination (feces, art, the will or spirit of the people) is flushed away, the 
container (the toilet, the gallery exhibit, democratic structures) is made conspicuous in its 
emptiness and open to new content. Eliminating refuse completes refusal. The crisis (or the 
vacuum), formally speaking, is one of representation-- visual, narrative, electoral, and legal.  
Reynolds embraces all of this messiness. “Legislative work doesn’t deny you any of the 
indeterminacy, collaboration, authorship, or brushes with the uncanny that art provides,” she 
says.  “On the contrary, it can be a way to find it.” And, “I’m enthusiastic about legislative art 
because it is engaging, unpredictable and rewarding.  But mainly because it is necessary” 
(2014b). “Necessity” as a statement of moral urgency helps to dispel the long-standing 
associations of “contingency” with fine art, not just by the supposedly ignorant masses but the 
mainstream of modern art.  But the first quote, on indeterminacy and the uncanny, suggests that 
the legislative artist “finds” art, as Reynolds suggests, by turning her back on established forms 
of aesthetic beauty. This is what the Argentinian artist Pablo Suarez did in 1968 when he cited 
his letter refusing participation in an exhibition as his contribution to that exhibition (Camnitzer, 
2007, p. 34), or when feminist musician Kathleen Hanna, emulating an answering-machine 
recording, created a statement of her refusal to participate on Mike Watt’s 1995 album Ball-Hog 
Or Tugboat?as a track on the album. These acts, like Duchamp’s readymades, like the 
independent and collective disruptions performed by solitary inmates, offer a productive 
negation, a creative refusal.  
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An ethical choice allows the superego to induce pleasure by denying pleasure, which can 
include the denial of aesthetic pleasure. Marcel Duchamp, who identified modernist art with both 
contingency and with tactical formalism, famously turned his back on art in order to play chess. 
Of course he is remembered primarily as an artist, but he also made noteworthy contributions to 
chess, such as his examinations of insoluble endgame scenarios, referred to as deadlocks 
(Beliavsky and Mikhalchishin, 1995). In these articulations of algorithimic dead ends, Duchamp 
could be seen as setting a negative precedent followed by the sculptor Robert Morris, who in 
1963 signed a notarized statement that removed aesthetic content from his sculpture Litanies in 
response to a delay in timely payment. This was followed in 1969 by painter Lee Lozano with 
her declaration to leave the art world, and in 1971 to cut off all relationships with other women; 
critic Helen Molesworth (2006) described Lozano’s gestures respectively as rejections of 
capitalism and patriarchy. Lent momentum by Mierle Laderman Ukeles’ 1969 Manifesto for 
Maintenance Art, the “wage for housework” movement at the time, in which individuals agitated 
for recognition of female-identified care work not in order to be integrated into capitalism, but in 
order to refuse this labor. All these refusals seek to redefine the formal terms of art through a 
forceful negation of beauty, much as the iconoclasts of Alcibiades’ Athens and the London of the 
Puritans defaced images for religious and political ends.  
Legions of conceptual artists have followed this example by denying access to a specific 
object. In a recent example, Maria Eichhorn’s 2016 exhibition at London’s Chisenhale Gallery 
consisted of shutting down the gallery for the month-long run of her show, as well as all of its 
communications, in order to grant the staff a paid vacation. And, while exhibitions of both recent 
and historic invisible art have been plentiful over the last few years, it is worth remembering that 
refusals can be both aesthetic in their form and political in their effects, as when hundreds of 
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thousands of Puerto Rican voters acted en masse during national referendum elections regarding 
joining the U.S. as a state, turning in ballots stating “none of the above” in 1998 and blank 
ballots in 2012, before simply boycotting the polls (atypical for this high-turnout island) in June 
2017.  
Refusal can also appear as overabundance, rather than erasure. An aesthetic relationship 
between negation and repetition is proposed in Italian artist Mario Merz’s impersonal actuarial 
meditations on the politics of mass solidarity and cooperation. One of the many spaces Merz 
decorated with a series of ever-lengthening numerals based on the Fibonacci sequence was a 
prison in Pescara, Italy. In speaking of Walter Benjamin as a champion of “mechanical 
reproduction,” Boris Groys (2012) could also have been commenting on contrasts Merz drew 
between industrial proliferation and organic procreation. 
Capitalism is a silent work of reproduction and repetition.  What corresponds to 
capitalism, accordingly, is a theology beyond theology—a thinking of reproduction that 
only considers the form of reproduction, but no longer asks what is actually being 
reproduced (p. 98). 
What is denied in Merz’s iterative meditations is the sense of a frame or a limit, which in a way 
is common to all of the aforementioned works. Refusal to reproduce, repeat, resolve, or represent 
appears in Duchamp, Lozano, Merz, and Eichhorn (not to mention the voters of Puerto Rico) as 
the only possible resolution. Alain Badiou (2005) describes the failure of modern art as an 
inability to simultaneously meet two criteria required to unite truth and form: “Immanence: art is 
rigorously coextensive with the truth that it generates. Singularity: these truths are given nowhere 
else than in art.” (p. 9). In doing so, he apparently makes a paradox of the familiar courtroom 
oath, “the whole truth and nothing but the truth.”  Acting to make avant-garde refusal not virtual, 
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not a minimalist gesture of invisibility, but immanently legal, as TY10 has, is the kind of 
conceptual progression that, for Hegel, defines a productive negation.   
 
 
3.7  The eager and willing confessor 
 
“Transgression presupposes the existing order,” says Pierre Klossowski (1947/1991), 
“the apparent maintenance of norms under which energy accumulates thereby making 
transgression necessary.” (p. 19)  Žižek compares Lacan’s belief in desire to the pursuit of 
unbearable excess and cruelty rhapsodized by Georges Bataille. In his book The Tears of Eros 
(1961/2001) Bataille imputes ecstasy to a victim in an image of a man being cut to pieces, “the 
death of a thousand cuts,” while throughout his contemporary work Erotism (1962/1986) he 
describes his opposition to the modern relaxation of sexual prohibitions, precisely in order to 
preserve the possibility of violation. “Thus Bataille brought to its climax,” according to Žižek , 
“the dialectical interdependence between Law and its transgression” (2006, p. 95). As I will 
detail in the following chapter, this emphasis on transgression is an important component of an 
administrative aesthetic. But it is opposed by the aesthetics of refusal. TY10 is only one of 
countless examples of ethically-motivated artistic responses to anguish abound. “The 
iconography of suffering has a long pedigree,” acknowledges Susan Sontag (2003), right after 
asking, “What does it mean to protest suffering, as distinct from acknowledging it?” (p. 38).  
For Sontag, this moment of protest began with Goya’s The Disasters of War, pitiable 
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printed scenes from the Napoleonic Wars that prefigure the storytelling undertaken by Tamms 
Year Ten. Recent examples of proactive (versus merely exploitive) political provocation exist 
throughout conceptual art, from the revolutionary Constructivists in Russia and Estridentistas in 
Mexico in the 1920s, to the 1960s utopianism of the Diggers in the U.S., to the artists who 
created the 1968 installation Tucumán Arde in Argentina, and other works that flaunted U.S.-
backed authoritarianism in Latin America throughout the 1970s, to the 1980s censorship-baiting 
of David Wojnarowicz and General Idea, to the 1990s provocations of Critical Art Ensemble and 
the Yes Men, to the 2000s work of Dutch video artist Renzo Martens.  
Making work that critiques of the kind of disaster tourism Arthur and Joan Kleinman 
(1997) describe as a solipsistic and sadistic “cultural appropriation of suffering” (p. 2), Renzo 
Martens’ 2007 film, Episode 3: Please Enjoy Poverty, offers a striking example of the pathos of 
judicial impotence. In the film, he attempts to rally the impoverished residents of a small village 
in the war-torn Congo to document their own misery, selling photos to Western media outlets as 
a means of developing a sustainable occupation. In the end, after arranging a meeting with a 
media executive, he fails to find a buyer for the photos taken by the men he tutors--- thus we see 
the impossibility of self-representation that applies to art as well as neo-colonialist press 
coverage. But, both within the diegetic timeframe of the film, and the time since its release, 
Martens has continued to pursue the possibility of representation through an iconoclastic critique 
of documentary journalism. 
In his videos Martens goes into war zones and behaves both ludicrously and strategically: 
whether interviewing Chechniyan refugees about himself, interrupting a U.N. press conference 
with irrelevant and irreverent statements, or teaching Congolese villagers to shun journalists and 
document and sell their own war documentation. In Episode 3, perhaps the most striking visual 
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moment occurs when he comes to a village of plantation workers and erects a large neon sign 
saying “Please Enjoy Poverty,” around which the villagers celebrate and dance for hours. 
Martens poses as a sadist, and yet the pleasure his artwork provides is clearly the pleasure of 
tragic anguish juxtaposed with absurd humiliation. Interestingly, Martens has now moved from a 
satirical performance of failure to one of overcoming, as he has founded an artists’ community in 
Congo with the stated intention to “gentrify the jungle”—going so far as to stage a public Skype 
address in a jungle clearing to a group of Congolese artisans by American celebrity author 
Richard Florida, an economic-development culture booster known for his work on “creative 
cities.” Though Martens does not present it as a stand-alone art piece, this event, through its 
documentation, can be aesthetically appreciated for its tragic absurdity. The group of artists he 
has assembled, the Cercle d’Art des Travailleurs de Plantation Congolese, premiered their work 
in New York in spring 2017 at SculptureCenter, as well as at the Armory Art Show. 
Much as with Nathan For You, the cable reality show that uses inept marketing 
consultations to prompt farcical legal scenarios, the pathos in Episode 3 hinges on the failure of 
pedagogy to resolve traumatic social deadlocks. In a different way, the exhibitions by the Cercle 
d’Art des Travailleurs de Plantation Congolese conveys a similar message, exemplified in its 
lackluster critical reception (Okeke-Agulu, 2017; Bishop, 2017). There lurks in these aesthetic 
projects an alienation of ethics from itself, in which efforts of enlightenment merely reassert 
existing relations of power, with authentic self-representation as seemingly the only way out. An 
awareness of schadenfreude, the punitive pleasure of observing suffering, is made available to 
the viewer, but so is the humiliation of the protagonist. The atmosphere of doom is directly 
linked to existing political institutions, such as the U.N., the World Bank, and global media 
conglomerates. When Pierre Klossowski attributes to Sade the view “that of themselves 
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institutions ensure the triumph of perversions” (Klossowski, 1947/1991, p. 26), this is a view that 
might also be ascribed to another French philosopher: Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
Bringing together the themes of pedagogy, judgment, and policing, Jeffrey Martin (2014) 
reflects on international cultural differences in the training and evaluation of judges and police 
officers. He draws a contrast between the pragmatic common-law tradition of American society 
on the one hand, in which judges and police officers are expected to draw on lived experience 
and employ intuitive discretion, and on the other the French civil law tradition, inherited from 
imperial Rome, who instill codification and constraint in the training of both their judiciary and 
their police. But pedagogy becomes a means of judgment even between levels of executive 
authority within one state; one clear example is a highly critical U.S. Department of Justice 
report on the use of force by Chicago police, which includes sections dedicated to identifying 
and correcting “training deficiencies” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017a, p. 8). In particular, 
Martin describes the French paradigm as subservient to the rule of law and the separation of 
powers, and distilled in the writing of Rousseau, for whom civil society preceded and superseded 
the state, and who famously propounded a non-institutional pedagogy built on free exploration.  
Rousseau has a relationship to violence that seems to invert the sadistic glee of the police 
in the manipulation of rules and the power to punish. Rather than the arbitrary whim of a master 
or judge, Rousseau is associated with adherence to formally contracted rules—a form of pleasure 
and politics that Gilles Deleuze (1971/1989) associates with masochism, and links to an 
alternative logic of non-patriarchal power. Indeed, based on his Confessions (1782/1987), 
Rousseau seems literally to have been something of a sexual masochist; he was labeled as such 
in 1890 by Dr. Richard von Krafft-Ebing (Musser, 2008), who distinguished masochism as 
enjoyment of submission from a simple attraction to physical pain. The punishments Rousseau 
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received as a child from his nursemaid, developed in him a vivid fantasy structure; as Nancy 
Durbin (1993) says, “(T)he young man’s sexuality is in some way stirred up by a seemingly non-
sexual infraction” (p. 26). Being spanked by Mademoiselle Lambercier, declares Rousseau, 
“decided my tastes, my desires, my passions, my being, for the rest of my life.”  He elaborates: 
To fall at the feet of an imperious mistress, obey her mandates, or implore pardon, were 
for me the most exquisite enjoyments, and the more my blood was inflamed by the efforts 
of a lively imagination the more I acquired the appearance of a whining lover. (I, p. 41) 
He uses this disclosure not as an excuse for sensual imaginative abandonment, nor as a pretext 
for lachrymose self-deprecation, but, along with anecdotes of unjust punishments in his life (one 
on which he was punished unjustly, and one, the theft of a ribbon, in which he caused an 
innocent girl to be punished), and his other lapses (including his literal physical self-exposure to 
women at a well in Turin), as ways to advance his ideas about the deterioration of social 
relationships, from traditional horizontal connections of mutual aid and confidence, to modern 
interactions determined by hierarchies of power (Schreiber-Byers 2010). With this change, 
Rousseau says, “we were less ashamed of being wrong, and more frightened of being accused; 
we began to conceal our doings, to rebel, to lie” (I, p. 21).  
Based on his experience as an apprentice, Rousseau condemns the moment when, 
through subjection to tyranny, the child goes from “filial dependence to servile slavery” (I, p. 
31).  As he gains experiences with social rank and institutional authority, Rousseau’s outrage 
grows.  An experience with an ambassador in Venice, he says,  
left in my soul a seed of indignation against our stupid civil institutions, where the true 
common good and real justice are always sacrificed to some apparent order, which is in 
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fact destructive of all order and simply adds the sanction of public authority to the 
oppression of the weak and the iniquity of the strong (I, p. 327) 
Unlike liberal thinkers before and after him, Rousseau resolutely refuses to concede that there is 
any possibility of true justice through manmade laws, saying:  
 In order to discover the rules of society best suited to nations, a superior intelligence 
beholding all the passions of men without experiencing any of them would be needed… 
It would take gods to give men laws. (1762/1978, p. 25) 
Rousseau is an iconoclast, in that he refuses to acknowledge any perfectibility in civilized 
institutions, and thus the ability to use government to create representations of justice. In his 
ironic and perverse absolutism, he is more an artist and a legislator than a litigator or teacher. 
Not citing what has gone before, nor embracing order and pleasure with the detached fervor of 
an aesthete, Rousseau confronts, opposes, and seeks to replace the institution--simply because 
what comes next cannot be any worse than what currently exists. 
This sense of accusation suffuses the Confessions, most generally directed at the 
powerful on behalf of those whom they accuse and persecute, but also at the reader (Durbin, 
1993). Pankraj Mishra (2017) goes so far as to lay the 21st-century global resurgence of angry 
populism at the feet of Rousseau’s persecution complex, citing the philosopher’s “severe 
maladjustment” (p. 25). But for her part, Laurie Jo Reynolds speaks about the accused individual 
in order to oppose a larger narrative about evil predators, a narrative that projects fantasy 
outcomes or political scapegoats, echoing Rousseau’s view of the good individual damaged by 
society. Here she discusses designations such as “sex offender” or “staff assaulter” that denote 
the most despised criminals: 
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Because these classifications produce false narratives about why crimes are committed, 
and to whom, they also fail to address or prevent the tremendous harm that comes from 
violence.  They also prevent us from seeing how structural conditions, such as poverty, 
inequality, disenfranchisement, and racism, lead to crime, or how some groups are 
systematically criminalized.  These labels force us to imagine an individual person 
making bad choices, as if they had an entire world, and endless opportunities to choose 
from (2014b). 
Like Rousseau’s, Reynolds’ work can be seen as revolutionary, in the sense described by 
Foucault (1978/2008, p. 40), making use of law to redefine and reassert the sovereign power of 
the people, rather than to abolish the state (and thus, we see under neoliberalism, to inevitably 
repackage and reassert it in the private sector). In TY10, traditional cultural representations are 
challenged, so that presentations of powerless individuals may be amplified. Individuals are not 
condemned, but rather the institutions they represent.  
As set forth in his First Discourse (1750/1779), Rousseau’s attitude toward culture and 
research was less reverent even than his attitude toward the state. “(T)he arts and sciences,” he 
said, “have together, in all ages, and in all countries, produced a general contempt of good 
morals, and total disregard of public virtues: evils which have never yet failed to terminate in the 
annihilation of empire” (p. xii). This revolutionary venom was perhaps only nearly matched by 
his distaste for his own medium, that of literature.  William Wordsworth, whom Christian Gauss 
(1914) identified as Rousseau’s “English disciple” (p. 12), announced: 
 Books! ‘tis a dull and endless strife, … 
 Let Nature be your teacher (as cited in Gauss, p. 13). 
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Or, as Rousseau stated unceremoniously in his educational treatise Emile, “I hate books” 
(1762/1978, p. 184).  
Not propounding the necessity of art in the somewhat pedagogical sense offered by Tania 
Bruguera, Reynolds’ view of artistic necessity seems to follow Rousseau, who stated 
ambivalently that “the arts are necessary to us now as crutches are necessary for the old and 
decrepit” (Quoted in Gauss 1914, p. 8). “The essence of politics, according to Rousseau,” says 
Alain Badiou, “affirms presentation over and against representation” (2006, p. 95). This can be 
seen in a 2012 exhibit at Chicago’s Sullivan Galleries, in which Reynolds turned the gallery 
space into a functioning lobbying office. This happened at the same time as Opening the Black 
Box: The Charge is Torture, an exhibition organized by the Chicago Torture Justice Memorial 
Project; my students participated in this show, which put on display Chicagoans’ responses and 
proposals to memorialize the legacy of notorious police torturer Jon Burge. In the TY10 
installation space, Reynolds had a dedicated work and archive space, about which she said: “This 
approach is what theorist Stephen Wright calls the ‘one-to-one scale,’ where the representation 
of the work, and the work, are the same thing.”  “They took no time away from the project in 
order to represent it,” she said, “in fact, they wanted to support it” (2014b).  This gets at a key 
element of the TY10 project as an art piece: it prefers presentation to representation, politically 
as well as aesthetically.  
Giving meaning to students’ existence as self-actualized subjects rather than treating 
education as mere information is an important part of most if not all progressive education 
inspired by Rousseau’s fictional student Emile. Despite the utopian educational projects that 
have been undertaken in his name, however, Rousseau rejected the sentimental glorification of 
childhood, prefiguring Emile Durkheim’s warning (1893/2002, p. 230) about the formalizing 
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self-expression as applied to education. It is wrong-headed to presume Rousseau was an 
advocate for “innocent” artistic self-indulgence, partially because he placed no particular value 
on aesthetics and culture, and partially because it makes it hard to understand how he 
understands an “innocent” child (like himself in his Confessions) committing a crime.  
Laurie Jo Reynolds refuses, as Rousseau also would, to assign corruption to any 
individual’s nature, thus complicating the simplistic ideas of childhood innocence that drives the 
social contempt directed at sex offenders, She reminds people of the high number of sex 
offenders who are juveniles, citing the average age of youth perpetrators as 14.   
(F)eminism made the leap that we have to look at the broader systems that lead to and 
support rape culture, and silence victims.  But this radical critique by feminists has been 
hijacked and distorted by legislators, and the news media, who have persuaded us instead 
that all the moral depravity is embodied in certain individuals that are just not us, and not 
in our families, they’re these strangers. (2014b) 
And, of course, a great number of sex offenders are sexual abuse survivors. Himself a notorious 
denier of sexual abuse, Sigmund Freud wrote, speaking of those who re-enact trauma: “He 
reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he 
is repeating” (as cited in Bloom 2005 & 2010).   
For Rousseau as for Reynolds the socializing mission depicts the child not as a blank 
slate, a notion proposed by John Locke, but relies on a redemptive, experiential and experimental 
idea of transformative autobiography opposing the quantitative accountability now holding the 
day in education policy. Nonetheless, Jeffery Martin (2014) observes that Rousseau’s social 
contract, realized in the French insistence upon the rights enshrined in the rule of law, has 
resulted in the creation of an “administrative police,” with the right to gather unlimited 
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information on citizens (p. 471). The citizen registries Martin describes the police maintaining in 
France, as well as in Taiwan, can be seen as analogous to the sex offender registries that 
Reynolds opposes, which should suggest that the analogy between her and Rousseau requires 
many caveats. 
 For Rousseau, confession relates to both pleasure and politics. His feverishly emotional 
writing set the stage for modern revolutionary theories, as well as the moral and aesthetic 
arguments of idealists and Romantics in the 19th century.  His ideas on egalitarian revolution and 
childhood autonomy still influence how we view and respond to the violence perpetrated on, by, 
and in the name of children and marginalized people. Catherine Malabou (2011) speaks of 
confession in Rousseau as a political act inaugurating citizens through mutual recognition. “The 
yes of forgiveness shatters the negativity of their isolation,” Malabou says (p, 25), which is an 
apt summary of the epistolary exchanges initiated by the Tamms Poetry Comittee that led Laurie 
Jo Reynolds to the founding of TY10. But in this founding, she declaratively opted for reform 
over mere recognition, or radical reconfiguration. 
 The writing of a memoir in the form of a confession has no more recognized precedent in 
the West than the Confessions of Saint Augustine, in which he counsels, “Return within yourself. 
In the inward man dwells the truth” (as cited in Koch, 2015, p. 159). In his City of God, however, 
Augustine is torn about the seemingly contradictory Christian duties to solitude and to service.  
 Holy leisure is longed for by love of truth, but it is the necessity of love to undertake 
requisite business. If no one imposes that burden upon us, we are free to sift and 
contemplate truth; but if it be laid upon us, we are necessitated for love’s sake to 
undertake it. (as cited in Koch, p. 207) 
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But the parallels between Augustine, Rousseau, and Reynolds perhaps diverge with the intrusion 
of this “burden” of interpellation, the moment of calling that redirects the pilgrim’s path. The 
“holy leisure” Augustine speaks of was something that Reynolds has no interest in, but it seems 
to have influenced Rousseau’s notion of an ideal life, as well as some literary notions of the 
prison space. 
Jacques Rancière (2013) depicts Rousseau’s “solitary reverie” as a “disinterested sensible 
state,” (p. 47) focusing in particular on Stendhal’s Julien, a carpenter’s son who finds his final 
respite in a prison cell (p. 45). But the philosophical definition of solitude, going back to the 
imprisoned Roman patrician writer Boethius, requires than solitude be voluntary (Koch, p. 16). 
An aesthetic approach that disenchants this notion of monastic confinement is suggested by 
Kevin Thompson (2016), who sees an aesthetically important literary gesture in a publication of 
the Prison Information Group, an early 1970s Parisian activist effort that included philosophical 
luminaries Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, and which published documents about prisons 
and by prisoners. Thompson notes a pamphlet the group published in 1972, Suicides de prison, 
which, among other documents, features a group of letters from a gay prisoner who committed 
suicide while in solitary confinement. Thompson contends that the volume “frames these 
letters… such that they are transformed from being mere discourse… to fundamentally new 
kinds of statements,” statements which can prompt insight into “the processes that compel so 
many into incarceration” (p. 200). While literary insight still remains a form of recognition rather 
than action, this Prison Information Group would eventually cease their efforts, in order to make 
way for an advocacy group composed of former prisoners and prisoners’ family members-- 
something like TY10. 
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Seemingly unlike either the immobilized subjects for whom she advocates, or the solitary 
artist described by Rancière, Byron, Wordsworth, and Rilke, or the paralyzed “beautiful soul” 
exemplified in Melville’s Bartleby and Kafka’s hunger artist (not to mention Hamlet), Laurie Jo 
is an artist oriented toward collaboration and uncomfortable with the cessation of struggle 
required for reflection. Suffering from undiagnosed sleep apnea, for years she powered through 
sleepless nights and bleary days fueled by caffeine, maintaining the campaign through ceaseless 
communication and repeated expressions of gratitude. She shuns the aura of works and 
personality typical of the artist and, unlike Stendhal’s picaresque heroes in The Red and the 
Black and The Charterhouse of Parma, who accept imprisonment with a sort of beatific 
delight15, Laurie Jo pursues arduous activity, directed toward defined goals. Both resistance to 
and transformation of the prison experience can be seen with the example of Albert Woodfox, 
the former Black Panther framed for murder who spent over forty years in solitary confinement. 
A militant teacher and organizer, Woodfox severely restricted his intake of sleep, as well as other 
forms of physical satisfaction. “We wanted the security people to think that they were dealing 
with superhumans,” he reflected (Aviv 2017). 
The gestures of refusal in which TY10 engages, refusals to be visually or dramatically 
titillating, can through Rousseau be seen as both resistance and avant-garde provocation directed 
at systems of state-sanctioned punishment. Itself a grotesque parody of provocations by artists 																																																								
15 In The Charterhouse of Parma, Fabrice del Dongo surprises himself by “laughing in a jail.” 
“’Never have I been so happy,’ he confesses to himself” (as cited in Pearson 2014, p. 164).  “The 
prison-wish seems stronger than the prison-fear,” says Roger Pearson of Stendhal (p. 164), 




like Chris Burden and researchers like Philip Zimbardo, widespread long-term solitary 
confinement can also be seen as a result of modern utilitarian calculation yoked to medieval 
confessional redemption.  
Despite his appreciation of solitude, the coercive fact of allegedly dispassionate yet 
compassionate internment would likely for Rousseau reflect an institutionalized morality that he 
called amour-propre, or “self-love.” Rousseau’s political ideals rely on a Platonic self-revelation 
rather than the pedagogical pragmatism of Quaker reformers like Benjamin Rush. Rather than a 
detailed definition of government, whose artifices he despised (as in his critiques of 
Montesqieu), he elaborated a political narrative of the autonomous social individual and the 
“general will” while remaining critical of the practice of philosophy itself, and even, in his 1761 
novel Julie, of the violent utopianism advocated by Enlightenment visionaries inspired by his 
own writings (Žižek 2011). While Rousseau seeks to promote an ideal of solidarity that 
inevitably relies on ideology, he also seeks to eradicate the comfort that comes from believing in 
the myth of an eternal and unchanging social order. 
Žižek (2012) praises the rejection of fantasy in Jacques-Louis David’s The Death of 
Marat, which inspired Rousseau’s brutal insurrectionary offspring, the Jacobins. This painting 
places above the martyred leader a large empty dark space, opposed by Žižek to the sort of 
detail-packed ideological fantasy scene typical of Stalinist Social Realism (p. 711). But I think 
again of the words of Edmund Burke, the prominent British critic of the French Revolution, who 
spoke of the “sacred veil to be drawn over the beginnings of all government.” Perhaps the 
necessary “censorship” that the post-Revolutionary statesman Jean de Dieu d’Olivier identified 
as essential to legislative art is most beautiful when it is most explicit, as with the numerous 
artworks that make use of redacted text, and the austere modern architecture that developed from 
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the functional blankness of the prison structure. But Rousseau himself would likely have 
dismissed any form of artistic idolatry outright, and for Reynolds visual gestures, while 
significant, are largely incidental. And for both, while literary works may be objects of suspicion, 
personal narratives are vital tools of emancipation. 
Confession and experimentation can be seen as intimately connected to morality, 
pleasure, and violence. Ideally not reinforcing but sabotaging “subjectivity” is the 
“subjunctivity” that Jerome Bruner (1986) links to narrative desire. “To be in the subjunctive 
mode,” he says, is “to be trafficking in human possibilities rather than in settled certainties” (p. 
21). This should be understood apart from the “ventriloquation” Bakhtin identifies in novelists’ 
use of dialogue (Wortham, 2001), seducing the reader to legalistically judge characters’ 
intentions. As in a trial, ideologies in what Bakhtin calls the “polyphonic novel” strive not for 
consensus but for conquest (Groys, 2012, p. 184). In the right circumstances, then, confession 
can undermine rather than sustain interrogation.  
In a polyphonic narrative, aesthetics becomes a competitive interrogation of unique, 
individual truths, to be compared and consumed as otherness, the standardized strangeness of 
suffering objects. But this contemplation of affect is perhaps the perverse inverse of what, 
decades before realism made art out of everyday life, Schiller (1794/2004) called “the still more 
difficult art of living” (p. 80), an art which, each on their own terms, both Rousseau and 
Reynolds might endorse. In such an art, one might imagine an artist who turns away from the 





3.8  An alignment of wills 
 
Considering the pedagogical guidance to be given to those drafting laws, Helen Xanthaki 
(2010) describes the practice as a pragmatic balancing act, placing it in the Aristotelian category 
of phronesis, or practical wisdom. She writes that legislative drafting considered as “a pure form 
of art” is a “traditional” approach that “ignores its nature as a discipline of law” (p. 121). But her 
negotiation of common and civil law, administrative and legislative roles, historical institutions 
and exigent circumstances, represents in some respect the aesthetic decision-making required in 
any design process. While Aristotle opposes phronesis, often translated as prudence, to episteme 
and techne, which respectively denote knowledge and skill, these two, despite Xanthaki’s 
contention otherwise, map only imperfectly on to our contemporary notions of science and art. I 
would contend that this prudent balance applies to successful art no less than legitimate law. 
While it may be artistic, this prudence is surely political. The tactical juggling act 
Xanthaki describes, put forward in the context of standardizing rules across the European Union, 
can be related to the ongoing calculus Foucault (1979/2008, p. 52) describes as necessary to 
maintain balance and avoid imperial supremacy across the continent of Europe, beginning in the 
1648 Peace of Westphalia. In contrast, however, Agamben (2000) suggests dispensing with such 
artful realpolitik altogether: “…(W)e could conceive of Europe not as an impossible ‘Europe of 
the nations,’…but rather as an aterritorial or extraterritorial space in which all the (citizen and 
noncitizen) residents of the European states would be in a position of exodus or refugee, the 
status of European would then mean the being-in-exodus of the citizen…” (p. 24).  
But no such utopia has come to pass, and so the arena of legislative drafting should not be 
understood as a somehow unproblematic space of populist consensus. Constantly beholden to 
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donors and a party apparatus, the creative potential of the legislator is easily redirected, like that 
of the artist courting collectors, into the monotonous task of crafting an image of appeasement 
and predictability, to reassure powerful interests. In the American legislative context, at multiple 
levels of government, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) has become a highly 
influential source of readymade legislation. For example, a trove of leaked documents revealed 
an effort to promote private prisons through the expansion and heightened enforcement of 
criminal laws (Cooper, Heldman, Ackerman, and Farrar-Myers, 2016). The tireless efforts and 
expressions of gratitude that are hallmarks of Reynolds’ artistic practice are perversely mirrored 
in the favors ceaselessly demanded and rewarded by an entity like ALEC, whose wide influence 
seems to render irrelevant the very distinction between the market and the state. And, while 
corruption need not be accepted as unlimited and inevitable, it can be seen as inseparable from 
the practical considerations of law. 
As it happens, phronesis describes Reynolds’ approach to politics quite succinctly. 
Making common cause with as many officials, activists, and reporters as possible, whether in 
administrative or legislative capacities, is a theme that runs throughout Reynolds’ recollections. 
Despite the collective imaginative creation of political reality pursued by Tamms Year Ten, it, 
unlike the Tamms Poetry Committee, may be outside the realm of poiesis, the ideal aesthetic 
realm which Plato saw as primary to material physis and concrete praxis, and which Heidegger 
associated with world-making rupture (Di Pippo 2000). But the pragmatic performances of TY10 
shouldn’t be confused with mere rationality. While Jacques Rancière observes that the arts came 
in time to be “extricated… from the legislative reign of truth over discourses and images” (2004, 
p. 12), art could be at times a source of creative legislation that generates images and discourses 
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through paradox. Even if, to be both effective and aesthetic, tactical deployments of traumatic 
affect must project an image of orderly rigor. 
As the psychoanalyst Hanna Segal proposed in 1952, the roots of aesthetics can be seen 
more in a cry of mourning and aggression than in an ordered expression of rationality (Trieman 
2016). Paul W. Kahn (2011), following Carl Schmitt, offers a vision of politics based in 
collective will, before and above reflective reason. In describing his understanding of politics 
Kahn argues for an approach based on analogy and rhetoric rather than logical proof; this mode 
of argument, central to common-law deliberation, was touched upon earlier in discussing legal 
realism, in which history rather than rational argument is the a guiding principle. One analogy 
Kahn makes is between the interpretation of law and of art, in which he situates art as an 
intermediary. 
The (art) work itself is engaged in a kind of conversation with us and with other works… 
An act (of interpretation) commensurate with human freedom must fill this middle range 
that represents an interchange between the universal and the particular. This domain is 
neither that of reason nor of desire but of the imagination. (p. 129) 
Although Schmitt, ever the realist, decries the aesthetic influence of Romanticism on politics 
(1928/1986), 16 Kahn makes the analogy between an artist creating art and a collective 
democratic “popular sovereign” creating the state, presenting the claim, “We do not speak of the 
popular sovereign knowing or wanting but only willing” (p. 131). 
																																																								
16 However, Schmitt, who would eventually become a legal advisor to the Nazis, dallied with 
Expressionist literature, and had a friendly and respectful relationship with the important Zurich 
Dada artist Hugo Ball, a fellow anti-rationalist and anti-Semite (Stark, 2013). 
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Outlined in his book The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Rancière (1991) describes the learning 
situation similarly, as an alignment not of rational understandings but of wills—an alignment 
poorly understood by the majority of those involved in education, but certainly appreciated by 
those in politics (Bingham, Biesta, and Rancière, 2010). The faculty of imagination, while it may 
seem more passive and fanciful, is the faculty of will, and also of religious faith. The capacity to 
pursue a political vision, as Schiller expressed, is the capacity to bring something believed to 
exist into existence.  
 Roland Barthes (1971/1976) describes Ignatius Loyola as a figure consumed obsessively 
by the act of writing and classifying, while simultaneously focused on the image. This image is 
not an indistinct mystical vision, but rather a “view”—his writings are “compositions of place” 
whose “detail is painstaking” (p. 55); “the image is the abiding material of the Exercises” (p. 66). 
Although intended as a guide, the reason that Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises should be understood 
as art rather than pedagogy is that, like laws written by legislators for the use of courts, or 
textbooks written for the use of teachers, he wrote not for individual practitioners but for the 
director of the religious retreat center, whose responsibility it was to lead the meditations of 
individual exercitants (pp. 41-44). But, as with the work of the legislator, this guide is comprised 
of minutiae, and, like the evidence from her archived lobbying files that Reynolds presents as 
artwork, the project is set out “in a discursive system of annotations, notes, points, preambles, 
precautions, repetitions, reversals, and consolidations which form the strongest of defenses” (p. 
70). “Ignatius opens to the Divinity a list, at once metaphoric and metonymic, of its attributes; it 
is possible to speak God” (p. 68).  
The rigidity of the system requires constant rearticulation and emendation. It is an 
incessant activity to be sustained by will. But this totalizing rigidity is evidence of neither 
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rationalism nor narcissism. Reynolds worked through the Tamms campaign in a sleepless haze of 
adrenaline, partially as the result of sleep apnea that went undiagnosed until 2016. Without 
attributing any religious motivation to her personally, Reynolds’ work manifests the Christian 
ideal of solidarity with a society’s most despised individuals, and should be understood as 
neither simply utilitarian nor ecstatic. Just as the juror and the legislator assert the voice of a 
constituency, Reynolds acted as a conduit for both the men incarcerated at Tamms and the family 
members that formed Tamms Year Ten. Her single-minded struggle follows the Jesuit mandate, 


















Chapter 4: The Executioner and administrative aesthetics 
 
 
4.1  Getting their hands dirty 
 
For Hegel (1835/1975), the modern protagonist can be noble, or poignant, but cannot be, 
“as he was in the Heroic Age proper, the embodiment of the right, the moral, and the legal as 
such” (p. 194). Because these principles aren’t abstracted into a social code, this bygone hero in 
himself represents and confronts an unknowable and infinite truth we associate with Lacan’s 
Real. Comparing Lacan’s Real with Frantz Fanon’s idea of necessary violence, Frank Wilderson 
(2010) says that “what Loïc Wacquant calls the ‘carceral continuum’… remains constant, 
paradigmatically, despite changes in its ‘performance’ over time—slave ship, Middle Passage, 
Slave estate, Jim Crow, the ghetto, and the prison-industrial complex” (p. 75). Thus Hegel’s hero 
might be said to exist today only in its negation, in which disorder, immorality, and illegality are 
projected on to a racialized Other. 
This Real is first and foremost a negative space—it’s what cannot be named or imagined. 
But an element of the Real can also be found in the administrator making instinctive decisions 
simultaneously in her own name and in the name of an authorizing corporate entity, and it is the 
feared regime of punishment whose presence reassures a fearful public. It is also the undefined 
realm of ungoverned activity, which police participate in while putatively acting to contain, 
where anxiety about a descent into barbarism is less assuaged than redirected by turning social 
chaos against itself.  
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The Real is also the uncanny presence that haunts many in long-term solitary 
confinement—a featureless space that persists monotonously, denying the distinctions between 
inner and outer reality that sustain a stable sense of a coherent world (Guenther, 2013). In 
Illlinois the open-ended, state-backed authority of the correctional officer is organized and 
manifested in AFSCME, the union that was Tamms Year Ten’s primary opponent in pursuing 
prison reform. And yet the Illinois governor, taking advantage of the line-item veto, a check the 
state executive enjoys vis-à-vis the legislature, was able to close the Tamms supermax, 
decisively overcoming the inertia of the State Assembly.  
The abstractions of aesthetics and law enter into a visceral, tangible situation of power 
directed by desire. “Before the Law” is a story within Franz Kafka’s novel The Trial, published 
posthumously against his wishes in 1925. This parable is related in a cathedral by a prison 
chaplain to the protagonist, a target of mysterious legal persecution. In the story, a man lives his 
life before a guarded door; in the man’s last moments of life, the guard reveals this door exists 
only for him, and it is then closed forever. An inconclusive interpretive debate follows this tale. 
In the larger world of the novel however, the protagonist Joseph K. experiences all the futility of 
the mythic legal subject in “Before the Law,” yet his banal existence of tedium, anxiety, 
discomfort, and inconvenience is punctuated by scenes of sexual brutality, and visits to a strange 
courtroom bedecked with pornography. I propose that experiences of lust, delusion, disgust, and 
fear, as well as confusion, humiliation, and frustration, connect art to the law just as much as 
ideological issues of interpretation. In regard to race, Shannon Sullivan (2014) expresses it well: 
“"white ignorance primarily operates physiologically, not cognitively” (p. 591). This pre-
cognitive realm of experience echoes the largely intuitive, irrational world of the police: partially 
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because of the delusional concept of race that historically has informed policing, but also 
because it relates to violence more broadly. 
Guy Debord (1961/ n.d.) was associated with the Situationist International, which 
participated actively in the ill-fated May 1968 street protests in Paris, events which attempted to 
enact what Debord termed a “revolutionary judgment of art” (para. 2). It may be just as 
outrageous an act as calling a lobbying campaign art, to say that revolutionary engagement can in 
and of itself be artwork, as Luis Camnitzer says in discussing novel forms of resistance 
undertaken by the militant revolutionary Tupamaros of Uruguay (2007), but Camnitzer’s ideas 
are important to thinking about the executive aspect of art, the art of the inspector, torturer, or 
executioner. Their spaces of wide discretion are defined by the aesthetics of judgment, teaching, 
and interpretation, discussed earlier, which tend rather ironically to bracket off choices for 
judges, critics, and teachers. The legislative artist, of whom Reynolds is my exemplar, can 
potentially bridge the virtual world of criticism and the material realm of action—the general and 
the specific, the abstract and the concrete, the public and the private. But the executive, fighter, 
lawbreaker, and police officer all occupy the latter category of the specific, concrete, active, and 
private: all characteristics many would associate with Hegel’s classical hero, or a modernist 
definition of the artist as auteur and provocateur. A reflection on the direct use of immediate 
power can round out the idea of legislative art. 
Prefigured in Duchamp’s “curated” readymades, the administrative role of the curator 
(commissaire in French, which also means “chief of police”) has come in much of the 
contemporary art world to absorb and sometimes eclipse the status of the material or conceptual 
visionary. As administrative roles in universities and large nonprofit organizations have been 
steadily and formlessly multiplying, as have state policing agencies (Brodeur, 2010), and as have 
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the foundation grants for temporary small-scale community enhancement art projects sometimes 
identified as “social practice.” Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek connected capital directly to 
the formation of desire and taste (Robin, 2017), and the funding of the fine arts has indeed now 
become a highly abstract market of quantified speculative investment (Kazakina, 2017), distinct 
from the premodern institutional patronage of aristocrats and high clergy. Nebulous economic 
contexts of artistic production are eroding the idealized autonomous creativity attributed to the 
artist since at least Kant, but also perhaps overshadowing the art being produced.  
Nonetheless, the association of art and politics has a lengthy history in the West, if we 
consider administrative actions as “art,” in the senses both of “artifice,” and of being “artful.” 
Statecraft has been discussed in this way since at least the time of Machiavelli’s Prince, 
particularly through the backlash against Machiavelli (Foucault, 2004), and I would argue that 
art continues to provide a model for the creative enforcement of laws today, since far more 
sentences are reached in deals made by prosecutors, freely assembling charges and sentences, 
than in rulings made by judges, let alone juries.  
In the Leviathan, his monumental treatise on government, Thomas Hobbes drew an 
analogy between the formation of the human body by God to oversee nature, and the formation 
of human government by man, through what he calls “art”: 
Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man.  For 
by art is created that great Leviathan, called a Commonwealth or State, which is but an 
artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose 
protection and defense it was intended” (1668/1994, p. 9). 
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The Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt sees the creation of the modern individual, in turn, as a 
creation of this (for him, exceedingly rational) governmental artwork.  Speaking of the changing 
shape of government during the Renaissance, he says: 
...a new fact appears in history—the State as the outcome of reflection and calculation, 
the State as a work of art. This new life displays itself in a hundred forms, both in the 
republican and in the despotic States, and determines their inward constitution, no less 
than their foreign policy. (1860/2008, n.p.) 
While there are reasons to continue to heed Walter Benjamin’s warning about aestheticizing 
politics, much may be gained by retroactively projecting on to these authors the modern use of 
the word “art,” and then taking the comparisons between politics and art more literally than 
figuratively.  
Contra Hobbes and Burckhardt, though, we should perhaps consider a more informal 
contemporary definition of art: art as a performance of power that parallels government as a 
project of vanity and self-glorification rather than a rational machine, as can be seen in the 
history across civilizations of sacralized authoritarian pageantry (Agamben, 2011). The 
Romantic ideal of total expressive freedom can be considered in this light, as can its leveraging 
as a transcendent principle--first in the Cold War and now in the War on Terror, in which artfully 
legitimated torture emerged from the shadows. Law functions in this current context of endless 
war not as a limit, but as a tool to enable executive autonomy and capital expansion. 
 The sadism associated with the torturer should be understood as intimately related to the 
goal of civil harmony through the medium of tragic theater. A mutation of the teacher who 
demands answers and apologies, we have the figure of an obscene interrogator, former Chicago 
police commander Jon Burge. Burge and his officers tortured false confessions out of at least 100 
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young African-American men in the 1980s and 1990s, including Mark Clements, who was sent 
to Tamms, but released when his tortured confession was thrown out. It was a project around 
Burge’s perjury trial that led to a classroom collaboration with Laurie Jo Reynolds while I was 
an art teacher on the city’s south side, at the school from which Burge graduated back when the 
area was relatively white and prosperous. Refracting Foucault’s police state without limits, 
Burge ruled through terror even more than surveillance. Hobbes (1668/1994) justifies this 
limitlessness in his Leviathan: “To resist the sword of the commonwealth in defence of another 
man, guilty or innocent, no man hath liberty, because such liberty takes away from the sovereign 
the means of protecting us” (p. 143). 
Burge’s reign of terror was undoubtedly propelled by the link between interrogation and 
pleasure. The same link is evident in a recent report finding that the Missouri parole board had 
spent years deliberately playing word games in parole hearings, attempting to insert and elicit 
odd words and references while questioning inmates (Bogan, 2017). Indeed, forced confessions, 
linking legal/religious transgression and pornographic spectacle, are a motif used by the Marquis 
de Sade (Barthes, 1971/1976, p. 145). The modern hedonistic appropriation of Hobbesian 
limitlessness embraces and diffuses the arbitrary chance that once expressed the whim of a 
monarch, in which no audience can grant or withhold approval. This is the sense in which the 
philosopher Georges Bataille speaks of sovereignty: acting freely “without receiving anything, 
even recognition that one’s act has occurred” (Rutherford, 2012, p. 15).  
This relates to how police organizations, particularly secretive forces in their nascent 
stages, often put a far greater value on individual autonomy than on collective organization. A 
noteworthy example can be seen in the early days of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the 
predecessor to the American CIA that was formed during World War II to coordinate clandestine 
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operations behind enemy lines. The OSS was notoriously disorganized, and its leadership put a 
great deal of emphasis on individual initiative and ingenuity. Referring to the founding director 
of the OSS, General William Donovan, R. Harris Smith (1972) writes: “Every eccentric schemer 
with a harebrained plan for secret operations (from phosphorescent foxes to incendiary bats) 
would find a sympathetic ear in Donovan’ office” (p. 3). At a greater scale, a parallel example 
contemporary with the OSS was its stated enemy, the National Socialist regime in Germany. 
Contrary to received impressions of the Nazis as embodying a brutally efficient and organized 
state apparatus, historian Gerhard Weinberg (1994) characterized the result of the party’s attempt 
to work on top of and alongside pre-existing bureaucratic structures as “administrative chaos” (p. 
686). Ernst Rudolf Huber (1939/2000), a professor of jurisprudence during the Nazi period, 
characterized the charismatic leadership of the Fuhrer as not even comprising a proper state 
under the rule of law (p. 282), with power devolved to “little Hitlers” operating at the local level. 
Today even the most reform-minded judges and legislators defer to the judgment of 
police, prison administrators, and, most importantly, prosecutors (Pfaff, 2017). As a 
consequence, the non-transparency and lack of due process faced by men sent to Tamms is 
echoed outside of corrections administration by the supposedly accountable public judiciary. 
Ryan H. C. Balisacan (2014), at that time an official corruption investigator in the Philippines, 
asserts that prosecutors are among the least constrained officials in any branch of government. 
In investigating cases, deciding what charges to file against whom, and handling the 
various incidents of trial including, among others, entering into plea bargains with the 
accused, prosecutors rely almost exclusively on their own appreciation of what “justice” 
demands in a particular situation. (p. 380) 
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The situation is not very different in the U.S., as Balisacan makes clear. The ability of Jon Burge 
to sustain his authoritarian fiefdom for multiple decades required the tacit permission of State’s 
Attorney Richard M. Daley, son of the infamous Mayor Richard J. Daley, who would himself 
become Chicago’s mayor in 1989 and remain in that position for 22 years. Along with 
illustrating the political ambition that drives many prosecutors (much like ambitious artists 
pursuing fame), this provides a stellar example of the principle of the prosecutorial exception as 
outlined by Sarat and Clarke (2009). 
Under the Trump regime, the executive has asserted its prerogative over that of judicial 
authorities primarily through immigration, as the immigration system is under the executive 
rather than the judiciary. The adjudication of immigration has been understood, ever since the 
issuing of late-19th-century Supreme Court decisions upholding the deportation of Chinese 
immigrants, to be a matter of administration rather than criminal law, and thus not subject to the 
Constitution (Hernández, 2017); immigration court judges are essentially “government lawyers” 
(Campoy, 2017). Legal scholars have stressed the role of the exception offered by prosecutorial 
discretion in limiting the extradition of law-abiding immigrants (Cade, 2013; Wadhia, 2013 and 
2015; Zatz and Rodriguez, 2014; Corcoran, 2014; Margulies 2014), which recall petitions for 
clemency made to monarchs such as the Roman emperor Justinian, mentioned above (Humfress, 
2005). Despite instances of mercy, this dynamic of sadistic autonomy plays out throughout the 
justice system, with America’s national prosecutors’ organization expressing both its resistance 
to Federal forensic guidelines, and its support for Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ mandate to 
seek maximum punitive sanctions (National District Attorneys Association, 2017a, 2017b).  
In regard to domestic racism, the recent spate of recorded and publicized police killings 
of unarmed African-Americans illustrates various gaps in the rule of law. A pointed example is 
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the apparent impossibility of gaining convictions in such cases, even in the rare case of a 
motivated prosecution. Michael Schatzow, one of the lead prosecutors involved in trying officers 
involved in the 2015 killing of Freddie Gray while in the custody of the Baltimore police, 
expressed pessimism regarding the ability of the judiciary to reform either the police, or the 
judiciary itself. 
A trial is not about answering broad questions. A trial is focused on whether the state can 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendant who is charged. A trial may 
not be the best vehicle to determine broad questions of public policy; broad questions of 
what the law should be; broad questions, in this case, of how the police should police; or 
how citizens should interact with the police. A criminal trial may not be the best place to 
do that. (As cited in Neyfakh 2016, para. 6) 
However, like police in other cases (Holley, 2016), the officers in Freddie Gray’s killing filed 
suits in response to their “defamation” and prosecution, and courts have proved willing to 
consider these lawsuits. The exceptional immunity granted to prosecutors has, in the case of 
Baltimore’s chief prosecutor Marilyn Mosby, has thus itself proven to be subject to exception in 
the case of prosecuting police (Hager, 2017). A longer historical view of the creation and 
evolution of the police, in and beyond the U.S., may help to illustrate both the rules of pleasure 
and the pleasure of rules. 
Through recapitulating in various ways the patria potestas, the power that an ancient 
Roman landowner held over his family and slaves, sovereignty stripped from indigenous groups 
was dispersed at the beginning of the American republic to hundreds of localities and thousands 
of newly propertied white men, thus defining a vast array of distinct and overlapping areas of 
state non-intervention within the state.  
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Early nineteenth-century American laxity in regard to criminal activities, great latitude of 
American administrative and judicial discretion, the extraordinary latitude of the 
American jury compared even to the English jury, the admission of illegally obtained 
proofs by U.S. courts, and the vagaries and inconsistency of sentencing and punishment 
kept the American police generally free to operate as they wished(.) (Peters, 1996, p. 111)  
The link between early American policing and slave patrols has long been overlooked (Turner, 
Giacopassi, and Vandiver, 2006), as has the explicit connection between suppressing slave 
revolts and the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides for “the right to 
bear arms” in the service of “a well-regulated militia.” There had already been hundreds of slave 
rebellions at the time of the Constitutional Convention, and Constitutional framer Patrick Henry 
advocated for this right as a direct response to the rights given to the U.S. Congress under the 
First Amendment.  
If there should happen an insurrection of slaves, the country cannot be said to be invaded. 
They cannot, therefore, suppress it without the interposition of Congress(.) (The 
Founders’ Constitution 1788/1987, para. 12) 
Service in such militias was considered obligatory throughout the antebellum South (Haden, 
2003), and was pivotal in establishing white supremacy as not merely an ideology but a duty and 
a regime. But it should be understood first and foremost as a prerogative to assert dominion 
through permission to break taboos on behalf of the order those taboos defined.  
This diffusion of arbitrary authority is still with us today. Jon Burge inhabits a role that 
the French Royalist Joseph de Maistre (1821/2009) characterized as an unfairly reviled figure. 
This is the executioner, who acts not as an ordinary individual, but in a role in which murder is 
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required in order to sustain the law. Rhapsodizing the executioner in terms not unlike Georges 
Bataille’s lament over the modern invisibility of the slaughterhouse17, de Maistre says: 
He is not a criminal and yet no tongue would content to say, for example, that he is 
virtuous, that he is an honest man, that he is admirable etc. No moral praise seems 
appropriate for him, since this supposes relationships with human beings and he has 
none. And yet all greatness, all power, all subordination rests on the executioner; he is 
both the horror and the bond of human association. (p. 36, emphasis in original) 
Egon Bittner (1990) describes the role of the police in similar tainted terms, stating that 
“policemen are viewed as the fire that it takes to fight fire” (p. 96). This gives the police officer, 
like the executioner, a morally ambiguous role; as Jean-Paul Brodeur (2010) succinctly states: 
“There is no significant divide between the good guys enforcing the law and the bad guys who 
are violating it” (p. 246). This is a variety of power without what might be termed prestige, but 
with great freedom. It recalls William Westley’s description of the “policeman’s world,” which 
he presents as “spawned of degradation, corruption, and insecurity. He sees man as ill-willed, 
exploitative, mean, and dirty; himself as a victim of injustice, misunderstood and defiled” (1970, 
n.p.).  
																																																								
17 “Meanwhile, today, the slaughterhouse is cursed and quarantined like a boat carrying cholera. 
In fact, the victims of this curse are not butchers or animals, but the good people themselves 
who, through this, are only able to bear their own ugliness, an ugliness that is effectively an 
answer to an unhealthy need for cleanliness, for a bilious small-mindedness, and for boredom.” 
George Bataille, as cited in Leach, N. (Ed.). (1997). Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in 
Cultural Theory, p. 22. New York: Routledge. 
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Yet these stains are what make the enforcer such a mesmerizing figure. The 
contradictions enacted by the executioner and the police officer literally defy meaning, as 
Picasso’s painting did for Bataille, in that they cannot be adequately included in the symbolic 
system they preserve. Barthes (1971/1976) describes the “solitary” space of Sade’s fantasies as 
“completely confounded with the blank of the narrative: the meaning stops” (p. 16). As much as 
this evokes imprisonment, it also depicts the world of the cop. When Slavoj Žižek (2000) states 
that “(t)he Lacanian Real is strictly internal to the Symbolic; it is nothing but its inherent 
limitation, the impossibility of the Symbolic fully to ‘become itself’” (p. 120), he could easily be 
talking about the impossibility of indicting a police officer. Bleak and Hobbesian perhaps, but 
rich with poetic tragedy.  
 In late medieval and early modern Western art, punishment appears as a glorified and 
divine necessity. While premodern Biblical and classical images of torment are abundant, 
Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s 1339 series of frescoes allegorizing good government makes its political 
points fairly literally, depicting an anthropomorphized goddess of security, labeled Securitas, 
holding a hangman’s gibbet. John T. Hamilton (2013) describes Lorenzetti’s painting as 
visualizing a collectivized, integrated deployment of fear and violence, opposing a common 
enemy (p. 145). This morally and divinely sanctioned violence was common throughout the art 
of many societies, and of course still exists in superhero movies and police procedurals. 
Ethically ambiguous images of inevitable corruption evoke a sort of tragic fatalism, 
exploited in narratives formed in the mold of Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry films. In the most 
general sense, Boris Groys (2012) similarly associates the modernist artist’s attempt to reveal the 
“truth” of her medium with the belief that war reveals the “truth” of a person, in which “a deep 
connection is proclaimed between aesthetics, the search or the revelation of the concealed, and 
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the violence that plays a key role in artistic modernism” (p. 229). The glorification of war was 
explicit for the Futurists, but Groys says that the ethos of cruelty was visible throughout avant-
garde art. 
Cubism… compelled (the image) to admit its… character by applying rigorous methods 
that were fully reminiscent of traditional methods of torture—reduction, fragmentation, 
cutting up, and collage. (p. 233). 
In the Cubist refusal to straightforwardly depict forms in such work, divisive modernist critic 
Clement Greenberg (1949/1961) sees a “radical denial of all experience not immediately 
revealed to the eye,” “The world was stripped of its… skin,” he continues, “and the skin was 
spread flat on the flatness of the picture plane” (p. 172). This torment is, Greenberg suggests, 
also a revelation. Revealing the intention (or desire) of the work, interrogation, is crucial to its 
pleasure, even as modernist art increasingly made a point of avoiding representation of any kind. 
But the pleasure can also be that of polymorphous perversity; Barthes (1971/1976) points this out 
in describing the impossible orgies of de Sade, noting that “to accomplish them, if they are taken 
literally, one would need a multiple and disarticulated body” (p. 130). 
The Cubists’ abstraction of torture resonates with Lon Fuller’s 1934 reflections on 
judicial interpretation, when he suggests that modern judges torture legal texts through 
imaginative analogies much as confessions were tortured out of prisoners in the Middle Ages, 
optimistically surmising: “The millennium, when it arrives, will bring not only a humanitarian 
treatment of our treatment of legal doctrine, but also, I feel sure, a greater certainty in the 
prediction of judicial decision” (p. 435). But torture may not be an artificial imposition on the 
language of law, but an element intrinsic to language itself (Žižek 2014) As with the positivist 
utopia advanced by Buckminster Fuller, as well as the algorithmic amelioration of justice 
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proposed by author Adam Benforado (2015), or Burckhardt’s hyper-rationalized state, Lon 
Fuller’s belief in total visibility, a discoverable transparent truth, may be more of a temptation to 
detached absolutism than expanded compassion.  
Supplementing this visibility, as an example of selective (perhaps Oedipal) blindness, 
Austin Sarat and Connor Clarke (2009) recognize in the decisions made by prosecutors to refrain 
from indictment something of the privileged sovereign “exception” designated by Agamben, 
after Schmitt (and Derrida)-- an insight relevant to the aforementioned failure of American 
courts to hold police accountable for Black civilians’ deaths. The brutal interrogator who faces 
his own inquisitors with wordless defiance (referred to in American police departments as “the 
code of silence”), as Jon Burge has done multiple times under oath since 2004, mirrors the 
unique moral outlook of modern art and law. The freedom to make such exceptions extends from 
the prosecutor, the legal voice of the police, to anyone else acting on behalf of the police 
(Bittner, 1990, p. 35). This vacuum provokes not only force but crime. “The theoretical discourse 
that was favourable to modern art….,” observes Groys, “has generally interpreted (the) 
avoidance of critical judgment… as the effect of an irresistible inner compulsion which forces 
the artist- even against his own conscious will—to create the Other, the new, the criminal and the 
dangerous” (p. 52).  So perhaps the artist builds his own gallows, anticipating an ever-deferred 
verdict, a judgment on the absence of judgment. This modernist anti-ethics can be perceived as 
perverse or as impossibly absolute, an ideal judgment, but it also may be viewed also as an 
executioner’s aesthetic, devoid of pity. 
But beginning around the turn of the 19th century, when de Maistre was writing, images 
of suffering start to become both a spur for empathy and a titillating spectacle. With the upheaval 
of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, violence can be understood as a call to 
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action, as in Goya’s Disasters of War, which Susan Sontag (2003) links to the ongoing history of 
documentary photography, in which depictions of suffering are intended to elicit sympathy. But 
violence can also become an occasion for sinister glee. At the time of the early French republic, 
this can be seen in the grisly waxworks of Madame Tussaud (Graybill, 2006). Punishment would 
slowly begin to change, as official public executions receded and made room for the 
dissemination of gruesome imagery through the market, whether for gleeful or empathic 
enjoyment. The inevitable distortion of Goya’s solicitation of empathy is expressed in Rancière’s 
sarcastic comment (2010) about how “a series of photographs about the way colonizers represent 
the colonized will work to undermine the fallacies of mainstream representations of identities” 
(p. 136), 
Such delectation of slaughter can be understood to appeal both to the oppressed as well as 
the powerful.  “There were two ‘Reigns of Terror’ if we would remember it and consider it, the 
one wrought in hot passion, the other in heartless cold blood…” said Mark Twain in A 
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, putting the Jacobins’ mass executions in a larger 
moral context; “(W)hat is the horror of swift death by the axe compared with lifelong death from 
hunger, cold, insult, cruelty, and heartbreak?” (as cited in Žižek, 2011, p. 387).  The 
revolutionary narrative that raised up Lenin and Mao, and exiled both de Maistre and Hobbes, 
allows pleasure to be taken in directing general retribution at a designated victim. This evokes 
the model of sacrifice laid out by René Girard (1999/2001), and discussed earlier in regard to 
scapegoats such as Linda Taylor and Richard Speck. Both revered and reviled, a victim 
ambiguously represents both her social group and an anonymous vessel of guilt and rage; we can 




4.2  “The justice of administration” 
 
In the early 19th century, the documented litany of breakdowns and suicides in American 
prisons that made use of solitary confinement was so horrific that the practice was eventually 
even decried by the U.S. Supreme Court, in the 1890 Medley case. And yet, in the 20th century, it 
returned. When the most excessively inhumane forms of prison labor were finally eliminated, 
when the use of indeterminate sentencing was banned, and even when the courts interceded in 
acts of egregious human rights abuses, the prerogative of prison officials was not curtailed but 
enhanced. In the face of legislative sentencing reform, electoral referenda, and judicial 
monitoring, prison officials built and expanded the most populous and expensive carceral 
facilities ever seen. Ultimately, the prison is a space of the executive. 
As seen in exercises of state discretion such as the placement of men in Tamms at the 
apparent whim of officials, as well as in Governor Pat Quinn’s free commitment to act against 
both the prison guards’ union and the majority of state legislators in closing Tamms, creativity 
has long played a central role in imprisonment and policing. Cincinnati, Ohio, which established 
its police force in 1852, one of the first American cities to do so, was also in 1870 the birthplace 
of the National Prison Association. Dedicated to “penal reform,” this group was instrumental in 
calling for prison sentences of indeterminate length. At this first Cincinnati meeting, Reverend 
E.C. Wines put forward “the principle that imprisonment ought to be continued till reformation 
has been effected, and, if that happy consummation is never attained, then during the prisoner’s 
natural life” (cited in Friedman 1993, p. 140).  
Indeterminate sentencing, a blank check for administrative creativity, was to be widely 
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adopted for serious felonies over the next few decades. It applied not only to violent crimes but, 
even after the end of forced sterilization and lifetime commitment after World War II, nonviolent 
sex offenders faced long indeterminate sentences, sometimes extended for many years by juries 
in the face of expert advocacy (Letourneau and Caldwell, 2013). Andreas Kalyvas (2008) 
explains evocatively that, for Max Weber, “real juridical creation leans on a web of extralegal 
substantive axiological meanings and imaginary significations established by the victorious 
charismatic movement after a protracted symbolic struggle” (p. 63). Without the innovations in 
incarceration over the course of the nineteenth century, based on the liberal outlook of Quaker 
reformer Benjamin Rush, and the individualist values of a young decentralized capitalist state, 
such freedom of juridical fiat may not have emerged.  
Over a century later, in 1971, an influential report was released by another progressive 
Quaker voice, the American Friends Service Committee. This report, entitled Struggle for 
Justice, protested against the use of indeterminate sentencing, and questioned the goals of 
rehabilitative justice to which it was connected. One important failure of the rehabilitation model 
linked with indeterminate sentencing is that this paradigm projected pathology on to entire 
sectors of the population, without addressing the dramatic physical and psychological effects of 
poverty. David Fogel, who in 1975 became director of the Illinois Law Enforcement 
Commission, was moved by these arguments. Like Wines, Fogel was a prison reformer; unlike 
Wines, Fogel was also a prison abolitionist. Fogel’s vision was a future devoid of prisons. He 
sought as a first step to get rid of the indeterminate sentences handed down to prisoners, who 
were at the mercy of authorities and constantly worried about their next parole hearing, instead 
pushing for a system of “flat time,” mandated sentences of a specified duration, but allowing 
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substantial judicial leniency. He wrote, “My concern is less with the administration of justice and 
more with the justice of administration” (1975, p. xv, emphasis original). 
Fogel’s attempt at technocratic transparency is consonant with Michel Foucault’s vision 
of modern punishment as simply a weighing of interests.  Foucault says:  
Something is interposed between the crime, on the one hand, and the sovereign authority 
to punish, possibly with death, on the other… Punishment will be rooted only in the play 
of the interests of others, of the family circle, of society, and so on. (1979/2008, p. 46)   
And yet this logic of “interests” could be said to have led to the replacement of rehabilitation 
with retribution, highlighted in the U.S. with the massive criminal justice paradigm shift of the 
so-called War on Drugs, during which determinate sentences started being legislated as well as 
adjudicated.  
As it turns out, determinate sentencing meant longer sentencing and minimal 
rehabilitative services in prisons, and effectively no services whatsoever when inmates were in 
solitary confinement. Around the same time that sentencing was being reformed, a similar spirit 
of rational transparency, compassion, and respect for dignity led to “deinstitutionalization,” the 
nationwide defunding of state-run mental hospitals, with no commensurate increase in funding 
for community-based mental health services. One result is that the vast majority of Americans 
institutionalized for mental illness now reside in jails and prisons. As mentioned earlier, relative 
to the general population, people with mental illness are highly overrepresented in segregated 
detention. 
Determinate sentencing, as well as other elements of Fogel’s Illinois “Justice Plan,” also 
ended up sparking the movement toward minimizing the use of probation, spurring prison 
overcrowding and new prison construction, and inaugurating the system of mass incarceration 
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that the U.S. supports today (Maghan, 1997).  Judith Butler (2014) observes that the early penal 
reformers, the historical opponents of the death penalty, “seem to prefer a long, drawn-out form 
of cruel imprisonment” (p. 32). Of course, cruel imprisonment was expressly what Fogel sought 
to overcome, like Rush and Beccaria before him, but, in polls and elections, popular sentiment in 
the U.S. has generally favored harsh punishments (Garland, 2001; Reiter, 2016). The imposition 
of legislative and judicial oversight over prison administration has proved to be, particularly with 
the expansion of incarceration starting with the drug war in the 1970s and the advent of 
supermax prisons in the 1980s, an authorization without stipulation—a blank check for officials 
and wardens to inflict seemingly endless penalties (Reiter 2016). “Punitive license,” it might be 
called. As demonstrated in these perversions of reform, law, like language, has a way of 
betraying reformers’ intentions. But the intentions of the accused are cited as the basis for 
punishment, and the accumulation of intentional proof in circumstantial detail, through 
surveillance and interrogation, is used to justify the magnification of this punishment.  
Such intensive administrative scrutiny has become the rule in punishment, as well as in 
schooling. One reason is that the legal protection of children is a particularly charged area, 
involving permanent and comprehensive restriction. All U.S. states have registries for sex 
offenders, some of which track individuals for life. While most states limit the amount of time 
sex offenders’ names remain public, many sex offenders have to continue to check in with 
authorities for life, and large areas near schools, parks, and day care centers remain prohibited 
zones for registered sex offenders to traverse, let alone reside. Both the prosecution of sex 
offenders, which Laurie Jo Reynolds now expends a great deal of effort in opposing, and 
anxieties around drugs and violence, have continued to propagate an image of school as a “safe 
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space.” The school is thereby exposed to what Walter Benjamin might term the “law-maintaining 
violence” of central oversight.   
(T)his legal system… strives to limit by legal ends even those areas in which natural ends 
are admitted in principle within wide boundaries… as in the laws relating to the limits of 
educational authority to punish (Benjamin 1955/1978, p. 280). 
This panic translates also into the oversight of teachers and school administrators, who for 
decades have been targets of suspicion in education policy. Thus, the less “successful” a school, 
teacher, or student is, the more visible it/s/he must become, and as the students are suspended 
repeatedly and eventually expelled (and often imprisoned), so the schools are put on probation 
and eventually closed or reconstituted, often as quasi-public charter schools. This happened with 
multiple schools I worked at in Chicago.   
And yet, while Chicago public schools continue to experience massive defunding, Jon 
Burge continues to receive a pension. He was briefly incarcerated for perjuring himself about 
torture (after the statute of limitations expired on his crimes), but, as Peter Manning (1978b) puts 
it, “(l)ying serves to relieve situations not easily solved by recourse to the law” (p. 247). Most 
importantly, highly visible videotaped police killings of unarmed Black people, even when they 
see the light of day, continue to result in few if any legal sanctions. As similar as they seem in 
some aspects of their jobs, the work of a police officer and a teacher are widely divergent in 
regard to the kind of autonomy they are granted and the oversight they endure. One reason for 
this is that, in keeping with the violent and undefined Real in which she operates, a police officer 
has far more of a negative than a positive job description, which allows her to claim legal 
sanction for extralegal actions. 
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 We know that (definitive activities of the police) do not include arrests; we also know 
that they do not stand under judicial control, and that they are not, in any important sense, 
determined by specific executive or legislative mandates. (Bittner, 1990, p. 32) 




4.3  Crowd control as mythic tragedy 
 
Before the word “police” came to denote a group of individuals paid to enforce laws, it 
was understood around 1600 to mean roughly what “civilization” now means in opposition to 
“barbarity,” but generally as a quality possessed by individuals (Febvre, 1930/1998). But it soon 
began to take on an all-encompassing idea of municipal order, incorporating health, charity, and 
general domestic well-being—domestic both in the sense of the homeland and the family. Cited 
by Michel Foucault, the historian Turquet de Mayerne described police in 1611 as “everything 
that gives form, ornament, and splendor to the city” (p. 313). Referring to Nicolas de La Mare’s 
1722 Traité de la Políce, Brodeur (2010) says that the term “police,” in early modern usage, 
”both means order and the power to establish it” (p. 47). Just as the Italian classicist, political 
economist, and diplomat Galiani believed “police” to apply equally to both the distribution of 
bread and the politeness of Enlightenment salon society (Swenson, 2000, p. 41), Sir William 
Blackstone says in the fourth volume of his Commentaries on the Laws of England, from 1769,:  
The public police and economy…mean the due regulation and domestic order of the 
Kingdom, whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, 
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are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood 
and good manners, and to be decent, industrious and inoffensive in their respective 
stations. (as cited in Bittner, 1990, p. 235)  
As late as the 1820s, the British police reformer Patrick Colquohoun was attempting to realize 
what David Garland (2001) describes as “an emphatically preventative model of regulation,” in 
which “crime control was a diffuse, widely shared responsibility, involving strict regulation of 
social and economic activities, informal surveillance, and the avoidance of criminal 
opportunities” (p. 31).  
Extending Colquohoun’s relationship between law enforcement and prediction into the 
20th century, a study conducted by sociologist Ernest Burgess in 1928 on Illinois prisoners, 
assessing each prisoner’s risk of returning to prison on a range of 21 factors, was an important 
moment in the development of actuarial science, affecting the development of insurance 
practices in particular and wider ideas of  “risk management” in finance and security (Harcourt 
2006). Whether public or covert, similar efforts to gather information and neutralize threats 
remain central to the work of political police agencies in both democratic and undemocratic 
regimes, and certainly in liminal spaces like prisons. This latter area is a realm of police work 
Brodeur refers to as “high policing.” 
On the other hand, the range of duties that “low” police undertake, even within one role 
(be it officer, detective, et cetera) is wide and generally quite undefined (Brodeur, 2010, p. 132), 
making membership in the police a performance of intuitive sensitivity and broad discretion with 
clear artistic parallels. While police enjoy many legal and extralegal privileges, much of what 
police do are activities not off limits to members of the public, and even more of their activities 
involve no direct physical violence whatsoever. Begging a comparison to the avant-garde, Egon 
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Bittner (1990) proposes that “anything unpredictable that cannot be dismissed or assimilated to 
the usual is a proper object of police attention” (p. 252). He emphasizes that patrolmen 
frequently handle any immediately pressing task, without any direct input, assistance, or 
oversight. He goes so far as to claim that “no human problem exists, or is imaginable, about 
which it could be said with finality that this certainly could not become the proper business of 
the police” (p. 250). The creation of a quasi-professional group authorized to deploy force at the 
discretion of individuals, without any real threat of censure, radically transformed the ideal civic 
harmony contained in the original concept of “police” into its anarchic opposite: a source of 
endless repressive pleasure. In the U.S., police as heroic restorers of order assuaged white 
insecurities around economic and political disparities, allowing them to mirror and perpetuate 
each other. 
This is the context in which the massive police response to the Black Panthers should be 
understood. The Panthers started out in Oakland performing surveillance on the police, and 
moved into providing food, clothing, and health care to members of their community—“to serve 
and protect,” to quote the familiar motto. Although militarism appropriately describes their 
eventual adoption of uniforms and guns, as well as revolutionary ideology, thereby violating 
Weber’s state monopoly on violence (a prohibition which never applied to propertied whites in 
the U.S.), the Panthers essentially acted as a grassroots mirror of the police, focused far more on 
local security than on instigating acts of war. But the police enjoy socially unique authority, 
backed by legislative statute, judicial precedent, and administrative policy, to pursue whatever 
goal they deem prudent, using the means at their disposal. And yet, as the Panthers certainly 
recognized, force rather than law is central to the role of the police, just as expediency rather 
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than law is central to the plea bargains that are negotiated by criminal prosecutors and that 
resolve the vast majority of criminal cases.  
Citing Bittner, Brodeur (2010) notes that, unlike any other group that enjoys a limited 
legal access to violence, such as prison guards, “the police can use their capacity to overpower 
resistance in any situation where the use of force can be justified” (p. 113, emphasis original). 
But Brodeur later points out that private security forces similarly exist in an ambiguous 
relationship to the law (p. 329). Thus “to police,” in any capacity, effectively means to enjoy 
extralegal privileges. After all, the “police powers” granted to states and municipalities by the 
Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has effectively blocked most Federal efforts at 
enforcing citizens’ rights supposedly guaranteed by that document—but guaranteed only at the 
Federal level (Gerstle 2015).  
In this way, “police powers” could be said to echo the seemingly lawless provocations of 
the modern avant-garde. The relationship of police to the laws they supposedly enforce may truly 
be thought of as aesthetic rather than teleological. Bittner (1978) rejects the very idea that police 
are employed primarily to enforce laws or fight crime, suggesting instead that “the police are 
nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force in society” (p. 
34). “I am not aware of any descriptions of police work on the streets,” he says, “that support the 
view that patrolmen walk around, respond to service demands, or intervene in situations, with the 
provisions of the penal code in mind.” “In the typical case,” he continues, “the formal charge 
justifies the arrest a patrolman makes but is not the reason for it” (p. 245).  




(T)he “law” of the police really marks the point at which the state, whether from 
impotence or because of the immanent connections within any legal system, can no 
longer guarantee through the legal system the empirical ends that it desires at any price to 
attain. (p. 288) 
Much as with art, and culture generally, the police have undergone an experience of mutual 
disenchantment with and by the public, in which their inability to meaningfully affect crime rates 
has resulted in a long-term strategy of veiling, cajoling, and, most importantly, containment. This 
exercise in political optics can be understood as a performance of tranquil security for a 
designated sector of the population (Manning, 1978a, p. 9). But in the U.S. this performance is 
two-sided, in that low-income (but not only low-income) communities of color have come to 
expect public humiliation, beatings, and occasionally executions, while tolerating enormous 
civilian bloodshed, in a manner that recalls displays of power in autocratic societies and colonial 
occupations past and present. These communities may be compared to blank surfaces on to 
which power is projected, as when Hito Steyerl (2012) compares bodily gestures of a university 
police officer at University of California Davis pepper-spraying a seated crowd to Jackson 
Pollock dripping paint on a canvas. Describing the “political aesthetics” of “kettling,” the police 
technique of obstructing, surrounding, and channeling demonstrators, Scott Sorli (2014) 
describes how the police shape the crowd with their shields and barriers, with tear gas and the 
built environment, into an amorphous outline of besieged containment, creating a “mass 
ornament” (p. 145). Going back to Bentham, prisons themselves can be seen as sites of display, 
as with a student I had in a 2016 prison-based reading group, who compared the cellhouse to a 
giant art gallery, exhibiting criminalized bodies for a variety of audiences. 
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This choreography repeats itself on a grand scale with political gerrymandering and 
school segregation (Chang, 2018), gentrification and incarceration, creating a segregated image 
of peace, sustained by “dark sites” of racialized poverty, the American equivalent of famed 
Soviet dissident author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s “gulag archipelago.” Working with just such a 
notion of politicized space, Jacques Rancière (2010) opposes the concept of police, as a force 
delineating and separating areas, physical and metaphorical, to politics, which thrives on empty, 
uncertain, and extraneous space and activity. The “partition of the sensible” that the police 
secures  
should be understood in the double sense of the word: on one hand, as that which 
separates and excludes; on the other, as that which allows participation. (p. 36)   
Politics confront police, Rancière asserts, through “an intervention in the visible and the sayable” 
(p. 37). The “sensible” thus links art and politics intimately, but not straightforwardly or 
comfortably. Art cannot merely be subtracted from or absorbed into life, and vice-versa; 
Rancière cites the example of militant French workers in the 1840s celebrating Gustave Flaubert, 
who was denounced by bourgeois critics into the 1860s (p. 116), but who expressed little 
sympathy for the poor, asserting, “Devil take me if I don’t feel just as kindly toward the lice 
biting a beggar as I do toward the beggar” (as cited in Rancière 2004, p. 157).18 
Political potential inherent in this very confusion of art and life, for both artist and 
viewer, permits a sense of autonomy separate from reason. In 1991, Neue Slowensiche Kunst, an 
art project associated with the German experimental band Laibach, created an imaginary state 																																																								
18 Flaubert’s quote has a nice symmetry with the comment Trinculo makes upon encountering 
Caliban in Shakespeare’s The Tempest: "When they will not give a doit to relieve a lame beggar, 
they will lay out ten to see a dead Indian" (as cited in Sontag 2003, p. 57). 
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with boundaries in time rather than in space; they went on to issue passports, produce musical 
compilations, and convene international congresses. Rancière says, 
Art lives so long as it expresses a thought unclear to itself in a matter that resists it. It 
lives inasmuch as it is something else than art, namely a belief and a way of life. (p. 123) 
At the same time, he is justifiably skeptical about artistic practitioners of “ethical immediacy” 
who “continue to try to overturn the logic of the theatre by making the spectator active…, by 
sending artists into the streets of derelict suburbs to invent new modes of social relations” (p. 
137). More than this, however, he declares: “Practices of art… do not take leave of themselves to 
become forms of collective political action;” here he could be read as dismissing any aesthetic 
value for an effort like TY10. Instead, by expanding their sphere of reference, artistic practices 
“contribute to the constitution of a common sense that is ‘polemical’” (p. 149).  
Political art for Rancière is a form of “dissensus,” opposing the police regime that “pins 
bodies to ‘their’ places and allocates the private and public to distinct ‘parts’”(p. 139). In its 
imagery of bodies and private parts, this quote resonates ironically with Barthes’ (1971/1976) 
description of Sadean libertines, who “have an overwhelming urge to hide the Female’s sexual 
organs scrupulously” (p. 123). But, along with making artwork out of everyday life, the police 
also then present this artistically transformed refraction of society back to the public. 
 According to “build the party,” cited by Benjamin Noys (2013), all aesthetics is merely 
“imperial neutralization, whenever direct recourse to the police is not possible” (p. 13). The idea 
of revolutionary art is rendered impossible. Similarly, in The Wretched of the Earth (1961/1963), 
Frantz Fanon talks about the work that aesthetics does in a colonizer society, as opposed to that 
of a colonized society. 
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 In capitalist societies, the educational system, whether lay or clerical, the structure of 
moral reflexes handed down from father to son, the exemplary honesty of workers who 
are given a medal after fifty years of good and loyal service, and the affection which 
springs from harmonious relations—all these aesthetic expressions of respect for the 
established order serve to create around the exploited person an atmosphere of 
submission and of inhibition which lightens the task of policing considerably. (p. 38, 
emphasis added) 
As Rancière would doubtless agree, this aesthetic policing is carried out spatially. The colonizer 
lives in an area of material and visual bounty. 
 The settlers’ town is a strongly built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit 
town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage cans swallow all the leavings, 
unseen, unknown and hardly thought about… (T)he streets of (the settlers’) town are 
clean and even, with no holes or stones. The settler’s town is a well-fed town, an 
easygoing town, its belly is always full of good things. (p.39) 
This town he contrasts to “the native town, the Negro village, the medina, the reservation, a place 
of ill fame, peopled by men of evil repute.” 
 They are born there, it matters little where or how; they die there, it matters not where, 
nor how. It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, and their 
huts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, 
of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. (p. 39) 
But then he links the life of the native to the Imaginary, to the fantastic projection of desire. “The 
look that the native turns on the settler’s town is a look of lust, a look of envy; it expresses his 
dreams of possession… to sit at the settler’s table, to sleep in the settler’s bed, with his wife if 
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possible” (p. 39). While this is not the aristocratic aesthetic ideal of the well-ordered cosmos, it 
expresses an aesthetic ideal nonetheless—a revolutionary one. 
In neighborhoods like the area of Chicago’s southeast side. where Jon Burge held 
something like sovereign power, there’s not much to distinguish it from Fanon’s “colonial” or 
“native” countries, where, unlike the aestheticized condition he attributes to capitalist countries 
overall, “the policeman and the soldier, by their immediate presence and their frequent and direct 
action maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of the rifle butts and napalm not 
to budge” (p. 38). I would modify Fanon’s searing analysis on three points. First, I maintain that 
in cities in America and throughout the world, the two towns, “settler” and “native,” exist side by 
side in racially and economically segregated urban areas. Secondly, I would not characterize the 
work of the policeman in the poor majority-Black neighborhood as any less aestheticized than 
the work of the teacher in the wealthy majority-white suburb. The teacher convinces the young 
white person that resistance is immoral, and the police officer convinces the young Black person 
that resistance is hopeless. This is a clear illustration of a judicial versus an executive rhetorical 
performance. And lastly, the police, as I’ve suggested, perform a vital aesthetic function in 
wealthy areas, just as in poor ones—conveying to “good people” the assurance that they are safe. 
The two audiences of the American police both experience outbreaks of unspeakable, 
irrational violence, and, at the same time, moments of stable and secure innocence. Each group 
identifies with one of these conditions as an everyday reality. The upheaval takes on aspects of 
dramatic fantasy, and the condition of peaceful stasis becomes an idyllic pastoral fantasy, each of 
which enters reality through active social reinforcement. For comfortable white areas, the 
repressed trauma returns as a recurrent element of nightmare, made manifest in media narratives 
of global upheaval and social decay. The proliferation of white militias testifies to the urgency of 
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the need for a conflict that can generate a catharsis to expunge collective guilt. This has 
manifested in various attempts to seize the extralegal white-supremacist authority currently 
embedded in policing, but dating back to posses, lynch mobs, and slave patrols.  
In a new twist on white nationalism, a few contemporary white radicals have gained 
marginal visibility in courtroom videos and news stories through announcing themselves as 
“sovereign citizens.” Often affiliated with separatist militia groups, these individuals have 
attempted to argue their way out of prosecution on the basis of their allegedly Constitutionally-
protected right to withhold consent to abide by state and Federal laws. This refusal is a form of 
micro-secession, a refusal to acknowledge the post-slavery laws of Reconstruction (Crowell 
2015, p. 2). This refusal, however, recalls nothing so much as the legally-informed tactics of 
police confrontation weaponized by the Black Panthers after the decline of 1960s civil rights 
activism. This recent right-autonomist white resurgence plays out in a reassertion of racial order 
in poor rural white prison towns like Tamms, experienced firsthand as bodily fear, felt by all the 
Tamms Year Ten members who attended a 2012 mass pro-Tamms rally in Ulin, Illinois. Family 
member Carol Wilcox (2014) compared her sense of the simmering fury on display that day, 
among the rural white crowd, to that faced by Freedom Rider anti-racist activists in the South 
during the American civil rights struggle. 
For poor Black and brown communities, repression itself is continually restaged in street 
violence, while some ecclesiastic and secular institutions insist upon the possibility of a world 
disciplined into normalcy. But many residents, especially young people, are under no illusions as 
to their standing with the police. 
This is a common understanding among the Black teenagers we work with on the South 
Side—regardless of any effort they may make to pacify officers, once detained, the 
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situation is largely out of their control. Students report that they assert themselves at their 
own peril.  (Futterman, Hunt, & Kalven, 2016, p. 17). 
The work of the police in a ghetto is largely a task of containment and separation (Bittner 1990, 
pp. 38-39). Fanon (1961/1963) says that, in the colonized world, “the dividing line, the frontiers, 
are shown by barracks and police stations” (p. 38). The “thin blue line” of the police may be 
understood as an opaque curtain of capricious violence that makes everyday life into life-and-
death drama. And this opacity, like that of the Freudian unconscious, offers the police a 
destructive freedom. This has only begun to be glimpsed in the videos of police violence that 
have surfaced to date. Friedrich Schiller (1794/2004) declares that “aesthetic freedom is to be 
distinguished from the logical necessity of thinking and the moral necessity of willing only by 
the fact that the laws which guide the operation of the mind are not realized, and because they 
meet with no resistance do not appear as compulsion” (p. 99). But no matter how free their 
expression, no artist who has an audience, who functions as a member of a community, can 
enjoy the level of autonomy enjoyed by the police. 
 
 
4.4  Mastery, mimicry and martyrdom 
 
The farcical aspects of law and art depend on the absurd joy of transgression. The pathos 
of tragedy can paint absurdity with sober gravitas, but, as Hegel shows in the Aesthetics 
(1835/1975), transgression can also come from the destructive glee of comedy. In Laughing at 
Leviathan (2012), Danilyn Rutherford describes a form of solidarity familiar among marginal 
groups by describing the people of West Papua, who insist upon smirking at the stern Indonesian 
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state that demands their allegiance. Not that the epics lacked violence, nor did Chaucer refrain 
from salacious detail, but the Marquis de Sade, a licentious political revolutionary, may be 
understood as the first comically violent literary provocateur—a revolutionary writer who 
endured years of solitary confinement for depicting tormented suffering as eroticism rather than 
piety--or perhaps as a different strain of piety. Sade writes comedy through his grim commentary 
on confinement and torture. 
It is important to understand that Sade’s writings are indeed escapist fantasies, even if 
linked to the Marquis’ professed revolutionary politics. Jacques Lacan (1990) comments 
specificially on the Marquis de Sade in relation to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, and finds 
Sade a pitiable character by comparison. Locked in his cell, Sade tries to carry out a moral duty 
to express amoral pleasure, a “will-to-enjoy” that Lacan associates with Freud’s “superego,” the 
realm of morals and laws. Thereby Sade mimics a kind of mastery in the Symbolic world of 
writing that, in Lacan’s telling, is the property of educated professionals, what Lacan calls the 
“university discourse” (1964/1977). But as pathetic and ridiculous as he may seem, the visionary 
Sade provides a compelling antihero precedent for more politically effective prison writers of the 
twentieth century like Antonio Gramsci, Aurobindo Ghose, George Jackson, and, particularly in 
terms of his erotic ruminations, Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver. And, at the same time, 
Sade’s delusions of hedonistic grandeur make him a caricature of the police. 
As thoroughly irreligious as Sade’s writing is, David Farrell Krell (2005) points out that 
“Sade’s heroes respond to beauty by desiring that it suffer beyond death, …into the infinity that 
is so successfully represented by the Christian hell” (p. 359). This is not unlike seventeenth-
century Christian mystics who embraced the inevitability of damnation, subscribing to a doctrine 
of “pure love” that entailed “an unqualified self-divestiture required by obedience to the 
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unknowable will of a transcendent, arbitrary God” (Bersani and Phillips 2008, p. 75)—even 
though they assured themselves that after death they awaited a prompt immersion in hellfire. 
“Priests and bishops are always among the Marquis’ heroes” notes Krell (p. 359), wryly 
downplaying the debased role of the clergy in Sade’s structured orgies. As anachronistic as the 
idea of eternal punishment already seemed to cultured Enlightenment Europeans, the 
contingency of fate in Sade is ultimately justified only in suffering, a viewpoint passionately 
expressed in the twentieth century by Georges Bataille, who evokes in his writing an ideal of 
individual sovereignty strongly influenced by Sade. 
Many visual depictions of divinely ordained violence decisively changed their tone (but 
not their ubiquity) after Sade, after Goya’s Horrors of War, and with the advent of documentary 
photography (Sontag 2003). Ennobling and titillating violence has continued to fuel high art as 
well as popular entertainment, particularly in the genre of film, with Alfred Hitchcock standing 
as the cinematic archetype for both audiences. The effect of these examples, if not their intention, 
is that violence has come to be associated with transgression, anxiety, and persecution rather than 
righteous judgment. While action movies and superhero comics continue to resolve conflicts 
through the smiting of wrongdoers, even in these the formless trauma of brutality is shaped 
through the gravitas of tragedy, in which the heroes, like de Maistre’s executioner, are the ones 
willing to get their hands dirty. Arbitrary power takes center stage, frequently refusing to rest in 
any single individual. This violent formlessness, an expression of Lacan’s Real, is also expressed 
in the amorphous plot of the Sadean “rhapsodic” novel, a narrative which according to Barthes 




 As portrayed in the novels of Franz Kafka and the films of Stanley Kubrick, the 
persecuting machinations of modern institutions often seem absurd, and sometimes darkly 
comical. Marshall “Eddie” Conway, the former Minister of Defense of the Baltimore Black 
Panther Party, tells this story of reading in the newspaper while stationed with the U.S. Army in 
Germany about the militarized response of police to African-Americans protesting in New 
Jersey: 
I was on my way to Vietnam, and at that point I decided to like leave the Army, come 
home, and with the concept that well okay, we needed to make some changes in America, 
America needed some kind of reform. Military vehicles shouldn't be sitting in the middle 
of the intersection and fifty-caliber machine guns shouldn't be pointed at Black women in 
the Black community, and so something was wrong with that picture, and I could 
probably come home and help join some effort to help reform that... As I went on I 
realized that some more serious kind of organizing need to happen, to improve the 
condition in the Black community, and I looked at all the different organizations, and the 
Black Panther Party represented at least a serious attempt to start feeding the children, to 
start educating the population, to start organizing health care, and stuff like that, so I 
joined, I started working with them, and I didn't discover until later on that the chapter 
was organized by a national security agent and police informants and so on. (Conway and 
Boyle, 2014) 
Conway’s sentencing was just one in a string of convictions, that, along with targeted 
assassinations, eliminated the Black Panthers as a political threat. Conway was released after 
almost 44 years, according to his attorney Bob Boyle, based on a 2013 finding that Maryland 
courts had, up until the 1980s, given jurors latitude to consider all instructions from the judge as 
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"advisory." This was found unconstitutional, Boyle said, because jurors were allowed to 
overlook the admonition to find a defendant guilty only if convinced of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
The prosecution of Conway by the government could be seen as having begun even 
before framing him, back when the Federal counter-insurgency program COINTELPRO decided 
to create a booby-trapped Panthers chapter in Baltimore. This maneuver outflanked Conway’s 
protest against a racial double standard (regarding public assembly) with another racial double 
standard (regarding political activism generally). The long-delayed release of other Black 
Panthers, some decades after signing tortured confessions, some after decades in solitary 
confinement in institutions like the state prison at Angola, a still-operational Louisiana 
plantation, provide parallel Kafkaesque (or Duchampesque) examples of legal contradictions 
resulting in deadlock. Even in 2013, the jury for Marissa Alexander, an African-American 
woman whose claim of self-defense based on “Stand Your Ground” was defeated (despite 
having injured nobody), was instructed based on the presumption of her guilt rather than her 
innocence (Cacho, personal communication, 2014). Alexander was released in early 2017, but 
her imprisonment continued a long tradition of Black women receiving long and brutal sentences 
for convictions related to self-defense in situations of gender violence (Haley, 2016). This was 
demonstrated again in the 2016 conviction, commuted in 2018, of Black teenager Bresha 
Meadows for the murder of her horrifically abusive father. 
Both those fighting against the state and those acting on its behalf often borrow legal and 
extralegal tactics from each other. Recent attempts both to cover up and to expose extralegal 
violence by the Chicago Police Department against poor people of color have continued to 
inspire ingenuity on both sides, most recently in the collaboration of journalists, lawyers, and 
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activists to expose a one-year cover-up of the police murder of Laquan McDonald that allowed 
Mayor Rahm Emanuel to retain his seat in a tight re-election campaign (Black, 2015). 
Whistleblowers within the CPD, effectively acting as informers to the public about corrupt 
officers engaged in long-standing practices that exploit citizens in low-income communities of 
color, have faced alienation and not-so-veiled threats. But through a long process of 
interviewing, even without access to tangible proof, journalist Jamie Kalven (2016), who helped 
to expose the McDonald video, has, like a talented prosecutor, managed to construct a detailed 
incriminating narrative.  
As shown in the above anecdotes, creativity in law is, in courts, classrooms, and public 
media outlets, used more often to justify rather than to end repression. But amoral creativity is of 
course exercised by private interests as well as by public authorities. Concerning the creative 
evasion of compliance in the arena of equal-opportunity employment legislation, Lauren B. 
Edelman (1992) emphasizes the importance of “the process by which organizations respond to 
law” over “viewing law and the legal process as given authorities that organizations either obey 
or resist” (p. 1534). So the operations of the legal apparatus can provide tools for resistance. 
Law-and-order jurisprudence has even been used in the service of anti-racism, as when in 1976 
arch-conservative Antonin Scalia, long before his appointment to the Supreme Court, 
successfully negated the statute of limitations and thus extended the power of the FBI to 
investigate John F. Kennedy’s long-unsolved 1964 assassination; this provided the strategy for a 
productive 2004 investigation into the 1955 murder of Emmett Till (Benson, 2016).  
Mimicking the emancipatory movements they sought to dismantle, the creative 
mobilization of American intelligence, security, legal, and police forces against political dissent 
in the 1960s provides a striking example of a dynamic in which state forces emulate their 
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antagonists, whether real or imagined (as with the Black Panthers efforts to “serve and protect” 
their communities). “Turning one’s enemy into a covert asset,” notes Jean-Paul Brodeur (2010), 
“is perhaps the oldest trick of the intelligence business” (p. 229). One example is especially 
relevant to Reynolds’ work on behalf of Illinois prisoners imprisoned in segregation, also known 
as solitary confinement. After the Korean War the CIA, along with academic and private 
interests, began studying Chinese imprisonment and interrogation techniques, particularly the use 
of solitary confinement, in order to disrupt the activities of U.S. political activists; one result was 
the 1963 publication of the KUBARK Counterintelligence Training Manual (Guenther, 2013, 
Kindle location 1628).19 In 1972, these techniques began being implemented in a Federal prison 
at Marion, Illinois, in which a “control unit” was established in the prison in response to a protest 
and strike by political prisoners (Gómez, 2006). This marked an important step toward the 
contemporary supermax prison, to be followed in 1983 by the aforementioned 23-year full-
prison lockdown in response to the murders of two correctional officers. Before joining the 
Tamms Committee, Reynolds was a part of the effort to end this lockdown. 
As with the element of “myth” Benjamin speaks of in founding laws, narrative is now as 
always connected intimately to law and violence in explicit ways—primarily but not solely in 
regard to interrogation. In his tongue-in-cheek comparison of community organizing with the 
military pacification of occupied populations, Nato Thompson (2013) quotes David Petraeus’ 
Counterinsurgenxy Field Manual 3-24: “The central mechanism through which ideologies are 																																																								
19 Also, during the post-9/11 “War on Terror”, psychologists James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen 
reverse-engineered torture techniques for use on U.S. prisoners at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba 
through examining 1950s military manuals on withstanding torture at the hands of the Chinese 
during the American war in Korea (Fink and Risen, 2017). 
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expressed and absorbed is the narrative” (para. 8).  Such advice could have been shared in a 
COINTELPRO briefing, I can imagine, in the operations leading up to the founding of the decoy 
Panthers chapter in Baltimore and the imprisonment of Marshall “Eddie” Conway, reminiscent 
of the idea of “pre-crime” introduced in Philip K. Dick’s novel (and later Steven Spielberg’s 
movie) Minority Report. This predictive security perspective resonates with the “narrative 
networks” program now being undertaken in the U.S. government by the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which “aims to address the factors that contribute to 
radicalization, violent social mobilization, insurgency, and terrorism among foreign populations” 
(www.darpa.mil, para. 6). 
An artistic comment on such authorial administration was a 1971 conceptualist art project 
entitled Orders & Co., during the period of Operation Condor, a decade-long series of brutal 
U.S.-backed regimes in South America that toppled democratic leaders and murdered hundreds 
of dissidents. In Orders & Co., Uruguayan expatriates in the U.S. issued commands to be 
followed by Jorge Pacheco Areco, the Uruguayan president. “On October 5, Pacheco was 
ordered to make sure his fly was closed before leaving his home. On November 5, while 
walking, he was to pay particular attention to every third step” (Camnitzer 2007, p. 244). Albeit 
amusingly ineffectual, this piece reflects on narrative as a matter of control. More recently, the 
DARPA-style approach to propagandistic conflict has been opposed by artist Trevor Paglen, who 
has attempted with some success to “plot” the opaque machinations of extrajudicial 
administration, both in the sense of mapping and storytelling, the latter largely through 
romantically indistinct images of classified operations, but also through a narrative of his 
collaborative investigation into the practice of “extraordinary rendition“ following the 9/11 
attacks (2006). On the other hand, keeping with this theme of top-down extralegal discretion, 
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eminent American legal scholar Richard L. Posner wrote after 9/11 that the Constitution should 
not be viewed as a restriction on the surveillance and pursuit of terror subjects (Cole, 2006)—this 
might be called freedom of repression. The pleasure of this freedom to repress is evoked in the 
video game Papers, Please, created by independent game developer Lucas Pope in 2013, in 
which players are put into the role of a border official checking documentation and deciding 
whether or not to let individuals cross into a fictional authoritarian Eastern Bloc country. 
Of course tragic drama is often deliberately evoked by those who oppose the police, with 
the names of martyrs fueling revolutionary action. Given the overwhelming odds they faced, 
leaders have made the most of their tragic circumstances. Martyrs like Martin Luther King and 
Harvey Milk spoke of and planned for their demise, controlling their own narratives beyond the 
grave. Foreseeing his eventual assassination, anti-apartheid leader and Black Consciousness 
theorist Steve Biko attempted to teach rather than to govern, while asserting that “death itself can 
be a politicizing thing” (as cited in Hook 2012, p. 32). Hook cites an assessment that: “Activity, 
not activism as such, marked (Black Consciousness) strategy… Its most astute exponents 
understood that if they formed a rigidly structured organization the police would immediately 
destroy it” (p. 34). In his attempt to move from an affirmative self-recognition in the aesthetic 
appreciation of Blackness, into communal liberation, Biko took on aspects of Hegel’s artist who 
achieves “supreme liberation” in rejecting material (or bodily) form for the objective abstracted 
Idea, “the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-
mediating knowledge, into an existence which is itself knowledge—into revelation” (1817/2008, 
p. 174). This spiritual “dematerialization,” to appropriate the term coined by art critic Lucy 
Lippard, echoed the poetically sublime aestheticizing of information in conceptual art.  
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Marshall “Eddie” Conway’s position as a soldier in Europe witnessing dramatic 
confrontation at home in the newspaper exemplifies the kind of predicament that for many 
people, as with Laurie Jo Reynolds’ experience of interpellation upon reading Johnnie Walton’s 
call to replace poetry with advocacy, provokes a dangerous decision to take action by 
challenging the law. In Conway’s case, he eventually won a liberating victory in the face of legal 
self-contradiction. But Conway’s case also serves as a reminder that liberalized parameters of 
judgment in democracies (civil rights, for example) have often resulted in selective deregulations 
accompanying a consolidated apparatus of control. Benjamin observes with regard to the police 
that “in democracies… their existence… bears witness to the greatest conceivable degeneration 
of violence” (p. 287). This dynamic of disintegration is visible in the structural inertia that David 
Fogel’s dilemma illustrates, and in the paradox of the free subject paralyzed by obedience in 
Kafka’s parable “Before the Law,” in which the protagonist is, without force, restrained 
throughout the course of his life from accessing a room in which the Law is kept. The parable 
form, a deliberate choice for Kafka, recalls the “mythic” dimension that, for Benjamin, is the 
foundation of law, and is also tied up with resistance to the law. For better or worse, the call to 
overturn law, to which Reynolds responded, seems inseparable from the call to found a new law. 
“Dematerialization” turns out to be useful when physical objects are overwhelmingly in the 







4.5  The blunt and elusive object 
 
 Celebrated American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes (1881/1963) reconstructs the history 
of liability in civil law as one in which inanimate objects, like ships and weapons; inhuman 
beings, like animals and trees; or incompletely human forms of property, such as slaves and 
children, went from being held accountable for various delicts (or claims of damage), to the 
eventual concentration of responsibility in the property owner. While this evolution displays an 
increasing appreciation of the freedom exercised by holders of property, it also involves an 
apparent shift in the legal status of inanimate objects—although Holmes cites a federal case in 
which a judge comments that “the thing is…  primarily considered as the offender, or rather the 
offence is primarily attached to the thing” (as cited on p. 27).  
This continuum between passive and intentional subjects leads the philosopher John 
Dewey (1916) to open Democracy and Education not with a human being, but a stone. “The 
most notable distinction between living and inanimate beings is that the former maintain 
themselves by renewal,” he says (p. 1). He moves into his views on modern schooling only after 
progressing from stones to a discussion of “primitive” peoples, who don’t sufficiently 
differentiate themselves from their environment, as “only a small number of natural resources are 
utilized (by these ‘primitive’ societies), and they are not worked for what they are worth” (p. 44). 
The restriction of judicial and legislative activity to the actions of productive and reproductive 
subjects has created room for the expansion of policing via the invention of forensic science, in 
which objects come to mark the traces of actions by culpable individuals (Kruse 2016). To some 
extent the debilitation of a person through solitary confinement resembles a cancellation of 
volition, reversing the incomplete evolution of intentionality laid out by Holmes and Dewey in a 
		
200	
manner consistent with Frank Wilderson’s (2010) idea of the fundamental fungibility of the 
nonwhite body.  
In a 1952 manifesto by the French Internationale Lettriste, headed by Guy Debord, the 
group disdained leaving behind evidence: “Anything that keeps something upright contributes to 
the work of the police” (as cited in Camnitzer 2007, 276n). And indeed much of the enjoyment 
created and experienced by police is far from immaterial. The birth of American police in patrols 
intended to contain immigrants and catch escaped slaves has been documented, but it is worth 
thinking about the significant pleasures of transgression and possession. An example might be 
the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, which gave slave hunters the right to kidnap free African-
Americans with impunity in supposedly “free” states. This principle was reinforced by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1857 Dred Scott decision, in which the citizenship of Blacks was decisively 
denied. During the American Civil War the participation of Black soldiers in General Sherman’s 
March to the Sea, walking off plantations, burning property, and freeing their fellow former 
chattel, defines the revolutionary rejection of the pleasure experienced by slave-hunters and 
slaveowners (DuBois, 1935, pp. 66-67), following the model laid down by Black Haitian 
revolutionaries who burned fields of sugarcane. The removal of Federal troops from the 
American South in 1877, signifying the abandonment of Reconstruction reforms, would allow 
regressive jurisdictions to deny African-Americans access to employment, housing, and the 
vote—but would also cause these same African-Americans to face the full force of legal and 
often extralegal punishment. 
The regime of mass incarceration can be traced back to concentration camps, the modern 
version of the slave labor camps that existed throughout ancient Rome. Just as concentration 
camps were used by colonizers in Cuba and throughout Africa in order to contain potentially 
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insurgent masses, disease-filled “contraband camps” were used during and after the U.S. Civil 
War to intern freed slaves (Downs, 2012), much as camps were used to permanently resettle 
Indians throughout the 1800s, before reaching an epic apotheosis in the Nazi death camps. 
Andrea Pitzer (2017) relates this history to the U.S. Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba, as well as 
to other “black sites”, refugee camps, and immigrant detention facilities. In all of these historical 
cases, torture has been common, and starvation and disease often rampant. While the 
development of these camps depended on the invention of material technologies like barbed wire 
and automatic weapons, as well as legal emergency powers in democracies that allowed 
extrajudicial mass detention, the ever-intensified dehumanization of the contained population is a 
key aspect of this administrative innovation. 
But actual inanimate objects still remain central to procedures of law enforcement. In 
general, the province of executive authority should be understood as the realm of the inanimate, 
only nominally restrained in the U.S. by the “exclusionary rule” banning the use in court of 
illegally obtained evidence. Back in 1962, Francis Allen identified four important limitations on 
this rule (pp. 78-79). As upheld in federal courts, these exceptions include the use of evidence 
illegally obtained by private citizens, evidence obtained by police illegally from a third party, 
testimony about illegally obtained evidence, and evidence obtained illegally by state authorities 
but submitted by federal authorities. Since this time, the War on Drugs, initiated under President 
Richard Nixon and expanded under Ronald Reagan, has further diminished restraints on police 
“search and seizure” authority.20  
																																																								
20 In a scathing and eloquent dissent in Utah v. Strieff (2016), a Fourth Amendment case 
involving police powers, Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor described a typical invasive 
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This history of intruding upon and seizing property continues to this day. In his history of 
American police militarization, Rise of the Warrior Cop (2014), Radley Balko talks about the 
evolution of the no-knock police raid after the Supreme Court ruled in favor of state authorities 
in the 1963 case Ker v. California. 
 The courts have since held that police may enter at the scene of a search without 
announcing even with a regular warrant if they hear or see activity within the residence 
that merely suggests someone is destroying evidence. (p. 46) 
The Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio expanded search powers further, allowing 
“police officers to stop and frisk someone based on no more than ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the 
person is engaged in criminal activity or about to commit a crime” (p. 55). The media theater of 
the War on Drugs made drug raids a reliable revenue source for local police departments, 
especially once the 1984 omnibus crime bill allowed for massive forfeitures of property in these 
raids (p. 152). Despite the seeming relevance of the Sixth Amendment, juries have been largely 
shut out of finding damages in forfeiture cases (Fineran and Luther 2013). To this day, police 
departments in cities like Chicago use forfeiture laws to create a massive “secret budget” 
(Handley, Helsby, & Martinez 2016), while in the last decade the Federal Drug Enforcement 
Agency has pulled in billions of dollars in cash and property, seized without due process or even 
administrative oversight, often from individuals who are released or never even charged with a 
crime, many “without a court-issued warrant and without the presence of narcotics” (U. S. 
Department of Justice, 2017b, p. iii). In July 2017 Attorney General Jeff Sessions told the 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
police stop by citing every Supreme Court decision that legitimated an officer’s apparently 
unwarranted intrusion into someone’s person, privacy, and property. 
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National District Attorneys Association that his intention was to expand the practice of civil asset 
forfeiture (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017c). 
 The militaristic shock tactics used by the police in drug raids historically coincides in the 
U.S. of with the sort of surveillance of trivial minutiae that might be associated with checkpoints 
in an occupied area. Taking its name and inspiration from a 1982 Atlantic essay on police reform 
by George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, a style of swiftly and harshly punishing publicly 
visible but minor property offenses, known as “broken windows” policing, was adopted for 
decades in cities throughout the U.S. It came to evolve into the “stop and frisk” patrol tactics 
now being praised by law-and-order politicians. In 1995, Eric Holder, the Black State’s Attorney 
of the District of Columbia, who would later become the U.S. Attorney General under Obama, 
introduced a program called “Operation Cease-Fire” which encouraged police to stop vehicles 
that appear suspicious on any pretext, in order to conduct searches for drugs and weapons; he 
even did so in the name of civil rights for African-American communities, claiming that “the 
people of Washington, D.C. in 1995 are in some respects no freer than the people of Selma, 
Alabama in 1965” (as cited in Forman, 2017, p. 194). The overlapping of intention and 
appearance appears in a high school student’s narrative from the south side of Chicago. 
Malik, a large wrestler, told us he wears “hipster” styles to avoid police scrutiny. “My 
jeans will be fitted. If I have a hoodie on, it wouldn’t be dark. It’ll be a bright red or 
purple or something like that with designs on it.” He notes that styles he perceives as 
more masculine, like “really baggy pants, big hoodies, things like baggy clothes in 
general are suspicious to the police.” (Futterman et al. 2016, p. 27) 
The delectation of minor visual information by the police is another element that evokes Sade’s 
fantasy accounts. Brodeur (2010) states that “profiling people on the basis of their physical 
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appearance is a built-in feature of the job of policing the streets” (p. 355). 
Brodeur also discusses “policing appearances,” which he says “refers to both the policing 
of appearances and the appearances of policing” (p. 174). There is the first sense, in which any 
visual cue which hints at wrongdoing can attract attention, but forms of wrongdoing without 
public visual evidence, such as most white collar crime, is not deemed relevant to the work of 
patrol officers, or what Brodeur refers to as “low policing.” The latter sense refers to another 
artful aspect of policing, in which the presence of police reassures citizens and reinforces civic 
order. Relative to the military, however, police have a limited capacity to confront direct 
organized resistance, which reinforces the importance for police of projecting an image of 
strength. For the police this can include tolerating some level of illegal activity, but requiring it 
to occur in private. As in modernist painting, the pure optical surface overrides any consideration 
of depth. According to Clement Greenberg (1949/1961), “now the unity and integrity of the 
visual continuum, as a continuum, supplants tactile nature as the model of the unity and integrity 
of pictorial space” (p. 173). Translated into politics, the image of force can be understood as a 
surface of order. The belief that this force is pervasive and fundamental supposedly operates to 
forestall social disintegration. 
On the subject of law and abstraction, Hito Steyerl (2012) relates the use of pixellation in 
contemporary military camouflage to the distortion that occurs in the most immediate recordings 
of events. She makes the point that mediated abstraction has become synonymous with authentic 
realism, when the mediation makes visible the significant lack of data in even the most detailed 
image. This again evokes Greenberg (1949/1961), who pronounced: “The paradox of French 
painting from Courbet to Cézanne is how it was brought to the verge of abstraction by its very 
effort to transcribe visual reality with ever greater fidelity” (p. 171). As Greenberg’s comment 
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suggests, this precision is inseparable from incompleteness, and provides an apt metaphor for the 
intensification of surveillance via advanced forensic technologies.  
Steyerl used a forensic 3-D modeling apparatus as part of her “White Shadows” project, 
in order to examine what is missed and abstracted by the supposedly superhuman documentary 
capabilities of technology. Describing this slowly rotating ultra-high-resolution digital-modeling 
still camera in a 2014 lecture, she notes its failure to capture any motion whatsoever. “You can 
document anything but a crime with this device,” she says. As with a panopticon, all objects are 
only seen by this camera from one central perspective, meaning that any hidden, oblique areas of 
the objects in the scene are simply blank, not rendered. While the forensic capabilities of the 
digital camera are formidable, in appearance it seems comparable, in terms of authoritarian 
optics, to Robert Whitman’s Solid Red Line, a 1967 installation in which a centrally placed laser 
device slowly traces and erases a red line on the gallery walls, as well as any viewers in the 
space. Whitman’s piece would be of no practical use to the police, but the appearance of 
oversight, as in the largely ineffectual implementation of police body cameras, is often all that 
matters. To evoke Lacan’s discussion of the disembodied “gaze”, the ability to project an 
inscrutable entity that anticipates and confronts the viewer, rather than to craft a specific 
rhetorical appeal to the viewer, is what separates judicial aesthetics from administrative 
aesthetics. 
Total surveillance has always been the ideal of policing, which over time has involved 
the collection and analysis of ever more minute scraps of information. Galiani, an Enlightenment 
economist and diplomat mentioned earlier, stated in 1773 that police “is an affair of detail” (as 
cited in Kaplan 2015, p. 596). Much like this fastidious policing, nineteenth-century realist 
authors are known for their detached cataloguing of mundane ephemera, as summarized by 
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Gustave Flaubert, whose preference for lice over beggars I cited above. Also fascinated by the 
ignominious was Flaubert’s contemporary Charles Baudelaire, who states: “Dullness is 
frequently an ornament of beauty” (as cited in Wender 2008, p. 72). Both authors are associated 
with the era of the flâneur, or dandy, a modern aesthete who wandered “through city streets that 
offer the fortunate individual the delights of the cityscape and the perhaps even greater pleasures 
of suspended social obligation” (Ferguson 1997, p. 80).  
Jean-Paul Sartre (1948) describes Flaubert’s objectivity as a force of sterile destruction, 
saying: “His sentence… falls into the void, eternally, and drags its prey down into that infinite 
fall. Any reality, once described, is struck off the inventory” (p. 131). Art, in the wake of the 
realism of Flaubert, Baudelaire, and Courbet, is the assertion of the increasingly minimal 
difference between experience and empty fact offered by the context of art. To characterize the 
ironies engendered by criminal justice reform as comically absurd and tragically inevitable, as 
Flaubert and Baudelaire might have, is cruel in a sense (an important sense), but perhaps also 
suggests how drama impels action: for armed citizens, government agents, jury members, and 
activists, the relationship between aesthetics and ethics elicits an intuitive response and a sense 
of purpose. 
Nonetheless, the flâneur resembles nothing so much as the police officer patrolling on 
foot, and their appearance in Paris was fairly synchronous. While this patrol officer would 
frequently rely on a squad car in the twentieth century, the detail-oriented beat cop was famously 
rehabilitated in Kelling and Wilson’s article “Broken Windows,” which, among its many claims, 
cites an odd, avant-garde-esque experiment based on the targeted perpetration and monitoring of 
automobile vandalism by Philip Zimbardo of Stanford Prison Experiment fame, whom I will 
discuss shortly in regard to creative sadism. The anti-vandalism policy to which Kelling and 
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Wilson’s article lent its name was made famous in New York in the 1980s, coincidentally the 
center of the international art world, at that point just beginning to become known for the beauty 
of its graffiti art. Both aesthetic and sadistic, the policy matches up well with the emphasis in 
modern and contemporary art on mundane objects and trivial gestures. 
In modern visual art the appreciation of the mundane arguably began with painters like 
Courbet, to be extended in Duchamp’s readymades, and later in the industrial imitations of Pop 
Art. Just as the 2003 Temporary Services book and exhibition “Prisoners Inventions” focused on 
creative tools made by prisoners using mundane objects, so too did the crowd of southern Illinois 
residents clamoring to keep the Tamms prison open, at the hearings held by the state 
Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability (COGFA) in the town of Ulin, 
Illinois in summer 2012. Tamms family member Carol Wilcox was in attendance, as mentioned 
above, and she recalled the fear she felt at the roar of the throng when a guard held up a 
prisoner’s confiscated shank. The guard triumphantly shouted that, confined in Tamms, its maker 
would never have the chance to use it again. Nervously laughing, she recalled, “I was like, get 
me out of here! Let’s get to the bus!” (personal communication, 2014). COGFA ended up ruling 
against the closure of Tamms.  
A similar appropriation of the prisoner’s meager possessions occurred shortly after the 
closure of Tamms, when former Tamms prisoners organized a hunger strike in which the 
mandated provision of sterilized toenail clippers was a stated demand. Reynolds (2016), while 
never opposing the hunger strike, is unequivocal in her deprecation of the strategy, in which an 
item like the sterilized toenail clippers inevitably appeared in media venues mocking and 
denouncing the prisoners’ demands. In 1979, French former prison doctor Antoine Lazarus 
observed in regard to similar prisoner demands: “What is surprising . . . is that they ask for basic 
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comfort: nourishment, bedclothes. . . . Detainees display, sometimes at the risk of their own 
lives, an enormous need to change things, to be heard, and simultaneously they demand all the 
little things” (as cited in Guenther, 2016, p. 49). Lisa Guenther goes on to say: 
Far from undermining radical decarceration projects, the creaturely politics of prisoner-
led resistance movements affirms the meaning of political subjectivity, not as an abstract 
status that is granted on the decimated ground of animality but rather as an elaboration 
and amplification of (inter)corporeal life. (p. 50) 
Along these lines, Alan Mills, who gives significantly more credit to hunger strikes than 
Reynolds (both, personal communications 2016), was involved in a contraband case at Tamms in 
2001 in which a prisoner who had been smuggling in hacksaw blades via his sister, managed to 
bargain with prison officials to shield her from prosecution and pay off his large debt to the state 
(Rushton 2001). Reynolds has, however, expressed a sense that litigators tend to overemphasize 
the positive effects of overt actions such as these. Subtlety has its advantages in all art forms. 
For her part, law professor Keramet Reiter (2016) gives ample credit to thousands of 
California prisoners who participated in hunger strikes opposing segregated detention in July 
2011, October 2011, and July 2013. These strikes did result in concessions from prison officials 
in regard to more obviously significant issues regarding long-term assignment to solitary 
confinement, but also in regard to more seemingly trivial issues around food and clothing. One 
important concession involving mundane objects was that the settlement imposed a formal 
process on so-called “gang validation,” the punitive administrative attribution of gang affiliation 
based on tattoos or personal possessions, which could add time in prison and/or in segregation 
(p. 197). While more far-reaching than the Illinois hunger strikes, Reiter does acknowledge the 
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ways in which prison officials used the California strikes as opportunities to depict the men as 
desperate and dangerous. These officials employed creative tactics to avoid being forced to meet 
prisoner demands, including shifting prisoners between facilities and, in at least one case, 
releasing a high-profile prisoner directly into general population who was summarily stabbed to 
death, possibly in order to create a media event (p. 201).  
This inscrutability of the object and the bureaucrat manifests in the artist herself. 
Discussing an alignment of the State with “inner legislation,” Žižek (2011) identifies a radical 
potential in displays of apathy he terms “Bartleby politics,” referencing a story by Herman 
Melville in which an assistant hired by a lawyer obstinately refuses to work, to leave the office, 
and eventually even to eat, voluntarily dying of hunger in jail. Such a display Žižek calls a 
“gesture of ‘preferring not to’” that “suspends the subject’s libidinal investment…(here the most 
radical act is to do nothing).”  Many commentators have linked Melville’s narrative to Franz 
Kafka’s story “A Hunger Artist.” Both Melville’s and Kafka’s anonymous (and eventually 
caged) protagonists become an uncanny presence by the end of the story; they begin as social 
beings but end up as autonomous obstacles, persisting obstinately until quietly transitioning to 
death, all the while seeming less and less like conscious intentional beings and more like 
inanimate objects. These can be read as chilling allegories of how an experience of collective 
alienation leads to mental disintegration for people in long-term solitary confinement, but they 
also demonstrate the aesthetic character of the hunger strike, and, in their paralyzed moral 
perfection, provide examples of what Hegel referred to as “the beautiful soul.” 
As the group Our Literal Speed has said, ‘If the twentieth century was defined by the 
Readymade, then perhaps the twenty-first century belongs to the Nevermade.” (Quoted in Cahill 
and Von Zweck, 2014)  While Lippard’s dematerialization recasts the Marxist critique of the 
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commodity fetish and the auratic art object in Walter Benjamin’s landmark essay “Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction” (1948/1978), as well as the spiritualization of freedom struggles, I 
would argue that another example of the “Nevermade” are the laws defining and protecting 
commerce and property--meaning everything we might consider modern or contemporary “art.” 
The art market emphasis from 2012 to 2014 or so on “post-Internet” gallery art underscores not 
just the homogeneity of capitalist material culture, but the possibility of sinister drama dwells in 
even (or in particularly) the most banal artifacts, as when fourteen-year-old Texas high school 
student Ahmed Mohamed made headlines in 2015 for bringing a homemade clock to school. 
Owing to his dark skin and Muslim identity, it was interpreted by school authorities as a bomb, 
with Ahmed being briefly put under arrest, and subsequently gaining widespread notoriety. 
Inverting this drama in April 2017, artist Huong Ngo created an installation of artwork at the 
DePaul University Museum of Art that focused on invisible ink, hidden pockets in drag 
garments, multipurpose kitchen utensils, and other strategic implements utilized by Nguyen Thi 
Minh Khai, a renowned but elusive female Vietnamese revolutionary spy during the era of 
French colonial rule. 
Out-of-place people with out-of-place objects connote hidden networks, recalling the 
physical subterfuge of the Underground Railroad while hinting perhaps at the covert methods of 
terror and torture increasingly prominent in post-9/11 policing and the quotidian items used in 
so-called “improvised explosive devices.” Not only artists, but through its networks of storage 
and shipping the art market itself can reveal strange aspects of the executive persistence of 
unexhibited art objects, material facts and speculative tokens in which viewers are irrelevant 
(Heidenreich 2016). With the enormous volume of investment, and thus theft, forgery, and 
black-market transactions in fine art objects (not to mention what might be termed cultural 
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money laundering), a noteworthy place where art and administration overlap is in the storage, 
shipping, and security apparatus of the art museum. Seeking to expose and interrogate this 
hidden realm, artist Don Celender created a body of conceptualist documentary work in the 
1970s and 1980s based on the administration and infrastructure of galleries and museums, 
including one booklet, Museum Piece (1975), which consisted entirely of images of the loading 
docks at various international museums. In 1978 Celender created the booklet Observations, 
Protestations, and Lamentations of Museum Guards Throughout the World, which documents 
responses to 1,200 surveys, in 12 languages, sent to museum security administrators and filled 
out by security personnel (Public Collectors Study Center 2009). Operating in the realm of realist 
bemusement, however, it’s hard to tell from Celender’s booklet if the questions guards answered 
on art and labor add up to an insight into the relationship of aesthetics and security. 
Žižek states: “The ‘divine’ dimension appears at (the) overlapping of violence and non-
violence.” (pp. 400-401) And so, decontextualization (or “defamiliarization”) still seems key to 
the seemingly divine intervention involved when a common object is placed in a gallery, be it 
Duchamp’s appropriated urinal in 1917, or a pallet of packaged bottled water in 2014, as part of 
an assemblage in Carson Fisk-Vittori’s exhibition at Carrie Secrist Gallery in Chicago (evoking 
Fountain? Water pollution? Waterboarding? Excess packaging? Air travel restrictions on 
liquids?). Ideally such an act remains one of evasion and refusal, not straightforward combat or 
surrender, through using an object to deny the interrogating eyes of the audience any insight into 
intentionality. The fundamental inscrutability of objects is one of Kant’s enduring insights. 
Enclosed in itself, the object is neither free nor unfree. It has no opposite, just as, in Lacanian 




4.6  Aesthetic pleasures of interrogation 
 
For citizens in a democracy, choices of representatives are made with a nod at public 
dialogue, though they ultimately reflect individual desires—which in turn derive from 
impersonal drives formed by group identification. However, for those who are objects rather than 
subjects of government, they regularly face external interrogation, without adequate 
representation, and these interrogations are about intentions rather than desires. “In contrast to 
everyday talk,” Derek Edwards (2008) observes, “police interrogations display a pervasive 
concern with the intentionality of reported actions” (p. 182, emphasis mine).  Edwards describes 
interrogations not in strict opposition to “everyday talk,” but as something of an institutionally 
specialized subgenre of these conversations, in which intentions are brought up reflectively or 
speculatively in order to explain anomalous events.  Keenan and Weizman (2011) argue for a 
“forensic aesthetics,” claiming “there is an arduous labor of truth-construction embodied in the 
notion of forensics, one that is conducted with all sorts of scientific, rhetorical, theatrical, and 
visual mechanisms” (n.p.). Yet there is plenty of evidence that the techniques involved in this 
“arduous” (and artful) labor are quite likely to result in false confessions, coercive plea bargains, 
and unjust convictions.  
According to the nine steps of the Reid technique, the investigator is meant to hammer on 
the suspect’s unquestionable guilt and emphasize the futility of denials in light of the 
damning evidence, while at the same time offering sympathy and potential justifications 
that encourage the person to see confessing as more acceptable. (Benforado, 2015, p. 32) 
It is perhaps unsurprising that this specialized idiom of interrogation and intentionality, an 
exercise rooted in using fiction to elicit information with little truth-value, forms the dramatic 
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basis for justifying the use of force in mysteries, police procedurals, and courtroom dramas from 
the Victorian era to today. But interrogation should not be thought of as necessarily aggressive, 
even if violent. In de Sade’s 120 Days of Sodom, for example, the erotic inquisitions are 
consistently detached, formal, and polite, much like formal legal testimony (Barthes 1971/1976, 
p. 132). Even when crude, it is merely explicit rather than invasive (p. 133). 
More broadly speaking, the search for intention is the stuff of realistic drama, of 
qualitative research, of law, and even of modern art, as parsed by Boris Groys (2012), again 
linking criticality and criminality:   
Modern art transcends or evades even the traditional distinction between art and non-art.  
It thereby escapes the aesthetic laws that previously made it possible to judge an 
individual work.  The wish to escape the judgment of others, however, generally leads 
people to suspect a criminal intent. (p. 51). 
These issues of judgment and intent are summed up as choice, in Albrecht Meylahn’s description 
of Lacan’s ethical Act as “an Act where the subject chooses him/herself as s/he becomes a 
subject and is no longer just the object of the big Other’s desire” (2013, p. 4). Certainly this 
“Act” conforms to the psychoanalytic goal of overcoming trauma through consciously putting 
the unspeakable into words. It also directly opposes a central goal of the use of isolation and 
sensory deprivation, which is to force a prisoner into reliance upon and trust in his interrogator 
(Guenther 2013). 
But do we choose ourselves—or only ourselves?  The “big Other” in Lacan is a figure 
that can refer to God or the State, among other defining entities, but, perhaps especially now 
when such grand narratives have lost much of their force, a proliferation of legal subjects can 
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instigate a mania to constantly interrogate the desires of small-o “others.”  Nietzsche says: 
From time immemorial we have ascribed the value of an action, a character, an existence, 
to the intention, the purpose for the sake of which one has acted or lived; this age-old 
idiosyncracy finally takes a dangerous turn—provided, that is, that the absence of 
intention and purpose in events comes more and more to the forefront of consciousness. 
He asserts that “an action is never caused by a purpose…” (as cited in Klossowski, 1969/1975, 
p. 51, emphasis original).  Albeit hyperbolic, such an ultimatum can throw into relief the 
invasive interpretation involved in an artistic critique, a criminal conviction, or a grade based on 
student effort. Plato, reviled by Nietzsche as a false idol, proposes in his Laws a similar idea. His 
prime interlocutor, a figure called the Stranger, states: “The unjust man is presumably bad, but 
the bad man is involuntarily so… For I agree that everyone does injustice involuntarily” (1967-
1968, 860d-e).  
Yet Plato maintains a place for harsh retributive punishment, based on weighing both the 
illicit pleasure brought about by a crime, and the criminal’s resistance to reform (i.e. amenability 
to pedagogical intervention). Punishment generally is justified as a political necessity, based on 
an assessment of a culprit’s moral character and attitude that Plato’s statement on willful 
wrongdoing would seemingly annul. Thus in the Laws Plato designates solitary confinement, a 
fate worse than execution, for the most impious and unreformed criminal. Of this criminal Plato 
decrees: 
…(L)et him who is guilty of any of these things be condemned by the court to be bound 
according to law in the prison which is in the centre of the land, and let no freeman ever 
approach him, but let him receive the rations of food appointed by the guardians of the 
law from the hands of the public slaves. (909d) 
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The contradiction between these two ideas reflect the conundrum of Plato’s teacher Socrates, 
famously executed for corrupting the youth of Athens; Arthur Shuster (2016) suggests that this 
tension between reason and retribution “may explain both Socrates’ popularity in Athens and his 
eventual condemnation under its laws” (p. 45). 
Two well-known (arguably Socratic) social psychology experiments that could be 
described as meta-sadistic, sadistically causing others to act sadistically for the sake of 
knowledge, are worthy of consideration as avant-garde provocations. The first is Stanley 
Milgram’s infamous obedience experiment, begun at Yale in 1961, designed to see how much 
pain a person would deliberately inflict when following orders. Volunteers who believed they 
were research assistants were told to administer progressively more intense electric shocks to the 
supposed research subjects; in fact, the volunteers were the subjects, there were no electric 
shocks, and the supposed subjects were actors who portrayed anguish through expressions of 
agony. This is perhaps the historical experiment most often cited when explaining the existence 
of academic review boards that oversee experimental ethics. Milgram went on to do several more 
variations on this experiment over the next decade.  
The other notorious anecdote concerns the 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment, in which 
volunteers were randomly assigned to play the roles of prisoners and prison guards. The 
experiment was ended prematurely in response to the cruelty of the students assigned to play 
prison guards. Projecting both empathy and a flair for marketing, Professor Philip G. Zimbardo 
reflectively summarizes the Stanford experiment thusly, on a website promoting a book and two 
films about the experiment: 
 How we went about testing these questions and what we found may astound you. Our 
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planned two-week investigation into the psychology of prison life had to be ended after 
only six days because of what the situation was doing to the college students who 
participated. In only a few days, our guards became sadistic and our prisoners became 
depressed and showed signs of extreme stress. (The Stanford Prison Experiment, 2016) 
This experiment ended just a few weeks before a prison uprising involving the revolutionary 
George Jackson at San Quentin, and another at Attica in New York that was brutally crushed by 
the National Guard. As a result Zimbardo ended up giving testimony to the U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Committee on his findings. The fascination both of these highly theatrical experiments have 
continued to elicit is partially indicative of the insights they apparently provide, but also of the 
pleasure they evoked by such seemingly allegorical vignettes. The public afterlife of these 
experiments resides in the glimpse they offer of cruelty at an analytical distance.  
The creative performances of Milgram and Zimbardo, whose most visible legacy may be 
in the arena of “reality-based” television, are for me most noteworthy for how their enactments 
of intellectual authority overlap and conflict with the content about state authority that they were 
intended to produce and convey. While less widely publicized, the experiences of people in long-
term solitary confinement, particularly but not exclusively of those with a pre-existing mental 
illness, offer far more vivid anecdotes than these social psychology experiments. In 1993, just 
before Judge Thelton Henderson began to hear arguments in the case of Madrid v. Gomez, 
regarding abuse of prisoners in the segregation unit at Pelican Bay State Prison in California, the 
television news show 60 Minutes aired a story on this subject, including the story of a mentally 
ill man who regularly smeared himself and his cell with feces, until he was given a scalding bath, 
scrubbed violently, and subjected to racist denigration by guards. Keramet Reiter (2016) notes 
the extremely high rates of mental illness (pp. 132-4) and suicide (pp. 163-165) in isolation units 
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at Pelican Bay.  
In 2012 the ACLU prison project was representing mentally ill prisoners in the Federal 
supermax prison in Florence, Colorado. A lawsuit brought on behalf of prisoners in solitary at 
the supermax alleged that one inmate  “amputated some of his fingers, a testicle, scrotum and 
earlobes.”  The allegations continued: 
Acts by other prisoner-plaintiffs include: swallowing a razor blade to persuade medical 
staff to amputate his right leg, where he suffered a gunshot wound long ago (he 
succeeded); amputating a finger, adding it to a bowl of ramen noodle soup and eating it; 
and swallowing broken glass (p. 768). 
David C. Fathi, executive director of the ACLU National Prison Project, said in 2004 that “every 
Federal court to consider the question has held that ‘supermax’ confinement of the seriously 
mentally ill is unconstitutional” (Katel 2012, p. 768).  There are still occasional reports, 
including the 2014 PBS Frontline program “Solitary Nation,” that document the prevalence of 
self-cutting and feces-smearing among prisoners in solitary.   
The similarities between such harrowing acts of self-harm and the intentionally lurid acts 
of self-tormenting artists do make for striking comparisons. One example is offered in Daniel 
Joseph Martinez’s 2002 animatronic self-portrait sculpture, entitled To Make a Blind Man 
Murder for the Things He’s Seen (or Happiness is Over-rated), in which the artist’s facsimile 
kneels on the ground in what appears to be a prison jumpsuit, repeatedly slicing at both his wrists 
with razor blades. But there are many more examples. Even overlooking Kafka’s fasting 
performer, Van Gogh’s ill-fated ear, and the Romantic torment of figures such as Beethoven and 
Goya, the artist as recipient of physical torture at least dates to the early days of performance in 
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the 1960s and 1970s, immortalized in early works by Chris Burden and Marina Abramovich and 
extended into spectacle by figures like Bob Flanagan, Ron Athey, Jean-Louis Costes, and G.G. 
Allin. Iraqi artist Wafaa Bilal’s 2007 web-based endurance piece, Domestic Tension (formerly 
titled Shoot An Iraqi), created in response to the killing of his brother at a U.S. checkpoint in 
Iraq, adds an explicit political dimension to this self-torment; for the duration of the month-long 
performance, an online interface allowed anyone to shoot paintballs at Bilal at any time of day.21 
In something of the same extrajudicial spirit as Shoot An Iraqi, Chicago artist Robin Hustle 
enacts on herself the same force-feeding procedure used on prisoners on hunger strike in the 
Guantanamo Bay prison in the 2012 video How It Feels to Force-Feed. 
Mikhail Bakhtin, in his study of Rabelais, hearkens nostalgically all the way back to the 
medieval carnival, which, he claimed, included “’mirthful’ tortures, murders, insults, defamation, 
pelting with excrement, and so on,” prison-like vignettes which Groys (2014) interprets as a 
reference to the show trials of the genocidal Stalin era (p. 186). Bakhtin’s exultation of the 
“carnivalesque” as a model for the “polyphonic” novel is thus also an exaltation, if perhaps a 
bitterly mocking one, of the regime that persecuted him. The pleasure generated by cruel acts, 
recognizing them as violence related to law, is emphatically not meant to implicate TY10 to the 
practices of torture the group was dedicated to exposing and eliminating, nor to place it within a 
genealogy of spectacularly brutal art, but it is relevant to placing the enterprise within a larger 
art-historical context. 																																																								
21 In a moment of retributive administrative art, Bilal (2013) recalls a 2008 experience in which 
his gallery premiere of a suicide-bomber-themed video game, entitled Virtual Jihadi, was shut 
down by the city of Troy, New York, predicated on the width of the gallery’s door frame not 
being up to code. 
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Leaving aside the more recent and emancipatory subcategory of masochistic 
excruciation, the history of brutality in Western art (and entertainment) is of course as long as 
those histories themselves.  "I am convinced we have a degree of delight, and that no small one, 
in the real misfortunes and pains of others," Edmund Burke wrote in 1757; "There is no spectacle 
we so eagerly pursue, as that of some uncommon and grievous calamity" (as cited in Sontag, 
2003, p. 87). Many decades later, Thomas DeQuincey (1839/ n.d.) took a more tongue-in-cheek 
tone in his essay, “Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts,” in which he makes the modest 
proposal, “Murders have their little differences and shades of merit, as well as statues, pictures, 
oratorios, cameos, intaglios, or what not” (p. 1). At one point he refers to a “revolution in the art” 
brought about by a pair of serial killers in 1828 who murdered strangers to sell the cadavers for 
dissection (p. 5). Francesca’s flagellation of Christ, Grunewald’s agonized Passion, Titian’s 
flaying of Marsyas, Gentileschi’s beheading of Holofernes, Holbein’s entombed corpse, and 
Rembrandt’s slaughtered ox, begat Piranesi’s dystopian prison images in the Carceri, Eakins’ 
medical demonstration, and Bacon’s hanging carcasses; the carnage of the Iliad, Shakespeare’s 
gruesome Titus Andronicus, Verstegan’s Theatre des Cruautes, and the brutal spectacles of 
Madame Tussaud’s waxworks and the Grand Guignol have spawned the sinister voyeurism of 
Law and Order: SVU and the bloody implication of torture and terror in 24. In its own way, the 
ideal of aesthetic enforcement continues to this day, with ongoing fetishization of police 
violence--both in popular culture and in the imagery of militarization deployed in actual police 
operations and broadcast through media.  
With roots in Futurism, the role of the artist as tormentor is also central to the history of 
participatory art. 1960s Argentine performance artists exemplify this (Longoni and Mestman, 
2004, Bishop 2012): in what he called “an act of social sadism made explicit” (as cited in 
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Longoni and Mestman, p. 162), Oscar Masotta lined up poorly-dressed individuals to be viewed 
on stage to the accompaniment of a piercing electronic tone (To Induce the Spirit of Image), 
while Rodolfo Elizalde and Emilio Ghilioni started a fight in the street, and Graciela Carnevale 
locked viewers in a gallery (both from the Ciclo de Arte Experimental).  If slightly less 
spectacular, an undercurrent of violent aggression powered the masculine swagger of both 
American Minimalist sculptors22 and Viennese Actionists. Recently, the artists Jordan Wolfson 
and Jon Rafman have followed in the sadistic wake of Jake and Dinos Chapman by making 
gallery artwork that celebrates unadulterated brutality. But cinema may be the medium most 
famously associated with sadism in our era: from Bunuel, Oshima, Romero, Leone, and 
Peckinpaw to Tarantino, Lynch, von Trier, and Haneke.   
The relationship between “edgy” culture and torture is well-established, providing 
spectacles that transmit an emphatic but often opaque or ambiguous political potential. The artist 
Trevor Paglen (2006) describes a CIA facility in Afghanistan known as the “Dark Prison,” in 
which “Eminem’s Slim Shady album and other abrasive music and sounds were blasted twenty-
four hours a day; interrogations were held under strobe lights; and prisoners were strapped to the 
ceiling” (p. 127). But the forms imposed by cruelty can allow new forms to emerge. Suggesting 
an emancipatory dimension to prison, Jan-Louise Lewin (2017) contends that South African 
male sex workers make the prison into a site of performance. Mentioned earlier, the scandalous 
Richard Speck tape, in which a serial murderer with breast implants snorted cocaine and 																																																								
22 The Brooklyn Museum’s April 2014 exhibit of work by social practitioner Ai Wei Wei 
features the artist in “solitary confinement” inside a steel box, reminiscent of Minimalist artist 
Tony Smith’s 1962 six-foot cube Die. Anna Chave (1990) describes how connotations of 
domination and torture haunt work by classic Minimalists like Robert Morris and Richard Serra. 
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performed fellatio in prison, a video that ignited public outrage about leniency toward 
prisoners,23 could fit seamlessly into the scatological tradition that connects Carolee Schneeman, 
Paul McCarthy, Ryan Trecartin, and Santiago Sierra.   
Sierra is a Spanish artist known for paying participants, often members of socially 
marginalized groups, to provocatively debase themselves; he received a prominent mention in 
Claire Bishop’s 2004 salvo in the magazine October in regard to “relational aesthetics,” a term 
for process-oriented public collaborations which has since been replaced by “social practice” and  
“socially-engaged art.” He appears again as a champion of avant-gardism in Pablo Helguera’s 
Education and Socially-Engaged Art (2011), in which Sierra’s ethical provocations trump the 
“’feel-good’ positive social values” of, say, “a children’s mural project” (p. 10). For Bishop 
(2012), Sierra’s conceptual rigor is demonstrated in his transparency. 
Unlike many artists, Sierra is at pains to make the details of each payment part of the 
work’s description, turning the economic context into one of his primary materials (p. 
113). 
Grant Kester (2011), however, compares Sierra to voyeuristic documentary photographers, and 
though he finds Sierra’s moral confrontations compelling, for Kester they ultimately lack 
meaningful agency.  
																																																								
23 The response to the Speck tape has an interesting, somewhat opposed parallel with the 
response to images of U.S. military police torturing detainees at Abu Ghraib, which, as T.J. 
Demos (2013) notes, “circulated between very different interpretive contexts, performing equally 
as sadistic pornography and as documents of human rights abuses” (p. 130). 
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Whether pro or con, these writers don’t fully account for Sierra’s most provocative 
pieces, such as “245 cubic meters” (2006), his simulated gas chamber in an abandoned 
synagogue, or “Los penetrados” (2012), a film and photo series depicting a variety of interracial 
couples engaged in anal sex. While all of his works draw inspiration from early conceptual 
performances like Argentine artist Oscar Bony’s 1968 piece Working-Class Family, a family that 
posed in an art gallery for several hours a day (until the police shut the exhibition down), Sierra’s 
most outrageous works go beyond any sanctimonious accusation and become straightforward 
affirmations of perverse cruelty. For me, the provocateur’s presumed critique of the artist as 
exploiter (not to mention the utilitarian fig leaf of “transparency”) is less important than the 
illustrations he provides of ways in which power creates pleasure, a discussion that bears on 
Reynolds’ dedication to representing stigmatized and scapegoated individuals politically, rather 
than aesthetically. 
 Reynolds’ work on opposing punitive moral panics, particularly the lifetime stigma of the 
sex offender registry, shares subject matter with many aesthetic libertines, including but not 
limited to the Marquis de Sade. In their gleefully provocative parodic responses to the so-called 
“Satanic ritual abuse panic” around pedophilia in the 1980s, American artists Mike Kelley and 
Paul McCarthy each established their own recognizably perverse aura. Kelley has spoken and 
written about the stuffed-animal works he created in the 1980s garnering psychoanalytical 
critiques, which he parlayed into uncanny portrait photos of individual plush toys (Singerman, 
2008). He also created a series of installations, sculptures, and flat pieces that build on the 
fantasies of Satanic rituals projected into children’s testimony in the McMartin Preschool case in 
California, a popular spectacle that lasted form 1987 to 1990. McCarthy referenced this era of 
“day care hysteria” in performances that made use of creepy clowns, such as those 
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sensationalized in the case of the Fells Acre Day Care trial, which occurred in Massachusetts in 
the same era, but also referencing Illinois “killer clown” serial murderer John Wayne Gacy. 
Many differences in tone and content exist between this work and Reynolds’, but a noteworthy 
one is the apparent absence of the scene of law, of courtrooms or prisons, in the responses Kelley 
and McCarthy made to these media-circus trials. 
 Nonetheless, the perversity on which these artists trade is ultimately located with the 
keepers of public order.  The hypocrite that manipulates a child to accuse an adult of grotesque 
abuse is undoubtedly in the grip of a fantasy. These fantasies shape the ways in which police are 
expected to behave, in order to assuage the fears of the social group from which the accusations 
come. The laughable idea that the force unleashed by such a fantasy could have a rational 
component is critiqued by Egon Bittner in these terms: 
In sum, the frequently heard talk about the lawful use of force is practically 
meaningless… Our expectation that policemen will use force, coupled by our refusal to 
state clearly what we mean by it (aside from sanctimonious homilies) smacks of more 
than a bit of perversity. (1970, p. 122) 
The modern philosophical reference point for both perfection and perversity is the writing of 
Immanuel Kant around moral and aesthetic ideals. By proposing that we examine our intuitions 
at a rational distance, Kant introduces the possibility of clinically detached yet subjective notions 
of beauty and justice, thus allowing the subterfuge of these ideals in the fantasies of de Sade 
(Lacan, 1990), as well as the experiments of Zimbardo and Milgram. 
Much legal violence takes place in the nebulous zone between the letter of the law and 
the imperatives of administration and enforcement. Voter I.D. laws, “stop and frisk” policing, 
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and judgments concerning Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law are recent examples of race-based 
legislation, enforcement, and adjudication in our so-called “post-racial” society. Expanding on 
the legal fiction of the “reasonable officer” introduced by the unanimous opinion in the 1989 
Supreme Court case Graham v. Connor, under which many acts of police violence have been 
justified, including the 1992 beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles, Jody Armour (1994) 
coined the notion of the “reasonable racist.” This concept was deployed in a lecture by legal 
scholar Lisa Cacho in describing how the defense team successfully justified Neighborhood 
Watch volunteer George Zimmerman’s fatal shooting of unarmed teenager Trayvon Martin in 
2012 under “Stand Your Ground.” “(W)hether or not Zimmerman’s assumptions were right,” she 
said, “his actions would be considered justifiable if he could prove that he believed his 
assumptions” (personal communication, April 21, 2014). The 1989 finding of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Graham v. Connor on the question of “reasonable” police violence sets forth just such 
an ill-defined standard of “subjective objectivity” (Alpert and Smith 1994, p. 486), and similar 
logic guided the FBI’s finding that Cleveland police officer Timothy Loehmann was justified in 
his fatal shooting of 12-year-old Tamir Rice, armed with a toy gun (Peralta, 2015). Through a 
strong emphasis on environmental influences, Laurie Jo Reynolds and the Tamms Year Ten 
project oppose this absolute Kantian fidelity to intent. 
Kant’s philosophy links force, order, and aesthetics through the striving toward 
perfection, the ideal moral symmetry of punishment, and the ambiguity of the sublime. The 
sublime is the aesthetic impulse most intimately associated with tragedy, fear, and awe. He 
describes the experience of the sublime as  
a pleasure that arises only indirectly; viz., it is produced by a momentary restriction of the 
vital powers, followed by an even stronger outflow of them; it seems to be an emotional 
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state of being stirred, which the imagination takes seriously, rather than as play. 
(1790/1974, p. 245) 
This initial constriction is a response of horror, which is then resolved with reference to the 
universal (Makkreel 1990, p. 96). Jean-Paul Brodeur (2010) similarly describes Bittner’s analysis 
of policing as the constriction of minimal necessary force, opposed by the public demand for an 
immediate and absolute annihilation of criminality (p. 116). The aforementioned attribution of 
“police” as a source of “form, ornament, and splendor” in a public space relates perhaps to the 
sublime aesthetic transformation in which a chaotic multiplicity is unified into a “manifold” 
(Makkreel 1990, p. 77). This contradictory condition is echoed in the figure of the guilty 
criminal, whom Kant acknowledges will seek to avoid punishment, but who simultaneously on a 
deeper level desires punishment, since he shares a universal moral sensibility and desires to be 
considered a human worthy of respect (1797/1964, p. 108).  
Excessive compassion and rational mercy are both dismissed as immoral by Kant. 
Following this idea, Charles Baudelaire denounced compassion as cowardice in his criticism of 
Victor Hugo’s opposition to the death penalty. For Baudelaire, insistence on the sanctity of life 
“clings to animal existence and abandons the human” (Butler, 2014, p. 32), seemingly 
foreshadowing Agamben’s notion of “bare life.” Prefiguring Baudelaire’s defense of the death 
penalty, Kant looked upon the denial of punishment as a denial of humanity, and the denial of 
base pleasure as a more ultimately pleasurable experience of overcoming. A rigorous self-denial 
was practiced as a form of psychological training by Black Panther Albert Woodfox, who spent 
over 40 years in solitary confinement—more than any other prisoner in U.S. history (Aviv, 
2017), but who was of course given no choice in regard to his punishment.  
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Kant postulates what amounts to an absolutism of the individual’s freedom, innate 
understanding, and detached perception, as regards both aesthetic beauty and moral perfection. 
His rational claims to designate that which he claims to be self-evident offer no end of solipsistic 
tautological confusion.  Along with the reference to the “unconditional demand,” Žižek (1998) 
says, in regard to Kant:  
(T)he concrete formulation of a determinate ethical obligation has the structure of 
aesthetic judgement, i.e. of a judgment by which, instead of simply applying a universal 
category to a particular object or of subsuming this object under an already given 
universal determination, I as it were invent its universal-necessary-obligatory 
dimension… (para. 19, emphasis mine). 
Pierre Klossowski (1947/1991), prefiguring Jacques Lacan’s comparison of Kant’s “moral 
imperative” to the cruelty of the Marquis de Sade, says of Sade: 
Conceiving the perverse act as obedience to a moral imperative, an idea, he constructs a 
new conception of perverse sensibility on the basis of this idea (p. 18). 
However, apropos of Lacan’s “Kant with Sade” article (1990), Žižek characterizes Sade as the 
“symptom” rather than the “truth” of Kant: sadism for Žižek is not an affirmation of Kant’s 
extremism, but a deformation of the pure autonomy inherent in Kantian ideas about personal 
responsibility. “Sade is the symptom of how Kant betrayed the truth of his own discovery,” says 
Žižek (2006, p. 94). Similarly, Klossowski (1969/1997) cites Nietzsche comparing Kant to “the 
fox who returns to his cage after having broken out of it” (p. 7, emphasis original). 
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Friedrich Nietzsche claims that Kant’s moral categorical imperative “reeks of cruelty” (as 
cited in Butler 2014, p. 31), but Žižek (1998) insists that “this (sadism) is what Kantian ethics 
prohibits.” (para. 25).  Žižek challenges such characterizations of Kant as “the proverbial teacher 
who tortures pupils with impossible tasks and secretly savors their failings(,)” but who makes the 
excuse, “’ I myself find it hard to exert such pressure on the poor kids, but what can I do-it's my 
duty!’” (para. 18). Elsewhere, however, Žižek contends that sadistic detachment fulfills Kant’s 
description of a purely ethical act (1994, p. 27). Regardless, the executioner’s aura of selfless 
sadism haunts the teacher much as it does the police officer and the jingoistic or budget-cutting 
legislator, not to mention the figure of the internal judge that appears throughout Kant’s writings 
in the form of the reproachful conscience (Shuster, 2016, p. 109). Indeed, the internal 
disciplinarian motif is woven into the administrative fabric of modern schooling much as it is in 
modern jurisprudence, in the former case perhaps most visibly in the public shaming doled out to 
public schools and their teachers, along with the rise of police presence and hyper-punishment in 
schools serving low-income minority populations.  
This is where the example of police as the model bureaucrat, the exemplar of all other 
members of an administrative apparatus, becomes clear. Max Weber’s ideal of an administrative 
bureaucracy based on rules and roles, offering a dispersed and anonymous authority 
(1922/2012), matches up well with the clear behavioral regimentation of Sade’s libertine retreat 
(Barthes 1971/1976, p. 27), and both of these dovetail into Kant’s idea of duty, explicated by 
Lacan as a form of profound enjoyment, or jouissance. Prioritizing loyalty to an organization 
over personal extra-institutional responsibility is not unique to the police, and could be seen as 
extending to the pure autonomous self-referentiality of fine art, described in rather sublime terms 
in 1953 by painter Ad Reinhardt. 
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Fine art can only be defined as exclusive, negative, absolute, and timeless. It is not 
practical. useful, related, applicable, or subservient to anything else. Fine art has its own 
thought, its own history and tradition, its own reason, its own discipline. It has its own 
“integrity” and not someone else's “integration” with something else.  
In this essay Reinhardt famously dismisses art that in any way refers to a reality outside itself, 
saying: “Art is art; life is life.” The pleasures of aesthetics are made absolute in this executive 
vision of the artist as a role and not an individual caught up in relationships, or even in a body, as 
when he says, “The eye is a menace to clear sight.” The rules do not merely protect pleasure 
from irrelevant dilution, but, through obedience to their arbitrary dictates and divisions, produce 
pleasure through denying desire. 
The issue comes down to the nature of the detachment Kant requires of ethical and 
aesthetic considerations; indeed, all desire to Kant is “pathological” (Žižek  2012, p. 706).  
Returning to the artist, Žižek  says: 
The exemplary case of the "pathological," contingent element elevated to the status of an 
unconditional demand is, of course, an artist absolutely identified with his artistic 
mission, pursuing it freely without any guilt, as an inner constraint, unable to survive 
without it (1998, para. 10). 
In the modern era, then, both beauty and virtue are symptoms, if not necessarily of the same 
affliction.  Nonetheless, the recognition and affirmation of desire are, for psychoanalysts, the 
cure for both. The “fidelity to the truth of one’s desire” that Lacan advocates (Žižek, 2006, p. 
94), just as with the aesthetic and the moral “truth” that are for Kant superior to desire, 
underscores a point I would make about the temptations of autonomy: namely that, in the modern 
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era, desire is understood as truth.24  For literary critic Northrop Frye (1957), desire was not 
merely an individual but a communal destiny:  
Civilization is not merely an imitation of nature, and it is impelled by the force that we 
have just called desire… (Desire) is neither limited to nor satisfied by objects, but is the 
energy that leads human society to develop its own form (p. 73).   
A provocation offers a value, seemingly at the expense of moral evaluation or even traditional 
aesthetics (cf. Duchamp’s quite ordinary urinal), that confers upon the action an aura of ineffable 
truth implicit in every fascinated, repulsed, or infuriated response to Ad Reinhardt’s black 
canvasses or Damien Hirst’s carcass vitrines.  Kant, Žižek says, wants the consequences of 
immorality to dissuade desire; however, Žižek also reminds us that Lacan acknowledges the 
intuitive truism, known to Sade as to any teacher, parent, or babysitter, that the perceived 
immorality of an act, the sense of violating the Law and one’s duty, spurs the act’s desirability, 
and thus its pleasure. In the visual arts of the 20th century as never before, pleasure came to be 
associated with austerity and abjection, repression and repulsion. While this doesn’t describe the 																																																								
24 Groys (2012) attributes the 20th-century lionization of desire in French philosophy less to 
Freud and more to the Russian-born Parisian philosopher Alexandre Kojeve, whose lectures to 
the Surrealist circle were attended by Jacques Lacan, Georges Bataille, and other luminaries (p. 
157).  Groys calls Kojeve “the Duchamp of philosophy” for presenting himself not as an 
interpreter and critic, but merely a reproducer of Hegel’s philosophy for the Paris of his day (p. 
100).  Kojeve went on to a distinguished career as a chief planner of the European Common 
Market, presenting us with a biographical overlap of desire both as economic and psychological 
truth, expressed through law and philosophy respectively. 
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work of Laurie Jo Reynolds in any particular sense, it does help to delineate the context against 
which her work is defined. 
 
4.7  The positive veto 
 
The victory of Tamms Year Ten depended upon Illinois governor Pat Quinn, and the top 
administrators who oversaw the prisons. In general, these were officials whom Reynolds 
believed could overcome the organized resistance of the guards’ union, and the many voters and 
representatives they could mobilize. When Quinn came into office in January 2008, after the 
sensational arrest of Governor Rod Blagojevich for attempting to sell Barack Obama’s vacant 
Senate seat appointment, the new governor brought his chief of staff Jerry Stirmer, who was 
open to listening to the stories of institutionalized people and their families. In May, as 
mentioned above, Quinn appointed Michael Randle as his Director of Public Safety. Randle’s 
proposed prison reforms, based in part on legislation TY10 proposed, provided a blueprint for 
what advocates such as TY10 and the Uptown People’s Law Center would pursue over the next 
few years. The end of the primary TY10 struggle came with Quinn’s veto, which cut off funding 
for four Illinois prisons, including Tamms. This veto should be understood as a positive assertion 
of prerogative, as opposed to reductive legislative consensus or negative judicial censure. 
TY10 issued a “report card” on prison reform to the State House budget appropriation 
committee in 2011. State Representative Luis Arroyo continued to vocally combat Tamms 
funding in 2012, now as chair of the Appropriations Committee.  Undoubtedly influenced by 
Arroyo, but in a move that both Reynolds and MacFarlane characterize as heroic and selfless, 
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and as promised in his budget speech, Quinn erased Tamms and three other Illinois prisons from 
the budget that February with a line-item veto. TY10 made a point of repeatedly thanking him 
for this, sometimes with lavish bouquets of flowers. “Sometimes when you’re doing something 
really tough, like Governor Quinn was,” Reynolds said, “and everyone hates you and everyone’s 
yelling at you, (hearing from) the few people that are like ‘you’re doing it for me, thank you,’ 
that can give you the strength to keep doing it” (personal communication, April 20, 2014a). 
Tamms Year Ten eventually got over a thousand people to send thank-you notes to the governor. 
Opposition was fierce. While Quinn’s office lobbied hard to sustain the veto, AFSCME 
steadily campaigned for a veto override that would keep the prisons open. Their efforts included 
a proposal to reclassify Tamms as a maximum-security prison, a transition that would require 
significant new construction, and thus cost the cash-strapped department millions of dollars. 
Through the efforts of State Representative Barbara Flynn Currie, this became a bill to reduce 
Tamms to medium-security, but with a clause in the bill to make the action discretionary (and 
thus toothless). Despite the fact that one of the prisons slated for closure was empty, with its 
guards being shipped to another site every day during their shift, funding for all four prisons was 
re-entered into the budget. This was accomplished via the influence of no less a power broker 
than Michael Madigan, veteran Speaker of the Illinois House, without unified opposition from 
the Illinois House Black Caucus or other traditional allies of prison reform. This frustrated Luis 
Arroyo, who had made a public promise to around forty Tamms mothers and supporters that the 
prison would not reopen.  
Finally the Senate voted to override Quinn’s veto. Shortly before the House took their 
second override vote, TY10 took a page from Representative Arroyo’s playbook by sharing a 
story about overstaffing at Tamms with George Pawlaczyk, a friendly downstate reporter in 
		
232	
Belleville. Investigating a lead provided by a prisoner, it turned out that a prison with around 100 
inmates had not only 16 food supervisors, but also over two guards per inmate and two GED 
instructors, with employee salaries averaging over $70,000. The story made it into the Capitol 
Fax, which threatened Republican support for the veto override. Madigan never called the vote, 
and so the veto went unchallenged.  
In the end, the governor has the power to open and close prisons, while the legislature 
merely appropriates funding, and so Quinn went ahead with prisoner transfers through the end of 
2012, until the prison was empty. While budget concerns were cited as the major factor, the 
closure of Tamms in January 2013 was indeed Quinn’s decision, in the face of significant 
opposition from downstate legislators and AFSCME. Reynolds has repeatedly emphasized that 
she would have been neither angry nor surprised if Quinn had caved in on Tamms, in order to get 
union support on another of his political goals, such as pension reform. He was “trashed in the 
press,” Reynolds recalled, to the point of being “booed at the state fair.” “The union fights 
anything that can be perceived as pro-inmate,” Reynolds told me. She said that AFSCME leaked 
confidential information to the press about prisoner swaps across state lines involving Tamms 
inmates, including prisoner names, in the effort to provoke fears of threats to prisoner security 
and insist on the necessity of Tamms as a “safety valve.” Only three of the swaps actually went 
through, and the state police was sent in to investigate the leak, with no result. In any event, 
unions were a major source of Quinn’s support, which underscores for both Reynolds and 
MacFarlane the bravery of the decision to shutter Tamms.   
They also praise the courage of IDOC Director Salvador A. Godinez, who proposed 
closing Tamms in 2011 in the face of fierce opposition from within his department. “He had to 
defend this to his whole workforce,” Reynolds said, “to the people who run his prisons, to the 
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guards who love Tamms” (personal communication, 2014). “Really, the Department (of 
Corrections) is in a very unenviable position right now because anything they do to make 
prisoners’ lives better, the union runs crying to the press… but if they don’t do it, then the… 
advocates out there, like the people supporting the hunger strikes and everything, they attack the 
governor, they attack Director Godinez.” Here she stakes out a position that could be seen as 
both between and apart from the most vocal partisans in the debate over solitary. 
Reynolds spoke of Godinez’s stalwart loyalty, describing a meeting with him to which 
she invited no legislators, only bringing in two released former gang chiefs, one of whom 
Godinez knew from his days as an administrator at the Stateville prison. The guards’ union was 
very active in persecuting Godinez through the media, passing on anti-reform stories to many 
outlets in downstate Illinois. “Downstate legislators, all of them… they’re constantly calling for 
Godinez to be fired.  There’s actually a state resolution right now calling for him to be fired. And 
he wasn’t confirmed for two years in a row because they knew it was too political,” she said, “so 
they ended up confirming him this year… they had a confirmation hearing up near Chicago 
where the Senators couldn’t go to it” (2014a). As seen in the moms’ march on AFSCME 
headquarters in 2012, family members had come to play an even larger role in the organization 
than the released prisoners, in terms both of sharing information and volunteering, as well as 
helping one another. Along with pursuing grievances from these family members on behalf of 
individual Tamms prisoners, Reynolds, with other TY10 members, kept working on educating 
Democrats on issues of prison conditions, praising Quinn for his decision to close Tamms, and 
pushing legislators to keep Tamms out of the budget.   
Through executive action, legislative art became legal reality. In January 2013, Tamms 
closed, and has stayed closed. Quinn’s steadfastness in following through on his pledge, 
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especially given the heat he took from unions from cuts he was making to state pensions, still 
amazes Reynolds, especially given that Rod Blagojevich, his predecessor, at one point went back 
on a promise to close the Pontiac prison in order to gain other political concessions. Reynolds’ 
creative autonomy ultimately required the backing of a figure who had the option of avoiding 
compromise. And so she went on in 2014 to take a position in his unsuccessful re-election 
campaign. She says she regrets nothing (personal communication, 2016), and sees it as a 
necessary extension of the Tamms Year Ten campaign, in which the celebration of dedicated 
allies is of equal importance to the overcoming of enemy resistance.  
But Reynolds does admit that there was a degree to which, during the Tamms campaign, 
she always had to give Quinn the impression that the campaign was bigger than it actually was. 
In forming alliances just as in confronting enemies, a degree of bluffing is crucial. Along these 
lines, Joseba Zulaika (2016) notes that “military strategy is notorious for the use of bluff and 
stratagem.” He continues:  
 An army ready to strike means real combat, while an underground terrorist group’s threat 
of violence, you never know with certainty if it is for real until it happens. Still, threats 
are terrorist incidents, since intentionality is in itself a criterion for terrorism(.) (p. 45) 
This is obviously not to characterize the social justice achievements of TY10 either as bluff or 
terrorism, but to comment upon a tactical element of the project that is both artistic and political, 
while Zulaika’s quote underscores the crucial legal force of intentionality. Reynolds’ untold 
hours of re-election campaigning on Quinn’s behalf represents an extension of TY10’s public 
acts of gratitude, but her unwavering strategic focus is key to understanding her aesthetic 
intentions. Although ideas of citizenship often seem to have been eclipsed by privatization, 
especially in the reliably formal and jaded art mainstream, it may yet be possible to look past the 
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visual object market and recognize Tamms Year Ten’s undeniable political victory—at least 


















Chapter 5: Conclusion- the fourth estate 
 
 
5.1  Campaign as brand 
 
An idea to gather information from men at Tamms was put forward at a 2007 meeting by 
Jean Snyder and Locke Bowman, attorneys with the MacArthur Justice Center who were 
representing men at Tamms, and also working with Tamms family members through the Tamms 
Committee. Reynolds offered to take on this task, and was put in charge of the surveys. Attorney 
Alan Mills, who was also working on a class-action suit representing men at Tamms, was not at 
this meting, and Reynolds recalls that when he responded angrily to the surveys being distributed 
without his oversight, she was blamed. Mills’ contention is that the surveys implied that 
responses would be protected by attorney-client privilege. Reynolds has noted that the 
information gathered in these surveys turned out to be crucial to the lobbying campaign, in that it 
allowed the activists who became Tamms Year Ten to not have to rely on lawyers or on 
litigation. 
Despite the concerns Mills raised about the surveys at the time, and in talking to me, 
Reynolds said no men she worked with over years of organizing reported any such concerns-- 
despite the fact that, as she put it affectionately, “they complain about everything” (personal 
communication, 2016). Mills acknowledged that the content of the surveys provided an 
extremely useful foundation for the Poetry Committee to begin their lobbying work, and he 
doesn’t claim that there were any negative repercussions. But while Reynolds would later invite 
Mills to meetings with IDOC, and she still works with Snyder and Bowman, there had been a 
		
237	
decisive split between Mills and some leaders in the Tamms Committee early on, and the efforts, 
priorities, and viewpoints of TY10 and the Uptown People’s Law Center, which Mills directs, 
gradually diverged. 
This incident points up the imperfect compatibility between litigation and lobbying, and 
thus judicial and legislative aesthetic registers. Of course many groups both lobby and litigate, 
with the ACLU as a salient example, but the contradictions apply within as well as between 
organizations. The UPLC is a nonprofit, which thus has a focus on fundraising. Its messaging by 
necessity appeals to principles, as can be seen in their robust social media presence and 
(occasionally hyperbolic) mass emails. But it can be seen also in public actions, as when Brian 
Nelson, a former Tamms prisoner who works with UPLC protested outside the 2016 annual 
luncheon of the prison watchdog John Howard Association, claiming that the Society’s 
disinclination to endorse the anti-solitary bill authored by the UPLC and introduced by State 
Representative La Shawn Ford, had effectively killed the bill.  
However, Reynolds and others, including the John Howard Association, perceived the 
bill as highly unlikely to make any progress, owing to the way in which it was written. Poorly 
written legislation, and bad press generated by prison reform activism are often upsetting and 
alienating for legislative allies of reform, Reynolds explains. She suggests, however, that such 
setbacks tend to be de-emphasized by those who are wedded to the confrontational, pedagogical 
tactics of public interest litigation. Such an outspoken approach may align with the rhetoric of an 
election or a fundraising campaign, but are less congruent with the long-term coalition-building 
and horse-trading involved in creating law, a patient process that in some ways looks like the 
enigmatic process of developing multifaceted and compelling artwork.  
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While Reynolds has had disputes with litigator allies, and TY10 received extensive 
assistance from high executive officials, the bulk of their opposition has been the legislative and 
media opposition TY10 faced from AFSCME. Indeed, the prison guards’ union was the 
organization’s most bitter foe, opposing any measures that sought to curtail restriction and 
punishment of prisoners. While they found a common enemy at one point in protesting against a 
private health care contractor that racked up numerous medical neglect claims from Illinois 
prisoners, TY10 has had no success with its overtures toward collaboration with AFSCME over 
the years, though Reynolds once mentioned that she had some hope that the national union 
leadership’s “End Mass Incarceration” campaign might offer inroads against the recalcitrant state 
union (personal communication, 2014).  
During the 2012 legislative session, after longtime Illinois House Majority Leader Mike 
Madigan inserted Tamms back into the budget, following Quinn’s veto, Reynolds was 
approached by representatives of AFSCME, who sought a compromise in which Tamms would 
be reclassified as a lower-security facility, with more lenient treatment of inmates. Reynolds 
refused, citing the absence of common spaces at the prison—no cafeteria, chapel, school, gym, 
visiting area, day room, or vocational area—and she refused to support any further construction 
that would add such facilities. And, at bottom, she doesn’t trust the union. Reynolds maintains 
that AFSCME actively spied on its opposition, including TY10, and deployed a press strategy 
which focused on violence and scapegoating. In an incident that instructively illustrates 
correctional politics, California prison guards were convicted in 2003 of instigating a brief riot in 
the yard at Pelican Bay in 1993 in order to influence the Federal judge who was visiting the 
prison weeks before the beginning of Madrid v. Gomez, a landmark lawsuit addressing practices 
of solitary confinement (Reiter, 2016, p. 133). 
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As mentioned earlier, TY10 had a PR coup during the 2012 legislative session, when 
downstate reporters broke news about overstaffing at Tamms, but failures were also numerous, 
particularly in southern Illinois media markets in which prisons form a significant element of the 
economy. Back in 2000, not long after the formation of the Tamms Committee, a prison hunger 
strike that resulted in negative coverage was credited by Mills (2013) as having an important 
positive impact on the movement to close Tamms, while Reynolds sees the press backlash as 
evidence of its ineffectiveness. And, as mentioned earlier, opponents of solitary confinement 
received a blow five weeks after the closure of Tamms, when media outlets mocked a hunger 
strike in which prisoner demands included access to cable television and sterilized toenail 
clippers. In another media victory for AFSCME after the Tamms closure, several outlets reported 
that prison violence had increased, contradicting the findings put out by IDOC. As with the 
prisoner’s shank brandished by the pro-Tamms speaker, mentioned in Carol Wilcox’s anecdote 
from the rally at the 2012 COGFA hearings, material objects and physical danger, diametrically 
opposed to the lofty ideals put forward by the Uptown People’s Law Center, provided substance 
to the retributive vitriol put into the press by AFSCME. 
The gallery work produced in the Tamms campaign, as well as in Reynolds’ work around 
sex offenders, should not be understood as an end result, but as one part of an overall media 
strategy to change the law. Media literacy is a central element of Reynolds’ work, with the goal 
of this focus being to encourage wariness of the kind of sensationalist scapegoating that drives 
negative press and punitive legislation, but about which litigators and other activists may have 
little expertise or sensitivity. In September 2010, hopes for reform that began to be kindled by 
Quinn’s appointment of Michael Randle just over a year earlier to the post of Director of Public 
Safety were dashed, much as the 1988 U.S. presidential campaign of Michael Dukakis had been, 
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by reports of a crime committed by a man who had been released early from prison. John Maki, 
who took over the John Howard Association early in Quinn’s first term, fought to counteract the 
press attacks on Randle. Reynolds has continued to work closely with Maki, whom she believes 
helped to make the Department of Corrections more publicly accountable than it may have ever 
been.  
Reynolds began working with media consultants early on in the Tamms campaign, when 
she got a MacArthur Foundation grant to hire a PR firm that later would offer the group free 
workshops on dealing with the press. Two memorable lessons were to lay low, and avoid 
gloating. As highlighted in Reynolds’s parable of the well, and in Benjamin’s “mythic violence,” 
dramatic stories are crucial in creating new legal possibilities.25 The Chicago Reader ran an in-
depth cover story on Tamms in 2007, which was the first public outlet to break the story of 
inhumane conditions at the prison. In 2009 the New Yorker ran a piece on the consideration of 
solitary confinement as torture. Human Rights Watch supported the torture designation, as did 
Amnesty International in the U.K., but the U.S. branch did not immediately join them, and the 
ACLU was very late in opposing solitary confinement as an abridgement of human rights.  In his 
coverage, starting in 2010, Robert Wildeboer at Chicago’s public radio station WBEZ examined 
the enormous expense as well as the conditions at the prison.   
A week before the 2012 downstate COGFA hearings regarding the fate of Tamms, 
Governor Quinn’s press staff helped prepare Reynolds for a televised press conference, giving 																																																								
25  An intriguing study of competing stories with regard to the fates of prisoners is Sara Cobb’s 
2010 study in Narrative Inquiry on the different ways defense and prosecuting attorneys 
construct narratives in capital sentencing hearings, “Stabilizing violence: structural complexity 
and moral transparency in penalty phase narratives.”  
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her a list of tough questions and rehearsing with her. Reynolds also maintained a good 
relationship with IDOC press specialist Tom Scher throughout the TY10 effort. Messaging was 
again a major theme in a conference she organized in November 2016 around sex offender 
registries, with a panel presentation and a morning workshop given over to the Opportunity 
Agenda, a group that works with social justice projects to develop a “values-first” media profile. 
It was at this conference that I learned that John Maki would be heading a state legislative 
advisory commission investigating risk assessment practices and the outcomes of criminal 
registries. Along with this task force, an anti-registry campaign was being formed that included 
the ongoing work of a public interest law project, Illinois Voices, and the building of a broad-
based lobbying movement that would include victims representatives, law enforcement, 
probation officers, prosecutors, and academics.  
As part of this campaign, Reynolds plans to focus on the press, creating a story bank and 
pitching articles to various outlets. She has mentioned many times that, particularly in campaigns 
against punitive persecution of sex offenders, the prime enemy is mailers sent out to voters, in 
which support of such retaliatory measures is presented as virtuous, and opposition a capitulation 
to utter depravity—a phenomenon she credits for the success of legislative measures that 
stigmatize sex offenders. Her mission could be seen as, through a variety of approaches in a 








5.2  Order and entropy 
 
 Describing an early optical illusion created by Renaissance architect Filippo Brunelleschi 
that makes use of a mirror and a painting with one-point perspective, Thomas Brockelman 
(2011) writes: “Cutting the viewing hole in the painting precisely at the vanishing point collapses 
two representational functions, but in each of these, the effect of the pinhole and the mirror is to 
underscore the ‘subjective’ nature of pictorial representation” (p. 96). This seems to be an 
example of what Lacan means when he says: “That in which the consciousness may turn back 
upon itself… as seeing oneself seeing oneself—represents mere sleight of hand” (1977, p. 74, 
emphasis original). And this fabricated subjectivity, both excluded from and projected into the 
image, is hardly a solitary hallucination. Order in an image, a classroom, a city, or an institution 
is never simply a matter of clarifying a blurry, inchoate situation. Rather, it relies on controlling 
the frame, the boundaries of order and disorder—the point of view from which harmony 
dominates (and dominance harmonizes)—relative to an individual who is included in the image 
of order she perceives.  
This order can begin to be understood as an illusion, like the viewing apparatus 
Brockelman describes, or, in Lacanian terms, imposing the Imaginary on the Real. Hegel states 
in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807/1967) that attaining truth entails a chaotic condition of 
disorder, a “bacchanalian revel” of inebriation (p. 105). Georges Bataille, who also extolled the 
liberatory ethics of drunkenness, pronounced that “the universe resembles nothing and is only 
formless, like a spider or spit” (1929/1985, p. 31). While scientific laws of nature may be 
immutable, their ultimate derivation, even if they date to the Big Bang, may be arbitrary and 
contingent, a confluence of arbitrary factors. Order is a situated perception of a temporary state, 
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which is why the ultimate question an aesthetic theory needs to answer is one of critical 
judgment or pedagogy: “what is pleasurable to perceive?” But the political role of “the media”-- 
in the sense of journalism and popular culture, as well as in the sense of the inert materials to 
which the artist, in Schiller’s words, “does violence”-- is something that should not be 
overlooked in trying to understand the success or failure of an artist, just as it should be essential 
to tracing the success of a legislative campaign. In comparing art and law in a capitalist republic, 
stark differences exist in audiences and consequences, but marketing and distribution are vital to 
success. The link between art and politics is perhaps summed up in the idea of packaging, of 
design. And, in the case of prisons, absence and invisibility turn out to be useful as well. 
As in Foucault’s analysis of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, a centralized prison design 
that allows efficient surveillance, form and function can both be seen as responsible for 
projecting order into the consciousness of everyone in the space. But through isolation of 
individuals and the internalization of surveillance, centralization has evolved into dispersion. 
Foucault himself remarks that, in nineteenth-century housing estates for French workers, control 
was enacted through isolation, ‘by localizing families (one to a house) and individuals (one to a 
room).’  He continues: 
The layout, the fact that individuals were made visible, and the normalization of behavior  
meant that a sort of spontaneous policing or control was carried out by the spatial layout 
of the town itself. 
And this sense of being visible, on which this “spontaneous policing” relied, came to rely in 
other settings upon a pure and unadorned background. This blankness also simultaneously 
conveyed utilitarian simplicity, industrial efficiency, ethical clarity, and scientific objectivity. 
Built in Vienna in 1890 under the direction of the eminent psychologist Richard von 
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Krafft-Ebing (an influential theorist on masochism), the design of the Purkersdorf Sanitorium 
expressed spatial separation, medical specialization, and clean, gridded rationality. Leslie Topp 
(2004) emphasizes that the design thus implies a visual depiction of truth, which then acquires a 
moral aspect; this would become institutionalized in the bare white walls of the modern art 
gallery, which Alex Kitnick (2016), describing an installation by artist Matthew Barney, 
characterizes as a padded cell (p. 254). The Austrian and Czech modernist Adolf Loos is 
remembered for, among other accomplishments, the essay “Ornament and Crime,” in which, as 
the title suggests, Loos identifies adornment as a sign of immorality, barbarism, and decadence. 
Topp notes that an important influence on early Austrian modernism was the British art critic 
John Ruskin, who felt that excessive embellishment “is as truly deserving of reprobation as any 
other moral delinquency” (p. 18).  
Ruskin’s sentiments on moral and aesthetic purity were contemporary with the 
development of Victorian prison designs, which contrasted sharply with the era’s fondness for 
filigree. As the internal space became more subdivided, the prison exterior began to convey a 
look of functional austerity, decades before the style would become fashionable in modernist 
architecture. Yvonne Jewkes and Helen Johnston cite Britan’s Pentonville Prison, which opened 
in 1842, as ‘one of the most advanced buildings of the time’ and ‘a blueprint for the building and 
renovation of prisons.’ Pentonville featured a blank façade, a panopticon plan, and 520 solitary 
cells. The authors describe the increasing remoteness of penal locations in the United Kingdom, 
and also report that recent facilities are starting to look more dispersed and residential, like the 
housing estates Foucault describes.   
The initiation of a long-term full-scale lockdown began at the Federal prison in Marion, 
Illinois in 1983, but the nation’s first architecturally-planned supermax opened in 1986 in 
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Arizona: the Special Management Unit 1, or SMU 1. Based on the SMU 1, the Pelican Bay State 
Prison opened in remote Del Norte County, California in 1989 as America’s first state supermax 
prison, and boasted a modern, compact, highly utilitarian design. The architectural firm that 
designed it, Arrington Watkins, also designed the SMU 1; the firm’s website still boasts of its 
“design innovations,” including “windowless cells with skylighted dayrooms” (Reiter, 2016, p. 
106). As with the “global cities” that set the stage for modernity, architecture defines the 
possibilities of a contained human world (Therborn, 2017). Not only was Pelican Bay located in 
a remote area and planned to allow small, stand-alone pods, with infrastructure that allowed for 
maximum visibility of inmates and minimum contact between inmates and staff, the process of 
its political origin echoed this harsh elegance.  
While populist tough-on-crime grandstanding by the governor, two successful pro-
incarceration voter referenda, and legislative determinate sentencing mandates created the 
conditions for its existence, and complaints over a series of brutal and deadly incidents of 
prisoner abuse led to judicial oversight early on, the design and financing of Pelican Bay were 
delegated to corrections officials, and, as long as the consent decree was formally observed, 
prison administration was delegated as well (Reiter, 2016). Much as with Tamms, legislators and 
even top corrections officials, let alone the media or the public, remained largely unaware of the 
experiences of men in Pelican Bay. The appearance of transparency, as with Brunelleschi’s 
device, is an illusion.   
Ever an opponent of illusion, Walter Benjamin identifies “art pour l’art” with fascism in 
his critique of the Italian Futurists (1935/1968, p. 242). Yet Theodor Adorno, with whom 
Benjamin was associated in the Frankfurt School, promoted throughout his career the 
unblemished immanent authenticity of “autonomy” as the only possible artistic ideal—linked 
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conceptually to Ruskin’s equation of aesthetics with truth. Art and politics are incongruent but 
inseparable, each embodying surface contradictions rather than depicting truth deep within: this 
truth of superficial incongruity, however clumsily or fleetingly, may be taken up as teachable 
knowledge. In The Truth in Painting (1978/1987), Jacques Derrida talks about the painter Paul 
Cézanne’s commitment to truth as a performative but impossible promise. 
Its performance does not promise, literally, to say, in the constative sense, but again to 
“do.” It promises another “performance”… with no descriptive or “constative” reference, 
the promise makes an event (it “does something” in uttering). (p. 3, sic) 
This is not exactly the same kind of self-fulfilling speech action referenced by Bourdieu 
(1982/1991, p. 42). What a piece of art offers to do is often merely to undo itself; to the extent it 
makes a statement, it challenges its universal applicability. Whether in schools, asylums, or 
prisons, architectural designations of absolute truth eventually unravel at the hands of 
institutional populations (both the watchers and the watched), despite the best efforts of 
administrative and instructional hierarchies. Through what medium can an artistic gesture 
confront an institution? 
Through the contingent, temporary events in which they manifest, artistic performances 
and revolutionary gestures can either underwrite or undermine statements of necessary and 
eternal law. “Let the dead bury their dead,” writes Karl Marx (1852/1978, p. 597), eulogizing in 
Biblical language the failure of the French Revolution as evidenced by Louis Bonaparte’s 
successful 1851 coup d’etat-- a newspaper-aided, anti-legislative counter-revolution of sorts. 
Borrowing Foucault’s (2004) description of the coup d’etat as a theatrical expression of artistic 
freedom (p. 265), Bonaparte’s ascension could be seen as a well-scripted play rather than a 
funeral. In contrast to this orderly scheme, Marx presents liberation as a reintroduction of chaos. 
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 Proletarian revolutions…. criticize themselves constantly, interrupt themselves 
continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order to 
begin it afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses, and 
paltrinesses of their first attempts, seem to throw down their adversary only in order that 
he might draw new strength from the earth and rise again, more gigantic before them, 
recoil ever and anon from the indefinite prodigiousness of their own aims, until the 
situation is created which makes all turning back impossible (.) (pp. 597-598) 
While Marx’s lament regarding Louis Bonaparte reads like a prophecy of the Trump election, a 
far more minor but equally lurid contemporary example of the blurry line between spectacle and 
crime is a stabbing that occurred in December 2015 at the Art Basel art fair in Miami, an act that 
many took to be an artistic performance—although, ironically, heightened security prompted by 
spectacular ISIS-linked attacks the previous month in Paris permitted a swift response (Rayne, 
2015). This absurd vignette is the stuff of both contemporary art and political intrigue—to 
misquote Marx, it simultaneously embodies both tragedy and farce.  
Before this, in October 2014, a politically-motivated incident of vandalism and assault 
took place at a Chelsea gallery showing photos documenting civil wars in Syria and Ukraine, 
which writer Ben Davis (2015) linked to a spurious Russian media attack on the same journalist 
the following year. And in December 2016, the Russian ambassador to Turkey was shot and 
killed at a photography exhibit in Ankara at which he had been scheduled to speak, by an off-
duty Turkish police officer who clearly intended to make a spectacle of the event (Arango and 
Gladstone, 2016). The symbolic value of material actions is the stuff of media-fueled political 
movements, from the American civil rights movement to ISIS. Rather than merely shrugging off 
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such events as reality-show slapstick, it is important to recognize that Marx’s solution lies not in 
quiet pedagogical dogma but in messy and energetic dispute. 
 At the level of the individual, the endless self-questioning Marx talks about was 
formulated abstractly in the one-sided dialectic of psychoanalysis. Derrida’s description of the 
performance that “makes an event” seems right in line with Jacques Lacan’s notion that, while 
the unconscious is structured like a language, it does not say anything; rather, it acts, and creates 
effects in the world. Interpretation is undertaken by the analyst, who uses dreams and fantasies to 
attempt to diagnose forms of maladjustment, and interrogation applies to the experience of the 
analysand, who must endlessly enact self-disclosure before a “subject supposed to know,” 
perhaps even forming an attachment to the analyst reminiscent of the so-called “Stockholm 
syndrome.” The analyst can offer a modicum of reflective insight, but, as with Reynolds, the 
breakthrough only comes (if it comes) with interpellation, with the analysand somehow 
recognizing themselves and ultimately rejecting the analyst, along with any external, superior 
source of knowledge. 
 Not in spite of but actually owing to his powerlessness, the analyst, like the teacher, 
embodies the reinforcement of order, ruling through moral rather than physical force. The critic, 
when opposed to the gallerist, the curator, and the collector, seems similarly weak and parasitic, 
and yet participates in the only discourse that offers the guarantee of an artwork’s enduring 
transcendent relevance. A public-interest litigator involved in criminal justice reform similarly 
must appeal to a higher principle of justice than that of simple incapacitation or retribution.  
Opposing this formal regime is a physical regime. The “law and order” projected on to 
the police represent original chaos, communal drives, inchoate historical tendencies that split 
rather than unify a community. The officer is a fetish object intended to cover an absence, a hope 
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that, for members of dominant groups, allows anxieties around entropy to be temporarily 
assuaged. For dominated groups, while there may be frequent crises that call for police services, 
no such mirage exists. Tragedy, as Nietzsche has it in The Birth of Tragedy (1872/1956), relies 
on reconciling Dionysian chaos and Appollonian order through checks and balances. Negotiating 
between a universal ideal and a material hierarchy are the artist and the legislator. They offer, 
like Brunelleschi’s viewfinder (but absolutely unlike a solitary cell), a vehicle for projecting 
oneself into the center of a stable symbolic and physical space. The recognition of historic and 
contemporary structures of power requires the de-centering of the frame. 
 
 
5.3  Excessive commitment 
 
Art historian Claire Bishop (2012) describes collaborations with science and industry 
undertaken by artists in the 1960s and 1970s. One British initiative, the Artists’ Placement Group 
(APG), put artists into positions in government agencies. Speaking of artist Ian Breakwell’s 1976 
residency with the Architects’ Division of the Mental Health Group of the Department of Health 
and Social Security, Bishop quotes the members of the Architects’ Division who, in opposition 
to their superiors, appreciated Breakwell’s consultations of mental health patients in regard to 
their conditions. “Ian has succeeded, from his point of view,” the Division said, “ in giving us a 
real and lasting image of the insanity surrounding insanity.” The documentation Breakwell 
collected led to “media coverage, public outcry, and a government enquiry” (p. 172). But Bishop 
notes slightly disparagingly that Stuart Brisley, another APG artist, lists an archiving 
collaboration in his exhibition record “as a ‘project,’ rather than a work of art.” Despite her 
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skepticism, Bishop grants APG credit for aiding in “rethinking the function of the exhibition 
from show-room to locus of debate” (p. 176). Precedents such as these26 support the legitimacy 
of Reynolds’ artwork, but still don’t tell us how to discuss them critically.  
In response to a question after a talk, Laurie Jo Reynolds described Tamms Year Ten as 
an artwork in these terms: 
The way that I think about the aesthetics of this project, and about legislative art, is that, 
although there are clearly art forms imbedded in it, like the photo project and the posters, 
and, you know, the conceptual stuff, like the Supermax Subscriptions… that I sort of like 
think of the whole thing as an autonomous system… that is what is art… it’s that entire 
commitment, that entire, kind of, obsession, that drive… everyone facing in the same 
direction… the form of attention that we pay to everything… The way this came about, 
and the way we were connected to each other,… like, all of the things that shaped us… 
all those things are the aesthetic.  And also, the way that we existed in the State House, 
and the way that we existed with legislators, is totally different from how advocates do 
that… We had practically taken thanking people to an art form… To me it’s sort of the 
system, you know, it’s the commitment… For me it would not have happened without… 
my interest in art and my exposure to art and without me being an artist it wouldn’t have 
happened otherwise… And interjecting this poetry into these cards, into these people’s 
lives, is an example… it was a very strategic campaign, and things are strategic, there’s 
cause and effect, but there’s also this sort of excess, also, that we brought to it… We were 																																																								
26 In a “litigious art” move, in 1977 APG’s co-founder, John Latham, “sent invoices for ‘services 




always working from a position of weakness, against this state power… but what we did, 
as the weak participant in the deal, really changed over the years. (2014b) 
This holistic description of the project seems to line up with Grant Kester’s (2011, 2013) views 
on artwork as a complex collaborative process unfolding over time, rather than a singular object 
or event with one distinct creator, sealed off from any supporting context. Based on projects such 
as Project Row Houses in Houston, a long-term effort led by Houston-based artist Rick Lowe to 
provide affordable housing and sustainable art venues in a traditionally African-American 
neighborhood in danger of gentrification, Kester’s view is that art should not be read as isolated, 
timeless “textual objects,” but understood through ethnography, the kind of in-depth description 
commonly practiced in cultural anthropology. 
It’s fitting then that Kester sent out graduate students in 2013 to do ethnographic 
documentation of TY10, and the Blade of Grass Foundation also was planning at that time to do 
ethnographic reporting on the group’s work. Kester is substantially correct, in that a longitudinal, 
conscientious, multidimensional, inclusive, and unsparing examination of an artwork’s context is 
enormously valuable, and can often be found lacking in art criticism and art history. It should 
also be acknowledged that the kind of patient investigative technique pioneered by ethnographers 
has changed the nature of journalism, and, while writings documenting brutality and injustice 
predate modern anthropology, ethnography has provided a model for uncovering, substantiating, 
and disseminating vital information, proving to be a tool that benefits marginal populations.  
Yet, skepticism should be held in reserve for the presumed authenticity and sensitivity of 
such an approach to art (Feiss, 2014; Sharpe, 2014). An ethnography is often thought of as an 
unproblematically “rich” first-person account of history, but it has roots in pre-colonial 
conceptualizations of unfamiliar peoples as monstrous (Miyashiro, 2006), which were of course 
		
252	
deployed in campaigns of persecution and colonial occupations. Practicing techniques that 
parallel the detailed espionage carried out in a police state (Borneman & Masco, 2015), 
ethnography has now become a handmaiden of business management and market research 
(McCuistion, 2008). Most significantly, the kind of ethnographic approach Kester champions is 
targeted avant la lettre by Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe (2000) as an erasure of art: “ 'Art after art' turns 
out to be a kind of social documentation, anthropological in content and form... What is new is 
that the ethical is now no longer a volition for art, but what one has instead of art" (p. 109). The 
very approach taken by critics such as Kester is leveraged by those who associate all political art 
with the kind of “ethical regime” Rancière (2004) traces back to Plato; these critics seek to 
dismiss all art that apparently jettisons aesthetic questions in favor of the kind of instrumental 
concerns that seem tailored to the interests of a philanthropic foundation, rather than any public 
seeking a pleasurable, exciting, or contemplative experience. This has been a thus-far unstated 
concern in my writing here: can politicized “art after art” be saved from a complete absorption 
by social science methodologies? 
If it can be, it cannot wash its hands of aesthetics and art history, but, in the spirit of 
legislative compromise, it will need to encounter and engage with dissimilar artifacts, against the 
background of a shared history that may have yet to be written. “(H)istory is inaccessible to us 
except in textual form,” says Frederic Jameson (1981), “(…) it can be approached only by way 
of prior (re)textualization” (p. 82).  While she started out her career focusing on public policy, 
Laurie Jo ended up pursuing her interest in art because, as she stated, “it’s the cultural narratives 
about people that were actually determining the policies” (2014b).  In qualitative narratives, like 
this one, interpretations should not be accepted as empirical observations. As Ruth Ronen (2014) 
says, speaking of Kafka’s “Before the Law” allegory in The Trial, “The law is what cannot be 
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narrated or represented in utterances that portray truthful or fictional states of affairs” (p. 10). 
The law is always in a state of limbo between competing interpretations. 
There is certainly a contested history of the fight against solitary in Illinois, but what I’ve 
learned provides an insight into what makes the Tamms Year Ten effort worthy of regard as an 
art project: its ability to shift between appearances by absorbing content without contradictions. 
Art and politics are both incompatible and inextricable; viewers project a core of truth 
retroactively from a perceptible surface of depiction: truth that is momentarily taken up as 
knowledge, while simultaneously witnessed as a fleeting hologram. For this one reason among 
others, one thing that Tamms Year Ten couldn’t be, despite its fierce ethical commitments, and 
the better judgment of trial lawyers, is thoroughly transparent.  
Art points outward, but also back at itself. Critic and curator Diedrich Diederichsen 
(2017) asserts that “art’s ability to remain inaccessible within a public arena is one of its 
fundamental prerogatives” (p. 210). Peter Goodrich (2009) analogously describes the core of 
legal philosopher K. N. Llewelyn’s search for a conceptual kernel of jurisprudential realism as a 
search for the “inarticulate” and the “unthought” (as cited on p. 215). Along these lines, the 
artistic object may be an advocacy campaign, as a creative medium, but it then must be 
simultaneously a reflection upon itself as a specific, embodied advocacy campaign, with a 
particular imaginative approach. As with Burke’s “sacred veil,” art like law retains, as Édouard 
Glissant rather legalistically puts it, “a right to opacity” (as cited in Diedrichsen 2017, p. 210).  
 Another way of stating this is that art and law intersect at this point of rumor and 
misdirection. In Human, All-Too-Human (1878/1986) (in which he also cites John Adams’ 
liberal chestnut on the “tyranny of the majority”). Nietzsche dismisses the idea of artistic genius, 
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saying that artistic accomplishment is the result of labor and not divine inspiration; we can recall 
Reynolds speaking of her archives as “boxes and boxes of labor.” “The work produces its full 
effect when it excites a belief,” Nietzsche contends, “… that the complete and perfect has 
suddenly emerged instantaneously.” His goal as a philosopher, he writes, “is to counter this 
illusion and to display the bad habits and false conclusions of the intellect by virtue of which it 
allows the artist to ensnare it” (p. 80). In this case, the interpreter opposes the artist, just as the 
litigator opposes the lobbyist. Understanding a law requires understanding not only who it affects 
and what needs it addresses, not only the words that were used in the text and how they were 
interpreted in different contexts, but what deals and favors were required, and what larger goals 
were served in bringing it about. In this respect, Kester is perfectly correct. When seeing a piece 
in a museum, or in a prominent collection, magazine, blog, or gallery, similar considerations 
need to be borne in mind.  
 What Kester might not attempt is to insert a political campaign into a mainstream art-
historical narrative. An intriguing contrast might be drawn between Laurie Jo Reynolds’ work 
and that of any number of more palatable and commercially successful aesthetic approaches—
but a worthwhile counterpoint should share some key features. During their long career, the 
Swiss duo of Peter Fischli and David Weiss did, tongues firmly in cheek, what Nietzsche 
imputes to the artist:27 creating images of reality as substitutes for reality. At their 2016 
Guggenheim retrospective, “How to Work Better,” the artists created a slide table of their 
postcard-esque photographs of banal nature scenes and notoriously overdocumented tourist sites 




replicating shabby studio ephemera from painted polyurethane foam (Polyurethane Objects, 
from 1982 onward). They made an enormous series of gestural unfired-clay tableaux 
fictionalizing historic moments (Suddenly this Overview, 1981/2006). Most memorably, they 
created a film documenting an absurdly long Rube Goldberg-esque series of chain reactions (The 
Way Things Go, 1987). This latter marvel of inanimate choreography has gained traction outside 
the art world; one YouTube clip from the film boasts almost 400,000 views. 
 This work has been frequently associated with Conceptual Art, although clearly not tied 
to Lucy Lippard’s “dematerialization.” Instead, the pair made playfully self-aware objects that, 
like much conceptualist art, did not mind making fun of itself, while baiting the audience in the 
process; perhaps it could be thought of as prop comedy as well as informational humor. Looking 
at this work through the notion of the balance of powers, however, it could be suggested that it 
plays the rule-based poetics of Conceptual Art pedagogy, the judge, against the material violence 
of the avant-garde executioner’s shocking gesture. This cancellation is provocative in the way it 
befuddles the highbrow connoisseur and the art skeptic in much the same way, by begging the 
question as to how the gestures of Fischli and Weiss, in their grandly mundane way, came to be 
recognized as art in the first place. Their craftsmanship and laborious repetition, as well as their 
winking irony, offer ready answers. But it should not be overlooked that, as conceptual artists, 
they merely upheld a conventional interpretation of the Duchampian precedent, under which all 
modern fine art is merely a sideshow to industrial production. The postwar Belgian poet and 
artist Marcel Broodthaers offered another take on Duchamp, saying that with Fountain Duchamp 
“aimed at destabilizing the power of juries and schools” (as cited in de Duve 2016, p. 35). 
Broodthaers likely meant schools of art and exhibition juries, but there’s no reason to not impute 
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a larger legal and educational scope for the monumental urinal, comparable to the scope of the 
Tamms lobbying campaign. 
 Along with Duchamp, Broodthaers also provides an illuminating shared reference point 
for Fischli and Weiss and for Reynolds. Broodthaers is often credited with introducing the idea 
of “institutional critique”: curated objects and spaces that take the space, history, and archival 
and social contents of the museum as subject matter. While he was hardly the first artist to 
address exhibition space as itself an element of an exhibition, Broodthaers, with his “museum 
fictions,” was fairly unique in the 1960s. Rather than using mass-culture appropriation to 
prosaically deflate the grandiose elitist aspirations of modernism, as Pop artists did in the U.S. 
and the U.K., or rejecting all forms of visual display outright, as the Situationists would do in 
Paris, he was known both for clinging to unfashionable imagery and for engaging head-on with 
the concept of an institution. In their multi-media approach to the understated and disposable, 
Fischli and Weiss clearly reference Broodthaers’ anachronistic, deskilled, and consciously 
insincere works of studied tediousness. Broodthaers’ paintings and sculptures combine letters 
and numbers with egg and mussel shells, and his slideshow-esque films feature static images and 
cryptic text. Reynolds, however, echoes Broodthaers more subtly and elliptically. By being a 
“counter-utopian,” as Trevor Stark calls Broodthaers (Borja-Villel 2016, p. 140), Reynolds 
skeptically but sincerely takes the institution on, with neither a bemused wink nor a pious scoff.  
Contradicting but also complicating Bruguera’s instrumentalism, Broodthaers says: 
“I choose to consider Art as a useless labor, apolitical and of little moral significance. Urged on 
by some base inspiration, I confess I would experience a kind of pleasure at being proved 
wrong” (1975/1987, p. 35). On the eve of a Broodthaers retrospective in New York, curator 
Manuel Borja-Villel comments: “For Broodthaers, the artist’s political commitment is nearly 
		
257	
always manifested in the space of the adversary” (Borja-Villel et al. 2016, p. 119). Borja-Villel 
also notes that Broodthaers’ renowned meta-curatorial gesture, the 1968-1972 Musée d’Art 
Moderne, Département des Aigles, appeared after the May 1968 uprising in Paris, in which 
Broodthaers had attempted to act as a political mediator for a group of artists “and had ended up 
rather disappointed by the reduction of the whole discussion to the artists’ demand to have their 
work shown in the galleries of the Palais (des Beaux-Arts)” (p. 120). Broodthaers said of the 
Département des Aigles: “It plays the role of, on the one hand, a political parody of art shows, 
and on the other hand an artistic parody of political events” (1972/2012, p. 354). This could 
describe, respectively, the campaign office that Reynolds deployed as an installation in the 
Sullivan Galleries, and the “I AM A MOM” march at AFSCME headquarters, which pointedly 
evoked the 1968 Memphis sanitation workers’ strike. Just as Broodthaers framed the framing 
device of the museum, Reynolds bitterly mocks the possibility of politically progressive dark 
humor, with her comedy shows about supermax prisons and sex offender registries.   
Also in the wake of 1968, Broodthaers both published and exhibited several “open 
letters” on behalf of his fictional institution, essentially poetic press releases for political sit-ins, 
and in 1969 he copied poetry by Mallarmé in chalk on three black shirts from the Dallas Police 
Department (Un coup de dés, ombre, voile). A fairly similar effort, the project my high school 
students did in collaboration with Tamms Year Ten, to alter prison jumpsuits with text and 
images in response to the perjury trial of Jon Burge, was proposed by Reynolds. Like Reynolds, 
as well as many avant-garde artists in Cold War police states in his time, Broodthaers recognized 
an important overlap between the aesthetics and politics of collective self-imaging, both on the 
part of artists and of the state. In his final interview in 1974, he stated: 
 To change concepts one will first have to acknowledge that the Plastic Arts in an 
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outdated linguistic framework serve only as a practice field for manoeuvres of a more 
military than scientific type. (as cited in Buchloh, 2016, p. 46) 
Broodthaers’ “manoeuvres” were perhaps military in the sense of being socially strategic—
which is to say political, in the intimate and practical sense crucial to the Tamms campaign.  
Rachel Haidu (2016) describes the parties Broodthaers would hold for his unconventional 
museum, at which collectors mingled with prominent critics and artists: “they stayed really late, 
and they drank a lot and they sat on crates and they smoked and talked and so on” (p. 149)—the 
kind of event that would become common in informal gallery settings over the ensuing decades. 
Reynolds could be said to have made this sort of self-promotional networking into an aesthetic 
project of lobbying legislators. Like Reynolds, Broodthaers came to art after having rejected the 
possibilities of poetry, presenting fifty volumes of his final book of poems encased in plaster 
(Pense-Bête, 1964). In Pense-Bête he writes something of a working definition of legislative art, 
albeit in an appropriately tongue-in-cheek tone:  
 Works of jurisprudence have often excited my imagination. Each word in them has its 
place, a very precise place. The ambiguities of law certainly derive from differing 
interpretations of the text, from the spirit and not from the letter. (1964/1987, p. 15) 
Both artists brought forth a creative gesture as a result of an impasse, a feeling of impotence.  
Broodthaers reconciled unconventional objects and unconventional gestures through the use of 
conventions, the sort of reconciliation that makes Reynolds’ work “legislative” outside of its 
literal content as lobbying. 
Benjamin Buchloh (1987) acknowledges Broodthaers’ sympathy for and affiliation with 
leftist groups and events throughout his career, while admitting that “Broodthaers seems to have 
distanced himself generally from all the progressive aspects of the modernist credo,” including 
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“those defining themselves through explicitly political definitions and events” (p. 69). 
Nonetheless, Duchamp’s and Broodthaers’ readymades stand for an uncanny and hardly 
apolitical overlap between institutional spaces and bodily detritus, as opposed to Fischli and 
Weiss’s charmed philosophical relics of curatorial ritual. Laurie Jo Reynolds’ gesture, while 
more politically proactive, is also more artistically reluctant than those of Fischli and Weiss, and 
her assumption of an art context is almost perfunctory—neither she nor other Tamms volunteers 
have been terribly interested in discussions of art. In its momentary instantiations, her work is 
sometimes uncomfortably funny, but can, like Broodthaers’, also be simply solemn, without any 
obvious nod at either comedy or tragedy. As with U.S. Senator Jesse Helms’ vitriolic screeds 
against Federally-funded art considered “obscene or indecent” (cited in Honan 1989, para. 1), 
Reynolds and Broodthaers keep one foot, like good legislators, in the iconoclastic realm of the 
philistine. 
Still, as she tells us, Reynolds views the entire project of Tamms Year Ten as the piece, 
not its individual artifacts. The piece is a legislative campaign that had a singular goal. As an art 
piece, it is a campaign to create an event, which came with the closure of Tamms. But every 
work of art is similarly a struggle—in the case of stars like Fischli and Weiss, we might say that 
they have also achieved the victory of visibility and art-world success. Both art and non-art 
audiences may remain confused or dubious about how Tamms Year Ten is then to be understood 
or validated as art, but, what it is, as art, is a largely unseen portrait of what organized groups can 






5.4  Checks and balances 
 
 In appreciating the implications of a supermax prison like Tamms as a supreme 
rationalization of punishment, and strategic resistance to that prison as a work of art, I am 
interested not only in the intersections between different branches of the government, in how 
they supposedly restrict and reinforce each other, but also in the plenitude of incompatibility and 
contradiction embedded in between functions. “(T)he conception of the separation of powers,” 
claims Theodor Adorno (1969/1998), “…has its lifeblood in critique” (p. 283). The Tamms Year 
Ten campaign made use of legislative lobbying, but litigation and administrative and executive 
influence were also part of the effort to close Tamms. And it wasn’t a simple cooperative effort, 
where advocates collaborated unproblematically with lawyers, representatives, and officials. As 
I’ve described, there were also tensions and competing agendas.  
In terms of the tension between branches of government, the 2012 legislative session was 
probably the most vivid example. The governor closed the prison with a line-item veto, rejecting 
an item in the legislature’s proposed budget. The legislature stalled on closing Tamms and nearly 
overturned Quinn’s veto, and, in the meantime, the prison guards’ union went through the courts 
to attempt to keep the prison open. In fact, the very creation of the American supermax can be 
read through inter-branch conflicts (Reiter, 2016), as well as the more general return of 
retribution in place of rehabilitation (Garland, 2001). The movement away from indeterminate 
sentencing, which was in large part a result of litigation (along with administrators like David 
Fogel), represented a temporary assertion of legislative and judicial oversight over the decisions 
of prison officials, once fully determinate sentencing guidelines started being introduced, 
eventually including mandatory minimums such as “three strikes” laws. And yet the creation of 
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elaborate segregation units, prisons within prisons, both resulted from and expanded the 
restoration of executive discretion—both for prison administrators and for prosecutors, two of 
the primary architects of mass incarceration. 
Throughout this text, I’ve also tried to suggest that teaching, artmaking, and policing 
infiltrate one another. This principle manifests in figures such as the critic, the spy, and, indeed, 
the prosecutor—not to mention legislative lobbyists for prison guards. The experience of the art 
teacher provides one example of how all three forms of power (however constrained) intersect in 
one occupation. While the desire to have students express themselves can be at odds with 
classroom safety, the tension between teaching and making is no less pronounced. Even without 
invoking threats of punishment, the pressure on students to self-differentiate while conforming to 
institutional parameters and models for expression, while publicly struggling with media that 
they may be encountering for the first time, can create a challenging environment for both 
teachers and students. Beyond such discomfort, however, pedagogical, expressive, and security 
concerns can all be in open conflict. 
 As discussed earlier, the professions of teaching and law are generally despised—and of 
course plenty of people hate critics. The regimes of oversight that teachers endure in the U.S., 
due to their relative lack of autonomy, is one example of how administrators and lawmakers have 
leveraged this distaste into power. Tort reform, rules against frivolous lawsuits, are an example 
in which lawmakers and administrators have benefitted at the expense of lawyers. But teachers, 
lawyers, and critics can and do push back, albeit with far less leverage. But lawmakers and 
administrators can be relied upon to attack each other. While the ability of administrators or 
police officers to act unilaterally and to use violence discretionarily has been discussed, it should 
also be recognized that distaste for tyranny, bureaucracy, and legislative corruption and gridlock 
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are routinely used as talking points in displays of executive and legislative rhetorical art. Such 
dynamics can also be seen outside of governmental contexts, in conflicts and contradictions 
between religion, culture, and commerce.  
During the ratification debates over the U.S. Constitution in the 1780s, the Federalists’ 
judicial push for a universal legal apparatus struggled against the Anti-Federalists’ desire for 
spheres of local executive autonomy. The push for legislative mediation was less an explicit 
position than a means for sublimating the conflict between federal centralization and states’ 
rights, such that the latter was able to maintain its practical supremacy under the dubious formal 
aegis of federal regulation (Whittington, 2003; Gerstle, 2015). Just as this dialectic requires a 
third term, in the legislature, so does the “trialectic” I’m insisting upon require a fourth. The 
news media has often been cited as filling this unelected, non-accountable role, and, as 
commented upon by Max Weber (1919/1946) among others, this phantom Ministry of 
Information certainly can be regarded as accountable for highlighting any and every issue that is 
ever seen as relevant to the work of governing at a given time. It is clear that, for Tamms Year 
Ten, a proper appreciation of the role of media, in terms of garnering volunteers, political allies, 
and funding, drove the production of performances and visual works, and thus is fundamental to 
considering the project, in its widest definition, as an artwork. 
Once we at least hypothetically consider a government with four branches, a fifth column 
is perhaps inevitably bound to emerge. If I were to speculate on what this would be in the U.S., 
it’s a factor that I have attempted to underscore throughout, which is the drama of hierarchical 
racial conflict. This is not to discount class or gender identity, nor any other categories 
designating axes of struggle, but Brunelleschi’s viewing apparatus should be remembered here. 
Every vanishing point lies on a horizon. The very possibility of apparently free and endless 
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fertile land and agricultural prosperity that defines America’s endless utopian promise should be 
seen as a horizon that hides colonized people, like the painting that partially hides the true church 
interior when viewed in Brunelleschi’s mirror. As I suggested in the introduction, the aesthetics 
of race are in one sense pathetically simple—a totalizing visual system that simultaneously 
assigns power and beauty. But simplicity doesn’t imply either weakness or inevitabilty. The 
actions of the other four branches can, at least in theory, validate or override this aesthetic 
agenda. While the fundamental role of this division makes it extremely difficult to even begin to 
substantively discuss, I would suggest that addressing it should actually be the long-term goal of 
any legislative artwork, both in and beyond the U.S. And yet Hegel reminds us that “the actual 
world of justice and ethical life (is) understood through thoughts; through thoughts they are 
invested with a rational form… This form is law(.)” (1821/1974, p. 259). Thus, along with 
endemic issues of residential segregation and unequal public services, it shouldn’t be forgotten 
that, as one example, Illinois still faces the possibility of a new Federal supermax prison at 
Thomson (Stahl 2015). Illinois U.S. Senator Richard Durbin, who held Congressional hearings in 
2012 to address solitary confinement practices, helped to sell the prospective supermax site to 
the federal government (Ridgeway and Casella, 2013). 
And yet, why should anyone be interested in opposing this prison, if they or their friends 
or family members are in no danger of being sent there? The prison would be opposed, as prisons 
in the past have been, by activists who have chosen to pursue the decarceration issue, perhaps for 
personal reasons but perhaps for moral or religious reasons, and there will certainly be family 
and friends ready to fight. The terror, confusion, and euphoria of battle are made subservient to 
these noble, indissoluble, and ideological urges toward martyrdom and militancy. Essentially this 
fantasy puts the force of the Real, of the executioner or police officer, at the service of the 
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teacher or judge, which works better in theory than in practice. What does suffering have to do 
with justice, after all? The history of art, visual and otherwise, offers a wide catalogue of 
alternative options, and so it makes sense to find solutions through legislative mediation—and 
for there to be a political movement, aesthetics are necessary. 
In 1999 Rosalind Krauss lamented a “post-medium condition,” in which conceptual art 
had lapsed into consumer-friendly installation art that evinced nostalgia for politicized postwar 
avant-gardes such as Situationism, institutional critique, and Fluxus; blame for this state of 
affairs was placed squarely at the feet of Marcel Broodthaers. Laurie Jo Reynolds and Fischli and 
Weiss stand as opposed representatives of the Broodthaers tradition, suggesting both the limits 
and possibilities of legislative art. Krauss’s complaint seems like an extension into art itself of 
her earlier statement on the “expanded field,” in which she compares critics anxiously trying to 
expand the definition of sculpture through citations of precedent to lawyers before a court (1983, 
p. 33). But art criticism truly can stand as a sort of legal argument, just as a legal argument can 
be a type of criticism. And what this text has sought to argue, however elliptically, is that, just as 
art can be a form of lobbying for itself, albeit often in the non-democratic context of an exclusive 
cultural cabal, it follows that lobbying qua lobbying can be art. As Broodthaers said, “Since 
Duchamp, the artist is the author of a definition” (as cited in de Duve 2016, p. 34) 
Yet, in seeking to provide an explanatory background for Tamms Year Ten and 
Reynolds’ other work, despite a blizzard of citations, I have said nothing that necessarily 
validates my meandering account as art criticism, political theory, or anything else with a 
pedigree. In Museum Without Walls, his critique of the course art history since photography, 
André Malraux’s bitter tongue-in-cheek skepticism toward grandiose syncretic scholarship like 
mine is unmistakable.  
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Nothing conveys more vividly and compellingly the notion of a destiny shaping human 
ends than do the great styles, whose evolutions and transformations seem like long scars 
that Fate has left, in passing, on the face of the earth. (1967, p. 46) 
I haven’t tried to claim, however, that any of my juxtapositions here are more than suggestive. 
The job descriptions of artists, teachers, and police officers remain in most practical ways 
distinct from one another, as well as from those of judges, legislators, and administrative 
officials. Still, I make no claim to be practical, but to be meaningful. If art truly has no political 
education function, and prisons truly have no aesthetic or pedagogical dimensions, and 
classrooms truly have no political or artistic potential, my analogies are unhelpful. However, if 
under our liberal regime of social organization the line between these arenas is in some cases not 
merely blurry but nonexistent, there are good reasons to find new ways to discuss all three. I 
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